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Abstract  
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate, theoretically and empirically, the impacts 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the host labour market. Specific objectives focus on 
exploring the role of FDI firms in determining wages and the employment of female workers 
(hereafter referred to as female employment) by domestic firms, using the empirical case of 
the services sector in Vietnam. While the literature suggests that foreign firms, especially 
large multinationals, tend to pay higher and employ women more intensively than local 
firms, there is scant evidence on whether and how FDI firms can influence domestic firms’ 
wages and gendered employment, notably in the context of service industries. This thesis 
contributes to filling these knowledge gaps from both theoretical and empirical grounds.   
To realise the research objectives, I constructed two theoretical models to illustrate how 
the presence of FDI firms can be a determinant of local firms’ pay and employment 
decisions. The first model shows that foreign presence can influence the expected average 
wage of domestic firms (causing so-called ‘wage spillovers’) through two contrasting 
channels, namely productivity spillovers and cut-off capability. The second model shows 
that FDI firms can affect domestic firms’ female employment (measured by female-to-male 
labour ratio), directly via augmented female productivity spillovers and indirectly via the 
cut-off effect. The ultimate impact of foreign presence on wage and female employment 
depend on the relative strength of the two channels. 
Guided by the theoretical frameworks, I then specified two econometric models to 
empirically test and estimate the impacts of FDI firms on average wage and female employment 
of domestic counterparts. The empirical analyses utilise rich panel datasets of firms in Vietnam’s 
services sector over the five-year period 2009-2013, which were extracted from the enterprise 
survey database of the General Statistics Office (GSO). In the specified models, foreign presence 
is the variable of interest and measured by the employment share of FDI firms in an industry, 
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region and year. To address the potential endogeneity problem, I utilised the Generalised Method 
of Moments with Instrumental Variable (IV-GMM) estimation technique. Of this method, I 
adopted a novel approach to constructing IVs, which capitalises on the geographical and industry 
segmentation of the local labour market. In the estimation procedure, I conducted a number of 
diagnostic checking, including the endogeneity test, underidentification and overidentification 
tests (for the relevance and validity of selected instruments), and accounted for multicollinearity, 
autocorrelation, and heteroskedasticy problems.          
The estimation results indicate that FDI firms exert positive and statistically significant 
impacts on the pay level and female employment of domestic firms in Vietnam’s services 
sector. Specifically, a one per cent increase in foreign presence induces local firms to raise 
their real wage and female-to-male labour ratio by 1.15 per cent and 2.18 per cent on average, 
respectively. The findings also suggest that higher paying firms tend to be larger, state 
owned, more capital intensive, and well established. Additionally, smaller, privately owned, 
less labour-intensive firms are more likely to hire women at a higher rate.  
To provide deeper insights into the heterogeneity of FDI-linked impacts, I extended the 
analysis by examining different layers of disaggregation. Notably, at the two-digit Vietnam SIC 
level, the scatterplots of the data and the estimation results reveal divergent effects of foreign 
presence on domestic firms’ wages (positive in the high-wage group and negative in the low-
wage group), and female employment (positive in the male-intensive group and insignificant in 
the female-intensive group). Likewise, additional investigations at the three-digit level show 
heterogeneous FDI impacts, depending on specific characteristics of domestic and foreign firms. 
While the existence of positive FDI impacts at the overall sector level may imply services FDI 
attraction as a viable strategy to improve local wages and promote female employment 
opportunities, the findings of heterogeneous effects warrant a more cautious and selective 
approach to be adopted by local firms, workers and governments in policy and decision formulation.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and significance  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been considered a key driving force for economic 
growth and development in many host countries, particularly in the developing world. 
According to World Investment Reports (UNCTAD, 2018c, 2019), FDI inflows now 
account for about 40 per cent of external finance to developing and transition economies. 
The presence of foreign firms can exert considerable impacts on recipient economies, 
including labour markets. Policymakers generally expect FDI inflows to generate significant 
employment, enhance labour productivity and improve wages/income for the local 
workforce (Arnal & Hijzen, 2008). These widespread expectations partially explain strong 
incentives and fierce competition among host governments in attracting foreign firms. Given 
the increasing importance of FDI, further research on FDI impacts on the host labour market 
is of great significance from both analytical and policy perspectives. Furthermore, FDI in the 
services sector has rapidly increased and accounted for a dominant share of global FDI, 
implying growing relevance of research devoted to the role of foreign presence in this sector.  
The existing literature of FDI impacts on labour markets in recipient economies can be 
categorised into three main strands. The first strand of research examines the relationship 
between FDI and wages. Of this literature, a substantial body concentrates on wage gaps 
between foreign and domestic firms. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that foreign firms 
pay higher wages than domestic counterparts (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, & Wright, 2002; 
Görg, Strobl, & Walsh, 2007). Nevertheless, the overall impact of FDI on local wages can 
be subject to endogeneity problems. Foreign firms may select highly qualified employees, 
acquire high-wage domestic firms, and operate in high-wage industries or high-wage regions 
(Balsvik & Haller, 2010).  
2 
 
The second strand focuses on the employment effect of FDI. Foreign entry can shift up 
labour demand, directly creating new job opportunities for local workers (Axarloglou & 
Pournarakis, 2007). Moreover, foreign firms can generate indirect jobs by facilitating 
industrial contacts when buying inputs from domestic firms (backward linkages) or 
supplying inputs to domestic firms (forward linkages). In some cases, foreign firms can exert 
adverse effects on labour demand directly by divestment and closure of production facilities, 
and indirectly by increased competitive pressure in the local product market (Coniglio, Prota, 
& Seric, 2015; Moosa, 2002).   
The third strand of research emphasises the role of FDI in enhancing human capital 
accumulation and labour productivity of the local workforce. The entry of foreign firms 
involves the transfer of assets through on-the-job training provided to local workers (Aitken, 
Harrison, & Lipsey, 1996; Kim, 2015). If local employees successfully absorb these 
productive assets, FDI can directly contribute to human capital accumulation. More 
importantly, foreign presence can affect the labour productivity of domestic firms, causing 
productivity spillovers (Anwar & Nguyen, 2010; Javorcik, 2004; Newman, Rand, Talbot, & 
Tarp, 2015; Sun, 2011). Empirical evidence on FDI-induced productivity spillovers is 
substantial but far from unanimous for both developed and developing countries (see for 
example Gorg and Strobl (2001); Görg and Greenaway (2004); Wooster and Diebel (2010); 
and Iršová and Havránek (2013)).  
By comprehensively reviewing three major research strands on FDI and host labour 
markets, I identified four significant knowledge gaps that this thesis attempts to address in 
order to extend the existing literature as follows.  
First, modest attention has so far been given to exploring the impact of FDI inflows on 
domestic firms’ wages, namely wage spillovers. This is in contrast to substantial evidence 
on FDI and wage gaps, revealing the existence of a foreign wage premium, which 
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unambiguously benefits local workers in foreign firms. Exploring wage spillover effects will 
develop deeper insights and shed light on whether workers in domestic firms (accounting 
for an overwhelming proportion of the local workforce) can be better-off or worse-off from 
the presence of FDI firms. Addressing this research gap is of analytical and policy 
significance as the findings can carry far-reaching implications on a major share of the local 
workforce (i.e., workers in domestic firms). 
Second, examining FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment remains a 
striking gap in the existing literature. On the contrary, the finding of higher female 
representation within foreign firms (compared to domestic counterparts) is relatively well 
documented within the FDI-gendered employment research. In fact, while previous studies 
mostly analyse the FDI employment effect on the overall host labour market with a particular 
focus on the internalised effect on FDI firms’ employment changes, scant evidence exists 
for the influence of FDI firms on domestic firms’ female employment via spillover effects. 
Filling this research gap can have deeper implications for the host labour market to close 
gender gaps in employment and boost the long-term productivity of the workforce at large. 
This research area is essential from both academic and policy perspectives given the 
increased FDI inflows globally and persistent gender inequalities in labour markets, notably 
in labour-abundant developing economies. 
Third, while productivity spillovers from FDI are exhaustively investigated, other 
related types of FDI-generated spillovers, such as those on domestic firms’ wages or female 
employment, have received far less attention. Foreign firms with superior tangible and 
intangible assets can significantly enhance the labour productivity of the local workforce 
directly via on-the-job training and indirectly via spillovers. Arguably, foreign ownership 
advantages and their associated productivity spillovers can exert far-reaching impacts on 
other aspects of the host labour market such as wages and gendered employment. Therefore, 
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exploring new forms of spillovers from FDI, theoretically and empirically, can add 
significant insights by shedding light on the complex ways through which FDI firms affect 
workers, firms, and industries of host economies.     
Fourth, evidence on all three strands of labour-market impacts of FDI is notably scarce 
on firms and/or industries within the services sector. By contrast, the existing literature 
exhibits an overwhelming focus on firms and/or industries within the traditional 
manufacturing sector. In reality, however, services have become the largest and fastest 
growing sector. An increasingly dominant share of global FDI flows is within the services 
sector. Therefore, the rising prominence of services FDI demonstrates the great relevance of 
narrowing the substantial research gap on the potential impacts of services FDI on host 
economies, including the labour market.    
This thesis aims to fill the above-mentioned research gaps by investigating the impacts 
of FDI inflows on domestic firms’ wages and female employment in the services sector in 
Vietnam. The research contributes to existing FDI literature from both theoretical and 
empirical aspects. Notably, theoretical models are constructed to demonstrate different 
channels through which FDI firms can influence domestic firms’ average wages and female 
employment, resulting in spillover effects. Furthermore, significant empirical evidence is 
provided by specifying and estimating econometric models, using rich firm-level panel 
datasets of the services sector in Vietnam over the period 2009-2013.  
Vietnam represents a relevant and stimulating setting for this research. The compelling 
success story of this emerging Southeast Asian economy has been well circulated across 
various regional and global agendas. Since the Doi Moi (renovation) reform launched in 
1986, Vietnam has radically transformed from a war-torn country to be one of the world’s 
fastest growing and most dynamic economies with an average GDP growth rate of 6.4 per 
cent per annum during the 2000s (WB, 2017b). Notably, it has experienced a dramatic surge 
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in inward FDI since the early 1990s, ranked the 6th FDI priority location globally between 
2007 and 2009 (UNCTAD, 2010). Furthermore, as the world’s 14th most populated country, 
Vietnam is characterised by a large labour force of nearly 60 million people, low wages and 
persistent gender gaps, notably in the labour market (WB, 2017a; WEF, 2017a).1 
Additionally, empirical evidence for the case of Vietnam’s services sector is also valuable 
given the scant literature on these research areas devoted to this transition economy. 
Therefore, Vietnam provides a highly suitable and interesting case for examining FDI 
impacts on the labour market, especially from income and gender perspectives.   
1.2 Aims and objectives 
The central aim of this thesis is to examine, theoretically and empirically, the impacts 
of FDI on the host labour market in the services sector. To achieve this overall aim, four 
specific objectives are established as follows:    
(i) To build a theoretical model to explain the channels via which FDI firms affect wages 
of domestic firms; 
(ii) To explore empirically the impact of FDI inflows on wages of domestic firms in the 
services sector, using the case of Vietnam with a firm-level panel dataset from 2009 
to 2013; 
(iii) To build a theoretical model to explain the channels via which FDI firms affect 
female employment of domestic firms; 
(iv) To explore empirically the impact of FDI inflows on female employment of domestic 
firms in the services sector, using the case of Vietnam with a firm-level panel dataset 
from 2009 to 2013.   
 
1 Readers can refer to Global Gender Gap Reports (WEF, 2014; 2017a) for additional data on various 
aspects of gender inequality in Vietnam. For more detailed discussions on corporate/social culture and other 
institutional factors related to gender discrimination and inequality in Vietnam, see for example Liu (2004); 
T.-H. Pham and Reilly (2007); Son (2011); Lam and Laura (2016); T. Q. T. Nguyen and Simkin (2017); T. 
Pham and Talavera (2018).   
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1.3 Methodology  
To achieve the stated research aim and objectives, the thesis adopts rigorous theoretical 
and empirical strategies, which essentially engage a three-stage process.  
Of these, the first stage entails the modelling of the impacts of FDI presence on the local 
labour market. Notably, theoretical models are established to describe various spillover 
channels via which foreign firms can influence average wage levels and female employment 
by domestic firms in the host economy.  
The second stage, guided by theoretical setups, focuses on the detailed specification of 
econometric models, which comprise a vector of explanatory variables, particularly foreign 
presence (FDI) as a proxy capturing potential effect of foreign firms. To take into account 
possible endogeneity bias of the central variable (FDI), the thesis employs the feasible two-
step generalised method of moments with excluded instrumental variables (IV-GMM) 
estimator, where I utilised a novel approach to construct IVs. Besides, a number of diagnostic 
tests are performed to examine the reliability of the specified models and the estimation 
techniques, which also allows verifying the validity, prediction and generalisation power of 
the results.  
Finally, the third stage features the empirical testing and estimation of hypothesised 
FDI-linked effects, utilising datasets of firms in Vietnam’s services sector. At this stage, 
empirical investigation is further extended to shed light on the heterogeneity of FDI 
spillovers for subsets of the data based on firm and industry specific characteristics. The 
empirical findings give significant implications for local workforce, firms and policymakers 
regarding the presence of FDI firms and local labour market.  
1.4 Data  
In this thesis, the empirical analyses utilise rich firm-level panel datasets for the services 
sector in Vietnam over the five-year period 2009-2013. The data were obtained from 
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comprehensive Enterprise Surveys database of Vietnam General Statistics Office (GSO). Of 
which, GSO adopts two methods of direct and indirect data gathering for all business entities 
in the economy. Given the research scope of the thesis focusing on firms in the services 
sector, the enterprise data source by GSO is more suitable than that of the World Bank, which 
consists of a representative sample of private firms largely in the manufacturing sector.  
Since enterprise surveys contain extensively raw data, it is critical to conduct thorough 
data screening and cleaning procedure to ensure the reliability and usability of final datasets. 
This process includes checking raw data and recoding firms that fall into the research scope; 
recoding and constructing variables; inspecting data for errors and outliers; constructing 
panel datasets. For data management and analyses, the thesis employs the statistical software 
Stata 14, which is a preferred analytical tool in economics and econometrics research. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Following the first chapter of introducing the thesis, Chapter 2 provides background 
knowledge on FDI and the services sector, both globally and in Vietnam, to highlight the 
relevance and significance of exploring this area of research. Next, Chapter 3 gives a 
comprehensive review of the existing literature on the impacts of FDI on the host labour 
market, focusing on three main strands of FDI influences on wages, employment and labour 
productivity. Chapter 4 describes the research methodology (including both theoretical and 
empirical strategies) and data used in the thesis. Chapters 5 and 6 present the empirical 
results and relevant analyses regarding the impacts of FDI presence on domestic firms’ 
wages and female employment for the case of Vietnam’s services sector over the study 
period. Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising key findings, describing major 
implications for local workforce, firms and policymakers, as well as acknowledging the 
thesis’s limitations and pointing out the directions for future research.     
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Chapter 2: An Overview of FDI in the Services Sector 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the background knowledge on FDI and the services sector, both 
globally and in Vietnam, to highlight the relevance and significance of examining the 
research area of interest. It comprises three parts. Section 2.2 describes the conceptual 
background of FDI and services. A number of definitions and approaches to categorising 
these two key concepts are explained. Section 2.3 gives an overview of services and FDI 
from a global perspective. It illustrates the growing importance of the tertiary sector from 
various respects, including total output, employment, female employment and international 
trade. Furthermore, there has been a remarkable shift of global FDI from manufacturing 
towards services with services FDI reaching about two-thirds of total inward FDI stocks.  
Section 2.4 provides an overview of services and FDI in Vietnamese economy. In 
Vietnam’s economic development, services have played an increasingly significant role, 
being the most important contributor to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the second 
largest sector in providing jobs. Notably, services have shown important but fluctuating 
patterns in terms of FDI inflows to Vietnam. This section also identifies major strengths and 
constraints of Vietnam in attracting FDI inflows to the services sector. Lastly, Section 2.5 
summarises the chapter.  
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2.2 Conceptual background 
2.2.1 Conceptual background of FDI 
In the international investment literature, FDI has become a widely recognised 
terminology. According to United Nations’ 1999 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 
1999), FDI is ‘an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting 
interest and control of a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent 
enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct 
investor (FDI enterprise, affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate)’. The International Monetary 
Fund’s Balance of Payments Manual defines FDI as ‘an investment that is made to acquire 
a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the 
investor’s purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise’.  
Similarly, OECD’s Benchmark Definition (1996) refers to FDI ‘as cross-border 
investment by a resident entity in one economy with the objective of obtaining a lasting 
interest in an enterprise resident in another economy. The lasting interest implies the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a 
significant degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the enterprise’. 
Moosa (2002) defines FDI as ‘the process whereby residents of one country (the source 
country) acquire ownership of assets for the purpose of controlling the production, 
distribution and other activities of a firm in another country (the host country)’.  
The above definitions of FDI share one common feature, namely the long-term control 
of a foreign investor over the management of a firm in another country. This is the most 
important characteristic to distinguish FDI from foreign portfolio investment (FPI), which 
involves short-term and passive investment in financial assets (e.g., stocks and bonds) 
overseas without seeking management. The element of control offers foreign direct investors 
an informational advantage over foreign portfolio investors and domestic savers (Razin, 
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Sadka, & Yuen, 1999). Generally, a minimum of 10 per cent shareholding is the basic 
threshold for an investment project to be regarded as FDI. Nonetheless, in some cases, a 
foreign investor owning less than 10 per cent might exert significant influence on the firm 
management. Hence, Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2014) suggest that other factors should 
also be taken into consideration, including representation in the board of directors, 
participation in policy-making processes, interchange of managerial personnel, access to 
technical information, and provision of long-term loans at lower than market rates.  
To categorise FDI, a widely adopted approach is basing on types of activity conducted 
by a foreign investor (Caves, 1971; Chaudhuri & Mukhopadhyay, 2014; Moosa, 2002). 
Accordingly, FDI can be classified into three groups: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate 
FDI. Of these, horizontal FDI refers to investment made to expand the production abroad in 
an industry or business activity similar to the one undertaken in the home country. The 
underlying motives include accessing the local market, the exploitation of monopolistic or 
oligopolistic advantages (e.g., patents), and avoidance of trade costs (e.g., transportation, 
tariffs). Meanwhile, vertical FDI involves investment in a downstream (backward) or 
upstream (forward) industries as compared to the one operated in the source country. 
Notably, exploiting raw materials and cheap labour usually stimulates vertical FDI projects. 
Finally, conglomerate FDI engages new activities that neither replicate nor vertically relate 
to the existing ones in the home country. Due to the lack of prior experience, FDI projects 
of this type usually take the entry mode of joint ventures with foreign or domestic firms 
already operating in the industry.   
On the basis of investment objectives, FDI is divided into: resource-seeking, market-
seeking, and efficiency-seeking (Behrman, 1974; Dunning, 1993; Zaheer & Manrakhan, 
2001). First, resource-seeking FDI is undertaken for accessing and securing the host 
country’s resources (e.g., minerals, labour), which are of greater abundance and/or lower 
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costs than those in the home country. This form of investment is related to vertical FDI 
projects, particularly in manufacturing industries intensively using raw materials as 
intermediary inputs. Second, market-seeking FDI, closely linked to horizontal FDI, aims at 
serving overseas markets by producing and distributing to local consumers, rather than 
exporting from the home country. This type of FDI is typically essential to firms in service 
industries due to the low tradability of most services. Third, efficiency-seeking FDI is 
usually adopted by multinational enterprises (MNEs) as a strategy to spread value-adding 
activities globally to achieve efficient resource allocation. This type of investment provides 
MNEs with not only market access but also geographical diversification, economies of 
scope, and international sourcing of inputs.   
Several other approaches to FDI typology have also been identified in the literature and 
statistics on international investment. For instance, based on the direction of investment 
flows, FDI is distinguished between inward and outward investment. On the basis of entry 
modes, FDI consists of three major groups, namely greenfield investment, joint venture, 
mergers and acquisitions. From the viewpoint of host governments, FDI is categorised into 
three types: import-substitution, export-increasing, and government-initiated FDI.    
2.2.2 Conceptual background of services 
From a macro perspective, services are referred to as the ‘tertiary’ sector, one of the 
three sectors in an economy  (J. M. Clark, 1940; A. G. Fisher, 1935; J Fourastié, 1954). It 
comprises a diverse array of industries that provide intangible products, including 
telecommunication, transportation, tourism, finance, banking, insurance, wholesale, retail, 
and so on. Services represent a dominant component in developed and industrialised 
economies. Meanwhile, the ‘primary’ sector involves the extraction of raw materials and 
consists of such activities as agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining. This sector constitutes 
the largest segment in less developed economies. Finally, the ‘secondary’ sector, also known 
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as manufacturing or production sector, is comprised of activities that transform raw materials 
into final or semi-final goods. Most industries in this sector are increasingly mechanical 
engineering, for example electronics, garment, textile, and food processing. As an economy 
becomes more developed, the portion of the primary and secondary sectors decreases while 
that of the tertiary/services sector increases.    
From a micro perspective, services can be defined as heterogeneous outputs produced 
to order and which cannot be traded separately from their production (OECD, 2005). 
Typically, the production of services must be confined to activities that are capable of being 
carried out by one unit (i.e., producer) for the benefit of another (i.e., consumer). According 
to Haksever and Render (2013), services are economic activities that produce time (as a 
saving for customers), place, form, or psychological utilities. They can be acts, deeds, or 
performances that are largely intangible in nature. Similarly, the Australian Services 
Roundtable (ASR, 2006) defines services as activities delivering help, utility or care, an 
experience, information or other intellectual content, of which the value is mostly intangible 
rather than residing in any physical product.  
The services literature has identified four distinctive features that differentiate services 
from manufactured goods (Edgett & Parkinson, 1993; Moeller, 2010; Zeithaml, 
Parasuraman, & Berry, 1985). They are called IHIP characteristics (i.e., intangibility, 
heterogeneity, inseparability, and perishability). First, intangibility denotes the fundamental 
nature that services do not have a physical existence, hence cannot be touched, held, tasted 
or smelt. Second, services are highly heterogeneous and thus hardly standardised since they 
involve human interactions and service quality can vary greatly, depending on providers’ 
performance and customers’ perception. Third, the characteristics of inseparability 
emphasises the simultaneity of service provision and consumption, that is, services can be 
consumed only when they are produced. Fourth, perishability refers to the fact that services 
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cannot be stored or saved for later sale or use, thus once purchased the service is completely 
consumed and cannot be delivered to another customer. 
As services can be defined from different perspectives, they can also be categorised by 
several approaches. Of these, Katouzian (1970) divides service activities into three types, 
based on the relation with other economic sectors. First, new services refer to emerging 
activities in terms of income and time, including such industries as education, entertainment, 
hotels and restaurants. Second, complementary services (e.g., finance, banking and 
transportation) facilitate the production of the secondary/manufacturing sector. Third, old 
services include activities prevalent in the pre-industrial period, notably domestic services.  
Another approach to services typology was adopted by Browning and Singelmann 
(1978). Accordingly, services are distinguished by four major types, depending on the nature 
and recipient of services. First, the distributive services (e.g., communication, transportation, 
retail trade) involve the distribution of goods, information and passenger transport. Second, 
producer services (e.g., banking, legal, real estate, professional) serve as intermediate inputs 
in the production process of manufacturing industries. Third, social services (e.g., medical, 
education, government, religion) are mainly non-market activities that governments and 
non-profit organisations provide to the wider population. Fourth, personal services (e.g., 
domestic servants, hotels, restaurants, entertainment) are mostly consumed by individual 
customers.  
While scholars can literally propose various ways to categorise services, the 
International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) has been a widely adopted 
reference to report and classify service (and other major) activities in accounts and statistics 
of almost all countries. The United Nations (2017) developed the ISIC initially in 1948 and 
published revisions in 1958, 1968, 1989, 2002, and 2007. According to the latest revision, 
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services comprise 15 major groups of activities ranging from Section G to Section U as listed 
in Table 2.1 below:  
Table 2.1: ISIC classification of services 
Code                                                       Industry 
G -      Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
H -      Transportation and storage 
I -        Accommodation and food service activities 
J -        Information and communication 
K -       Financial and insurance activities 
L -       Real estate activities 
M -      Professional, scientific and technical activities 
N -      Administrative and support service activities 
O -      Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
P -       Education 
Q -      Human health and social work activities 
R -      Arts, entertainment and recreation 
S -      Other service activities 
T -      Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-
producing activities of households for own use 
U -     Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 
Source: United Nations (2017) 
The above-tabulated categories of services by the United Nations are adopted in most 
national and regional accounts (Haksever & Render, 2013; Kozak & Kozak, 2016; Marks, 
2009; OECD, 2005). Nevertheless, there are slight differences in the documented groups of 
services among national and regional classifications. For example, North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) regards utilities (i.e., electricity, gas and water supply) as 
part of the services sector. The Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial 
Classification (ANZSIC) and Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC) extend 
service industries to include utilities and construction.  
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2.3 Services and FDI: A global overview 
2.3.1 The importance of services in the global economy 
The growing importance of services in the global economy has been predicted since the 
1930s by the three-sector theory (C. Clark, 1940; A. G. B. Fisher, 1935; Fisher, 1939; Jean 
Fourastié, 1949). Accordingly, economies would gradually shift from the primary to the 
secondary/manufacturing, and eventually to the tertiary/services sector. At the primitive 
phase of development, the primary sector (particularly agriculture) plays a central role in 
generating income and employment. This sector could on average account for 65 per cent of 
the workforce while the secondary and services represent 20 per cent and 15 per cent, 
respectively.  
During the second phase of industrialisation, the growing demand for machinery in the 
primary sector would facilitate manufacturing production. The subsequent workforce 
allocation could be 40 per cent (primary), 40 per cent (manufacturing), and 20 per cent 
(services). During the third phase of development, a high level of technology and automation 
in the primary and manufacturing sectors would shift the labour demand to services, which 
satisfies increasingly sophisticated needs by other economic activities and individual 
consumers. As a result, services could attract 70 per cent of the workforce and the remaining 
participates in the primary (10 per cent) and manufacturing (20 per cent) sectors.2    
The theoretical prediction of the growing prominence of services has largely been 
confirmed in practice. In fact, this sector has played a far more significant role in various 
aspects of the world economy, notably regarding output, employment, international trade 
and investment. Services now represent the leading and most dynamic economic activity 
globally. Figure 2.1 shows the share of services in the world’s GDP, covering both developed 
 
2 The figures of sectoral shares in the three phases represent indicative changes in the relative importance 
of the three sectors for a typical economy, following the predictions of the three-sector theory (C. Clark, 
1940; A. G. B. Fisher, 1935; Fisher, 1939; Jean Fourastié, 1949).  
16 
 
and developing economies over the period 1970-2016. The sector’s output shares exhibited 
a similar upward trend at both the global and disaggregated levels by development status. In 
2016, total output of services activities reached up to US$ 48.38 trillion, accounting for more 
than 67 per cent of global output. Nevertheless, there exist stark differences between 
developed and developing economies. Services contributed to a much larger proportion of 
the output in the former group (76 per cent in 2016) compared to that of the latter group (56 
per cent). Furthermore, the share of services in GDP of developing economies has shown a 
more fluctuating pattern over the same period. 
 
Figure 2.1: GDP share of services by development status (1970-2016) 
Source: Based on UNCTAD database (2018a) 
In terms of employment, services have also made increasingly significant contribution 
to the global economy. Indeed, Figure 2.2 indicates that employment shares of services have 
followed trends similar to those of output. In 1992, the sector created 781.4 million jobs, 
accounting for 34 per cent of the total job creation. By 2018, 1,710 trillion jobs were 
provided by services activities, comprising more than half of total employment. Again, a 
huge and persistent gap between developed and developing groups can be observed. By 
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2017, the sector accounted for 74 per cent of employment in developed economies while this 
share in developing counterparts was modest at 21 per cent.  
 
Figure 2.2: Employment share of services by development status (1992-2018) 
Source: Based on ILO database (2018) 
Combining Figures 2.1 and 2.2, it can be seen that the gap in the employment shares 
between the two groups is even wider than the gap in the output shares, which might be due 
to that relatively more productive labour force was devoted to services in developing 
economies (i.e., 21 per cent of the workforce producing 56 per cent of output), as compared 
to developed ones (74 per cent of the workforce producing 76 per cent of output).  This can 
be partly associated with stark differences in the employment and output contributions of the 
primary sector in the developing countries. In fact, the labour force in this group remains 
predominantly concentrated in the low-value-added activities of the primary sector (62 per 
cent), which contributes merely 9 per cent to GDP (ILO, 2018; UNCTAD, 2018a). Thus, the 
rising services sector in the developing group tends to attract more skilled workers that 
comprise a lower share of the workforce but contribute a much higher share of output. 
Furthermore, services have become the largest employer absorbing female labour. Table 
2.2 shows the changes in the contribution of the three sectors in female employment across 
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the globe and groups of economies from 1992 to 2018. Similar to the trends in total 
employment, the primary and manufacturing sectors exhibit declining shares in employing 
female workers while services show the opposite pattern. Specifically, services attracted 
more than 55 per cent of women in the workforce during the period of 2011-2018, as 
compared to 38 per cent during 1992-2010. Besides, the shares of female employment in 
services also varied substantially between two groups of economies. This gap is more 
substantial than that of total employment. During 2011-2018, services in developed 
economies play a dominant role in hiring female, accounting for 87 per cent, which is nearly 
4.3 times higher than that of the developing group. While this substantial difference in the 
latest period (4.3 times) is likewise related to the historical dominance of the primary sector 
in absorbing female labour in developing economies, it shows a narrowing gap between the 
two groups over time (down from 5.8 and 5.2 times in two earlier periods, respectively).    
Table 2.2: Sectoral share in female employment by development status 
  
World 
Developing 
economies 
Developed 
economies 
1992-2000 
   
Primary 42.33 80.22 4.56 
Manufacturing 20.00 6.11 17.00 
Services 37.67 13.56 78.22 
2001-2010       
Primary 36.30 76.80 3.10 
Manufacturing 18.00 7.10 13.00 
Services 45.80 16.00 83.80 
2011-2018       
Primary 28.63 71.38 2.00 
Manufacturing 16.00 8.00 11.00 
Services 55.25 20.38 86.88 
Source: Calculations based on ILO database (2018) 
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While international trade has predominantly involved the sale of tangible goods across 
borders, many intangible services have become increasingly mobile and tradable. Trade in 
services can take place via three modes: (i) from one economy to another (services cross the 
border); (ii) within an economy to a service customer of another economy (consumer crosses 
the border); and (iii) through the presence of natural persons of one economy in another 
economy (supplier crosses the border) (UN, 2012). Services of high tradability include 
transportation, tourism, education, telecommunication, finance and banking. This is a noticeable 
trend given the growing contribution of services to the global output and employment.  
Figure 2.3 shows the export shares of services from 1980 to 2016. An upward but fluctuating 
pattern can be seen across the world and groups of economies. Sharp variations occurred since 
the global financial crisis that began in 2007. By 2017, the services sector accounted for 
nearly 24 per cent of the world total exports. Despite comprising a modest proportion, the 
contribution of services in global trade is expected to rise and should not be underestimated. 
Similar to the trends in the output and employment, developed economies exhibit a stronger 
engagement in services exports than developing counterparts. By 2017, the shares of services 
exports were 29 per cent and 17 per cent for the former and latter groups, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.3: Export share of services by development status (1980-2016) 
Source: Based on UNCTAD database (2018b) 
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2.3.2 Global FDI: A shift towards services 
The international investment landscape has undergone a marked shift of FDI sectoral 
composition from manufacturing towards services. This foreseeable change is in line with 
the rise of services in other aspects of the world economy such as output, employment and 
international trade. Intuitively, due to the intangible nature of services, FDI has been 
considered crucial for access to efficient services in the increasingly tertiarised global 
economy. By the 1950s, services accounted for about 20 per cent of global FDI stock, and 
the share grew steadily to 25 per cent in the 1970s (UNCTAD, 1989). Since then, dramatic 
increases in the proportions of services FDI have taken place worldwide. Generally, the shift 
of global FDI towards services is mainly attributed to three factors.  
First, it is largely associated with the growing importance of the tertiary sector in the 
world economy (Cuadrado-Roura, 2013; Doytch & Uctum, 2011). As services account for 
an increasingly dominant share in GDP and employment in almost all economies, 
tremendous opportunities have arisen for foreign firms to meet the expanding demand of 
local markets. In fact, services are generally intangible and most FDI in services is market 
seeking. These features suggest a greater potential and efficiency of FDI flowing to host 
service markets. 
Second, services FDI has been further facilitated by the privatisation and deregulation 
of this sector in host economies, particularly in developing ones (UNCTAD, 2004; 2010, 
2014a). Many key industries (such as finance and banking, telecommunication, 
transportation, and retail trade), previously under state or domestic private ownership, are 
now open for foreign investors to various extents. Moreover, this liberalisation process 
closely relates to the growth of the service component in various international agreements in 
trade and investment. 
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 Third, the prevalence of service offshoring and outsourcing has also contributed to the 
increase of services FDI (Cuadrado-Roura, 2013; Ramasamy & Yeung, 2010). The 
advancement of information and communication technology has promoted the tradability of 
many services. Consequently, various services have been offshored to foreign affiliates located 
in low-cost destinations. Furthermore, foreign and domestic manufacturing firms alike tend 
to outsource many services used as their intermediary inputs (e.g., telecommunication, legal 
and tax consulting, marketing, research and development, etc.) due to cost or capacity related 
issues. In this context, FDI firms, especially large multinationals, are usually more advantageous 
and competitive in providing these services than domestic counterparts.    
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of global inward FDI stock by sector between 1990, 
2002 and 2012. By 1990, service activities rose up to claim nearly half of total FDI stock. 
The share of this sector exhibited an upward trend to become the dominant component of 
FDI globally, reaching about two thirds (equivalent to approximately 15 trillion US dollars) 
in 2012. This share is rather close to that of services in world GDP (as depicted in Figure 
2.1). On the contrary, the manufacturing sector shows its declining shares over the years from 
41.32 per cent in 1990 to only 26.16 per cent (equivalent to nearly 6 trillion US dollars) in 2012.  
 
Figure 2.4: Global inward FDI stock, share by sector  
Source: Based on World Investment Reports (UNCTAD, 1992, 2004, 2014b)  
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The above contrasting patterns in manufacturing and services FDI clearly indicate a 
considerable shift of the world investment towards the tertiary sector. While significant 
changes in FDI occur among manufacturing and services, the primary sector shows 
comparably lower but more stable shares of total FDI stock in these periods. In fact, this 
non-dominant sector gained an increased proportion from 6.19 per cent in 2002 to 7.69 per 
cent (equivalent to greater than 1.7 trillion US dollars) in 2012.   
Figure 2.5 depicts the estimated inward FDI stock by sector for two groups of economies 
in 2002 and 2012 (the latest year that data of this disaggregated level are available). It can 
be seen that inward FDI largely concentrates in developed countries, of which the 
corresponding values in all three sectors more than double those of developing counterparts. 
More importantly, services increased significantly, constituting the biggest share of the FDI 
stock of both groups. By 2012, the shares of services FDI in the total FDI stock of developed 
and developing economies are relatively close to each other, being 67.89 per cent and 62.73 
per cent, respectively. It is worth noting that over this 10-year period, the developing group 
demonstrates a slightly higher growth in services FDI, narrowing the gap with the developed 
counterpart from 2.85 times (in 2002) to 2.39 times (in 2012).  
 
Figure 2.5: Global Inward FDI stock by sector and development status 
Source: Based on World Investment Reports (UNCTAD, 2004, 2014b) 
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  While manufacturing FDI also shows substantial increases in value during this period, 
this sector accounts for decreasing proportions in the total FDI stock across developed and 
developing economies, with a larger scale in the latter group. Specifically, during 2002–
2012 the shares of manufacturing FDI continuously shrank from 31.81 per cent to 25.02 per 
cent and from 37.69 per cent to 28.78 per cent among developed and developing groups, 
respectively. These figures affirm the shift of global FDI towards services, which appears to 
be more prominent in developing countries. 
Figure 2.6 illustrates changes in services FDI by major industries over the years 1990, 
2002 and 2012. While overall FDI in services increased markedly in volumes as well as 
relative sectoral shares worldwide, patterns among service industries are rather 
heterogeneous. Three main remarks are worth noting. First, investment in finance (i.e., 
financial and insurance activities) consistently represents the largest industry in attracting 
services FDI. Nevertheless, its shares are fluctuating with a sharp decline from 40.22 per 
cent in 1990 to 28.62 per cent in 2002 before bouncing back to 36.22 per cent in 2012.  
 
Figure 2.6: Global Inward FDI stock in services by industry 
Source: Based on World Investment Reports  (UNCTAD, 1992, 2004, 2014b)  
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Second, while the proportions of FDI in trade (i.e., wholesale and retail) demonstrate a 
downward trend, those of business activities (i.e., professional, scientific and technical 
services, real estate and renting) exhibit an opposite pattern over these periods. Notably, FDI 
in business activities rose sharply from 15.17 per cent (1990) to 30.24 per cent (2012), which 
was more than twice the share of FDI in trade. Third, another two emerging industries, 
namely (i) hotels and restaurants and (ii) transport, storage and communication, show striking 
variations over the years. While in 1990 their percentages are relatively close, the 2012 figures 
show an about thirteen-fold decline of the former (to merely 0.85 per cent) and a nearly six-fold 
increase of the latter (up to 9.73 per cent), as compared to their respective shares 10 years ago. 
2.4 Services and FDI: An overview of Vietnam’s economy 
2.4.1 The role of services in Vietnam’s economy 
Since winning independence in 1975, Vietnam has undergone extraordinary 
transformation, internally and externally. This emerging economy is located in the dynamic 
South East Asia and has transitioned from being centrally planned to market oriented, rural 
to urban, agrarian to industrialised, and nationally focused to globally integrated. The 
Renovation (Doi moi) reform launched in 1986 has markedly transformed the war-torn 
economy. Notably, the country has been successful in curbing inflation crisis by cutting the 
rate from 774 per cent in 1986 to 67.5 per cent in 1990 and 3.5 per cent in 2018 (GSO, 2018). 
At the same time, Vietnam has experienced remarkable economic growth, being one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world with GDP growth rate averaging 6.5 per cent per 
annum over the period 2000-2017 (WB, 2017b). The country has also become increasingly 
integrated into the regional and global economy by signing various bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on trade and investment liberalisation, including opening up many service 
industries to foreign investors. By 2019, Vietnam has engaged in 25 free trade agreements 
(12 signed, 4 under negotiation, 9 under consultation) (ADB, 2019).    
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During the development process of the economy, services have played an increasingly 
important role.3 Figure 2.7 shows the sectoral composition in GDP of Vietnam during the 
period of 1986-2016. Notably, services have risen to become the dominant contributor to the 
country’s total output since the early 1990s. There exhibits an upward pattern despite some 
fluctuations over time, particularly the sharp decline following the Asian and global financial 
crises. The share of services hit the record high of about 44 per cent in 1995 and 2009, 
remaining the most important contributor to GDP in 2016 (41 per cent). It is worth noting 
that while services constitute the largest sector in Vietnam, its output share is much lower 
than that of average developing economies (56 per cent in 2016). Indeed, Vietnam’s per 
capita GDP (US$ 1,725) remains relatively far below the average of the developing group 
(US$ 4,732) (UNCTAD, 2018a). Hence, further development is expected to lead to a higher 
service share. This implies potential for growth of services in Vietnam as well as challenges 
faced by the government to unlock and realise the untapped potential.     
 
Figure 2.7: GDP share by sector in Vietnam’s economy (1986-2016) 
Source: Based on GSO database (2018) and UNCTAD database (2018a) 
 
3 Compared to manufacturing, the services sector tends to be more diverse, comprising various kinds of 
industries with largely different characteristics. See Tables A2.1, A2.2, and A2.3 in the Appendices for 
more data on the heterogeneity of service industries regarding the distribution of workers by educational 
attainment, gender gaps in educational attainment and average wages across industries.     
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Similarly, the manufacturing sector demonstrated strong growth, with its share in GDP 
rising from the lowest proportion (prior to 1993) to surpass services in 2003 and 2004. 
Nevertheless, the manufacturing share began a downward trend since 2005 and slightly 
recovered five years later, becoming the second largest contributor to the country’s total 
output in 2016 (33 per cent). Contrary to the other two sectors, the primary sector has become 
less and less important in contributing to GDP. Notably, this sector’s share decreased nearly 
three-fold from 46 per cent in 1988 to merely 16 per cent in 2016. These patterns are 
consistent with those of other countries across the world.  
The sectoral shares in total employment of Vietnam and average developing countries 
during 1992-2018 are presented in Figure 2.8. While the GDP shares by sector (shown in 
Figure 2.7) are markedly fluctuating, the employment shares exhibit relatively smooth linear 
patterns. Notably, the primary sector remains the largest employer in the local labour market, 
but its proportion has declined sharply from 72 per cent in 1992 to 40 per cent in 2018. 
Meanwhile, an increased number of labour are attracted and shifted to services and 
manufacturing sectors. Of these, services continuously constitute the second largest sector 
in providing jobs to Vietnam’s economy. By 2018, the services sector had created about 20.8 
million jobs to the local workforce. Its employment share shows an upward trend, doubling 
from 17 per cent in 1992 to 35 per cent in 2018. More importantly, the services sector in 
Vietnam appears to outperform average developing economies in this respect as the 
employment share of this sector in the average developing group grew slower, steadily 
increasing from 15 per cent in 1992 to 22 per cent in 2018.   
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Figure 2.8: Employment share by sector in Vietnam’s economy (1992-2018) 
Source: Based on GSO database (2018) and ILO database (2018) 
Furthermore, services have played an even more important role in attracting female labour 
force. Figure 2.9 shows that service industries become an increasingly dominant employer of 
female workers in Vietnam over the period 1992-2018. The services employment share for 
female workers has risen significantly from 18 per cent in 1992 to 39 per cent in 2018, which is 
close to the share of the primary sector (41 per cent) and much higher than that of the 
manufacturing (21 per cent). Notably, Figure 2.9 also indicates that service industries in Vietnam 
attract a larger proportion of women than average developing economies.  
 
Figure 2.9: Female employment share by sector in Vietnam (1992-2018) 
Source: Based on GSO database (2018) and ILO database (2018) 
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Figure 2.10 depicts the movement of services trade in Vietnam during the period 1990-
2016. The share of services in total exports increased from nearly 7 per cent in 1990 to over 
23 per cent in 1998 before falling sharply following the Asian financial crisis. Since then, 
the services share continued a downward trend, accounting for more than 10 per cent of total 
exports in 2016. Besides, the patterns of services exports and imports are roughly similar. 
Notably, the share of services imports was continuously higher than that of services exports 
prior to 1997 and the remaining period shows an opposite circumstance with services imports 
making up the record low of about 7 per cent in 2018. Compared to average developing 
economies, services trade of Vietnam performed better in terms of contribution to total trade 
during the period 1991-2001. Nevertheless, the following years show declining proportions 
of both imports and exports, which fell far below the average of developing countries. Given 
the overall upward trend in services trade across the globe, Vietnam might need to devote 
greater policy efforts to boost growth momentum and promote trade in services. 
 
Figure 2.10: Services export and import shares in Vietnam (1990-2016) 
Source: Based on GSO database (2018) and UNCTAD database (2018a) 
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2.4.2 Services FDI in Vietnam: Some stylised facts 
The sectoral shares in the number of FDI projects in Vietnam in 1996, 2006 and 2016 
are presented in Figure 2.11. The primary sector is the least significant contributor, showing 
a continuously downward trend over these years. Its share has dropped markedly from nearly 
11 per cent in 1996 to 0.65 per cent (with 17 projects) in 2016. Meanwhile, FDI has been 
largely concentrated in the other two major sectors, which is consistent with the trends of 
global FDI flow. By 2006, manufacturing was the dominant sector in luring FDI projects 
with the proportion surging from 55 per cent in 1996 to 65 per cent 10 years later. Despite a 
considerable increase from 639 projects to 1042 projects in 2006 and 2016, manufacturing 
share went down substantially to about 40 per cent during this period. Hence, the shift from 
manufacturing toward services can be clearly seen over the past decade. By 2016, services 
constituted the largest sector in attracting FDI with 1554 projects, accounting for about 60 
per cent of total number of registered projects.    
 
Figure 2.11: Number of FDI projects in Vietnam, share by sector  
Source: Based on GSO database (2018) 
While the sectoral distribution in FDI project number indicates a noticeable shift 
towards services in Vietnam, the trend in registered FDI capital is rather different. Figure 
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2.12 depicts the relative shares in total inward FDI capital of the three sectors over the 
periods between 1996, 2006 and 2016. The primary sector has consistently attracted the 
lowest proportion of FDI capital, representing an average 2 per cent during these years. 
Furthermore, manufacturing share rose sharply from about 28 per cent in 1996 to roughly 
69 per cent in 2006. Regardless of a minor drop to nearly 63 per cent in 2016, this sector 
sustained its dominant role in luring FDI capital. Meanwhile, services demonstrated an opposite 
pattern compared to manufacturing. By 1996, FDI capital was concentrated in services, 
accounting for more than 70 per cent (equivalent to roughly US$6 billion). By 2006, this sector 
saw a two-fold decline to 29 per cent before slightly recovering (up to 36 per cent) in 2016, 
which is rather in contrast to the global FDI trends. In fact, the sectoral composition of GDP in 
Vietnam (Figure 2.7) shows a similar marked switch from services to manufacturing between 1996 
and 2006. Nonetheless, FDI in services recovered slowly following the Asian financial crisis while 
the overall services sector bounced back rapidly to reclaim its dominant role in output contribution.       
 
Figure 2.12: Total FDI registered capital in Vietnam, share by sector  
Source: Based on GSO database (2018) 
  Figure 2.13 demonstrates the composition of services FDI in Vietnam by major 
industries in 2006 and 2016. Resembling the global patterns, a large number of FDI projects 
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were attracted to a small number of service industries. Of these, business activities (including 
professional, scientific and technical services, real estate and renting) constitute the 
dominant industry, making up more than 44 per cent of the total projects in 2006. 
Nevertheless, its share decreased two-fold to merely 22 per cent in 2016. Meanwhile, 
wholesale and retail trade has risen as the largest industry in luring services FDI projects by 
2016. Its share went up sharply from 5 per cent to 33 per cent over the ten-year period. The 
proportions of the other two main industries (i.e., transport, storage and communications; 
and hotels and restaurants) in the total services FDI projects are stable at 6-7 per cent during 
this period. Notably, while the global trends indicate finance (i.e., financial and insurance 
activities) as the biggest industry in services FDI attraction, Vietnam shows a rather stark 
difference with a modest share of roughly 1 per cent over the years.    
 
Figure 2.13: Number of services FDI projects in Vietnam, share by industry  
Source: Based on GSO database (2018) 
The relative importance of service industries in FDI landscape can be further analysed 
by depicting the distribution of registered capital as shown in Figure 2.14. Despite having a 
declining share from 45 per cent in 2006 to 34 per cent in 2016, business activities remain 
the most important industry in attracting services FDI in Vietnam over the past 10 years. The 
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proportion of wholesale and retail trade in total services FDI registered capital has gone up 
markedly, though to a smaller extent compared to that of project number, from 4 per cent in 
2006 to 20 per cent in 2016. While Figure 2.13 shows similar shares in total project number 
of other two main industries, namely (i) transport, storage and communication; and (ii) hotels 
and restaurants, Figure 2.14 suggests a decrease of the former and an increase of the latter 
over the same period. Last but not least, foreign investment in finance has made a more 
significant contribution to total services FDI registered capital, raising its share from 1 per 
cent in 2006 to nearly 6 per cent in 2016. 
 
Figure 2.14: Total services FDI registered capital in Vietnam, share by industry  
Source: Based on GSO database (2018) 
2.4.3 Services versus manufacturing in Vietnam: A closer look  
The services sector is widely perceived to be more diverse than other sectors (See Tables 
A2.1, A2.2, and A2.3 in the Appendices, displaying the heterogeneity of service industries). 
Besides rich diversity, service industries differ from manufacturing in various key respects, 
including those under examination by this thesis. Of these, Figure 2.15 depicts the average 
wage differences by ownership type in these two sectors. Notably, both domestic and foreign 
firms in services pay higher than their counterparts in manufacturing. Specifically, domestic 
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service firms pay about 20 per cent higher than domestic manufacturing ones. Foreign 
service firms also offer considerably higher wages (2.7 times) compared to their foreign 
manufacturing counterparts. Furthermore, the foreign-domestic pay gap is much larger in 
the services sector (4.2 times) relative to the manufacturing sector (1.8 times). Wage 
premium in services might be associated with higher labour quality in this sector. In fact, 
Figure 2.16 shows the differences in educational attainment of the workforce in services and 
manufacturing. While most of the manufacturing workers are unskilled labour (69 per cent 
having no training/formal degree), the majority of labour in the services sector possess better 
skills (62 per cent having training/formal degree).               
 
Figure 2.15: Average wage rate differences by sector and firm ownership 
Source: Based on GSO’s Enterprise Survey in 2012 
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Figure 2.16: Educational attainment by sector  
Source: Based on GSO’s Labour Force Survey in 2012 
Figure 2.17 demonstrates the gender gap in employment by ownership type for the two 
sectors. Notably, foreign firms in both sectors tend to employ a greater share of female labour 
compared to local firms. Furthermore, both domestic and foreign firms in the manufacturing 
sector tend to hire female workers more intensively than their counterparts in services. The 
female/male employment ratio among manufacturing firms is roughly 1.5 times of that 
among services firms. This gender gap in employment is markedly wider among foreign 
firms with the ratio in manufacturing being 2.6 times higher than that in services. Moreover, 
domestic firms in services are the most male-intensive across both sectors, which implies 
significant potential for promoting the hiring of female labour.   
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Figure 2.17: Gender gap in employment by sector and firm ownership 
Source: Based on GSO’s Enterprise Survey in 2012 
2.4.4 The strengths and constraints of Vietnam in attracting services FDI 
2.4.4.1 Strengths 
The increased commitment of the Vietnamese government to promoting growth in 
services is one crucial strength in attracting services FDI. This sector has been considered 
the new growth engine and vital to Vietnam’s long-term plan to become a medium-to-high-
income economy by 2050. The country has adopted substantial policy changes to boost the 
development of services in domestic market and enhance the presence in international 
service market. For example, the finance industry has undergone radical reforms of 
restructuring the banking system, gradually opening to foreign investors, privatising state-
owned banking institutions, and strengthening the capitalisation of domestic banks. 
Furthermore, the continuously improved legal and institutional environment has further 
stimulated FDI inflows to services, including the Law on Telecommunications 2009, the Law 
on Real Estate Business 2006, Law on Credit Institutions 2010, Intellectual Property Law 
2005, the revised Law on Investment and Law on Enterprises 2005.  
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Reforms in the services sector have been largely driven by Vietnam’s rapid integration 
into the regional and global economies. On 11th January 2007, the country became the 150th 
member of the World Trade Organisation, demonstrating its strong commitment to widening 
market access to foreign service providers by gradually liberalising 11 key service industries. 
In addition, Vietnam has been actively engaged in a growing number of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements on trade and investment liberalisation. Major deals with strategic 
partners include ASEAN (1993), the US (2001), Japan (2009), South Korea (2015), Eurasian 
Economic Union (2016), Hong Kong-China (2017), and notably the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-pacific Partnership – CPTPP (2018). Vietnam’s increased 
economic integration and determined efforts to stimulate the services sector have 
significantly enhanced market access and investment environment favourable to FDI firms.  
A growing domestic market is another key advantage of Vietnam to compete for 
services FDI. Coupled with the country’s high economic growth, income per capita has 
surged nearly 16-fold from 130 US dollars in 1990 to 2,060 US dollars in 2016 (WB, 2018b). 
Rising disposable income in the world’s 14th most populated country (with about 95 million 
people) indicates huge potential of rising demand for consumer services such as tourism, 
retail, education, entertainment, and telecommunication. For instance, mobile phone 
subscriptions per 100 people in Vietnam have gone up dramatically from 0.03 in 1995 to 
127.53 in 2016 (WB, 2018b). Furthermore, the country’s expanding manufacturing industry 
has been well positioned to be Asia’s new industrial hub, given the relocation of global 
manufacturing FDI away from major destinations like China and India due to their rising 
costs. This trend has boosted the strong demand for producer services such as finance and 
banking; transportation; professional, scientific and technical activities. Therefore, Vietnam 
presents a highly promising market for foreign service firms. This comparative advantage 
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becomes more significant as services FDI is predominantly market-seeking and service 
industries in Vietnam are rather immature with limited supply capacity.    
Unique natural resources, historical sites and cultural values are essential assets for 
Vietnam to attract foreign investment in one of the largest service industries, namely tourism. 
Of these, the country is particularly well known for the seven UNESCO World Heritage 
sites, becoming a desirable destination among domestic and international tourists. Tourism 
constitutes the biggest services export contributor, hosting a high record of more than 13 
million of foreign arrivals in 2017 – a substantial increase of 30 per cent compared to 
previous year. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2017b), Vietnam was 
ranked the 10th in the world’s top fastest growing destinations for leisure travel spending for 
2016-2026. This booming industry has greatly contributed to the country’s social-economic 
development, accounting for 9 per cent of GDP, 7 per cent of total employment, and 10 per 
cent of total investment in 2016 (WTTC, 2017). Along with strong policy commitment to 
tourism growth and rising disposable incomes (of local and regional neighbouring markets, 
notably China), natural, cultural and historical endowments have made Vietnam increasingly 
attractive and promising among foreign investors in the smoke-free industry.  
FDI inflows in Vietnam’s services (and manufacturing alike) have been enormously 
boosted by a number of other major competitive advantages, notably (i) stable political 
regime, (ii) strategic geographical location, and (iii) abundant and cost-competitive 
workforce. Of these, socio-political stability represents one key strength of this emerging 
economy, which strongly enables a progressively transparent, supportive and stimulating 
investment environment for foreign businesses. Furthermore, Vietnam possesses a strategic 
location in the centre of the rising South East Asia. Proximity to other main markets in Asia, 
a long coastline (of 3,260 km) with easy access to the world’s major shipping routes have 
highly facilitated transportation and trading activities. Last but not least, Vietnam has long 
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been known as a favoured FDI destination due to its young and abundant labour force. Total 
workforce has surged markedly from 33 million in 1990 to 58 million in 2017 with nearly 
70 per cent of the population aged between 15 and 64 (WB, 2018b). More importantly, this 
young workforce has been increasingly educated and skilled while labour costs remain 
competitive at less than half that of China (Hayakawa & Tsubota, 2014; Leung, 2015; 
Tongzon, 2005). All these profound advantages have played a significant role in enhancing 
Vietnam’s competitiveness to lure FDI, notably into the rising services sector.      
2.4.4.2 Constraints  
Despite having tremendous advantages as a desirable location for services FDI, there are 
several constraints on attracting greater foreign investment flows to the services sector in 
Vietnam. Notably, market access by foreign investors remains restricted in a number of key 
service industries. For example, in telecommunication, foreign ownership is limited to 65 per 
cent (for non-facility-based services) and 49 per cent (for facility-based services). Similarly, 
maximum legalised foreign equity threshold is 30 per cent for joint stock banks and 49-51 per 
cent for most transport services (maritime, waterways, rail, and road). Besides, in other service 
industries that are subject to full foreign ownership restriction, usually under different phases, 
the implementation of Vietnam’s WTO commitments on services has encountered various 
challenges. In some instances, regulations and conditions by local authorities appear even 
stricter and more complicated than those required by the signed commitments. Consequently, 
foreign investors are faced with greater barriers and difficulties in licensing procedures.         
The strong presence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in several crucial service 
industries is another factor inhibiting services FDI in Vietnam. These industries largely fall 
to those that foreign (and domestic) ownership is restricted because the government 
considers them as strategic or sensitive. Typical examples of state-owned giants in services 
include Vietnam Posts and Telecommunication Corporation (VNPT), Vietnam National 
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Shipping Lines (VINALINES), the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC), Airports 
Corporation of Vietnam, Vietnam Airlines, Vietnam Satellite Digital Television 
Corporation, Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development. In practice, state-
owned firms have benefited from various forms of preferential treatment by state and local 
authorities, notably favourable access to land and credit. Despite increased divestment and 
privatisation in SOEs, the continued overwhelming foothold of these SOEs can significantly 
distort the market, deteriorate investment environment, and thus discourage FDI flows into 
Vietnam’s services sector. 
Other major constraints dampening FDI inflows to Vietnam’s services (and other sectors 
alike) consist of poor infrastructure, shortage of skilled labour, and complex administrative 
procedures. Of these, inadequate and under-developed infrastructure presents a critical 
obstacle to promote FDI in typical service industries like logistics, telecommunication, 
tourism, and transportation. While low labour cost indicates a comparative advantage of 
Vietnam in FDI competition, it is also associated with low skill and low productivity levels 
of the local workforce, discouraging FDI inflow. The country has been faced with difficulties 
in supplying FDI firms with highly skilled and educated workforce, particularly in many 
skill-intensive industries like professional, scientific and technical services. Moreover, 
compared to FDI projects in the manufacturing sector, those in services are challenged by 
more complex and conflicting regulations related to market entry and post-entry operations 
due to the incomplete legal system governing service activities in the economy.  
2.5 Summary 
This chapter provides background information on FDI and services globally and for the 
specific case of Vietnam’s economy. Notably, FDI definitions emphasise the long-term 
control of foreign investor over the management of a firm in another country. Compared to 
the relatively unanimous definition of FDI, services are more diverse and complex to be 
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defined and classified, partly due to the heterogeneous nature of services and their rapid 
evolution. Of these, the International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) has been a 
widely adopted reference to report and categorise service activities in accounts and statistics 
of almost all countries, including Vietnam – the empirical case of this research. 
Services now constitute the leading and most dynamic economic activity globally, 
accounting for two-thirds of output, more than half of total employment and nearly one-third 
of total exports. It also represents the largest employer absorbing female labour. More 
importantly, global FDI has been sharply shifted from manufacturing towards services. This 
phenomenon is mostly associated with the rise of the tertiary sector, privatisation and 
deregulation of services in host economies, the prevalence of service offshoring and 
outsourcing. Notably, the role of services varies significantly across groups of economies.  
The services sector has also played an increasingly important role in Vietnam. 
Generally, the patterns of how services contributed to this emerging economy are relatively 
similar to the global context. Nevertheless, this sector has lost its growth momentum, 
showing a sharp decline in total inward FDI by 2006, which is in contrast to the trend of 
global FDI. To accelerate FDI in services, Vietnam exhibits major strengths of strong reform 
commitment in the services sector, large and growing domestic market, and unique resources 
for tourism development. Other major competitive advantages include stable political 
regime, strategic geographical location, and large and cost-competitive workforce. 
Nonetheless, major constraints facing the economy in attracting greater services FDI consist 
of limited market access by foreign investors and the dominant role of state-owned 
enterprises in several crucial service industries; poor infrastructure; shortage of skilled 
labour, and complex administrative procedures.     
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Chapter 3: The Impacts of FDI on the Host Labour Market:           
A Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of previous research on the impacts of 
FDI on the host labour market. The entry and increased presence of FDI firms can generate 
significant effects on recipient countries in various aspects. One of these is the potential 
influence on the host labour market. Policymakers generally expect FDI to create large-scale 
employment, enhance labour productivity and improve wages/income for the local 
workforce (Arnal & Hijzen, 2008). These widespread expectations may explain considerable 
incentives and competition among host governments in attracting foreign investors. The 
existing literature on the impacts of FDI on the host labour market can be categorised into 
three main strands: (i) FDI and wages; (ii) FDI and employment; and (iii) FDI and labour 
productivity. Host governments largely expect that FDI inflows will generate positive or 
beneficial impacts on labour markets while empirical evidence for both developed and 
developing economies is far from homogenous.  
Following this, Section 3.2 reviews the first strand of FDI and wages, which largely 
focuses on the indirect effects of foreign firms via wage spillovers. Next, Section 3.3 reviews 
the second strand of FDI and employment, devoting major attention to FDI impact on female 
employment. Section 3.4 gives a brief review on FDI and labour productivity, which is the 
most intensively examined strand of previous studies on FDI-linked impacts on the host 
labour market. Finally, Section 3.5 summarises the chapter. 
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3.2 FDI and wages 
3.2.1 Wage gaps 
A growing literature examines the relationship between foreign ownership and wages 
in the host labour market. The wage effect of FDI is closely associated with the income and 
welfare of individual local workers and the whole recipient country. For many developing 
countries, FDI has greatly contributed to poverty reduction by providing millions of local 
employees with regular and decent income (Feliciano & Lipsey, 2006; Girma, Greenaway, 
& Wakelin, 1999). Workers in FDI firms are the first to gain direct benefits from the wage 
effect of FDI. Furthermore, the host economy can arguably be rebalanced and boosted once 
these additional incomes are spent on domestic consumption (Elliott & Zhou, 2015). These 
effects can be more profound as the empirical literature shows strong evidence that foreign 
firms tend to pay, on average, higher wages than domestic firms (Aitken et al., 1996; Conyon 
et al., 2002; Girma et al., 1999; Görg et al., 2007). 
A substantial body of the FDI-wage literature examines wage gaps between domestic 
firms and foreign firms. In a pioneering work,  Aitken et al. (1996) conducted cross-section 
comparisons of wages across domestic and foreign firms in Mexico, Venezuela and the US. 
The findings indicate that average wages are about 30 per cent higher in foreign firms than 
domestic counterparts for all three countries. The wage differentials remain, though at lower 
percentages, after controlling for the impact of the skill mix of workers, industry 
composition, location of foreign affiliates, firm size and capital intensity. Similar results of 
foreign wage premium are supported by empirical studies for both developed and developing 
host countries (Barry, Gorg, & Strobl, 2005; Y. Chen, Démurger, & Fournier, 2005; Conyon 
et al., 2002; Elliott & Zhou, 2015; Eren, 2009; Feliciano & Lipsey, 2006; Girma et al., 1999; 
Huttunen, 2007). It is, however, worth noting the overall impact of FDI on average wages 
might be distorted due to endogeneity problem. The existence of a foreign wage premium 
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may be attributable to the fact that foreign firms select highly qualified employees, acquire 
high-paying domestic firms or operate in high-wage industries or high-wage regions. Balsvik 
and Haller (2010) investigate the case of Norwegian manufacturing firms and indicate that 
foreign investors tend to acquire large, high-wage and high-productivity firms. 
While the foreign wage premium is well documented, the causes of such differentials 
remain debatable. Generally, three major explanations are discussed in the literature. First, 
foreign firms tend to have strong incentives to pay higher wages than local competitors to 
attract and retain workers, particularly high-quality ones (Aitken et al., 1996; Girma et al., 
1999). More importantly, a low turnover rate can reduce training costs and minimise the risk 
of productive know-how spilling over to domestic competitors via labour movement. 
Second, higher wages by foreign multinationals can be seen as rent sharing between 
employers and employees (Budd, Konings, & Slaughter, 2005). Compared to local firms, 
foreign firms are widely perceived to own superior productivity advantages and profitability, 
which enable them to pay higher wages to reinvest in the workforce. Finally, foreign 
affiliates are more likely to offer higher salaries to protect and enhance public reputation 
when complying with local labour law and being good payers (Almond & Ferner, 2007).     
The impact of FDI on skilled-unskilled wage gaps in the host labour market also 
receives considerable investigation. The entry of foreign firms, notably large multinationals, 
arguably introduces modern technologies and management practices that are skill-intensive 
or skill-biased. In fact, substantial empirical findings suggest that FDI inflows can increase 
the demand for skilled-workers, widening the wage gaps between skilled and unskilled 
groups in both developed and developing countries (Anwar & Sun, 2012; Berman, Bound, 
& Griliches, 1994; Chaudhuri & Banerjee, 2010; Zhao, 2001). In a study for a developing 
country, Te Velde and Morrissey (2004) reveal that wages of both skill groups are improved 
while skill wage gaps are worsened in Thailand given the FDI presence. A similar result is 
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supported for a developed economy by Taylor and Driffield (2005), finding that FDI inflows 
in the UK manufacturing industries account for 11 per cent of wage inequality even after 
controlling the effect of trade and technology. On the contrary, Airola (2008) asserts that the 
widened skill wage gaps in Mexican manufacturing industries is not caused by increased 
FDI inflows but by privatisation and other domestic reforms.  
A final strand of the FDI-wage gap literature examines the impact of FDI firms on local 
gender wage gaps (i.e., the relative female-to-male wages). In a country-specific study, 
Braunstein and Brenner (2007) investigate the influence of inward FDI on gendered wages in 
urban China, using data for 1995 and 2002. The estimation results indicate that in 1995 female 
workers were better off in gaining greater pay increases resulting from FDI presence while in 
2002 their male counterparts benefited more from FDI. This reversion might be explained by 
the shift of FDI firms towards higher productivity production, which favoured male-dominated 
industries in the latter period. Using firm level data of manufacturing industry in 2004, Z. 
Chen, Ge, Lai, and Wan (2013) found that the entry of FDI firms within the same region and 
industry exerted a positive impact on reducing the gender wage gap in Chinese labour market. 
In a cross-country study, Oostendorp (2009) investigates the impact of FDI and trade on gender 
wage disparities. Using the ILO survey data on wages of more than 80 countries between 1983 
and 1999, the paper finds mixed results, varying across levels of economic development. 
Inward FDI and foreign trade tend to narrow the occupational gender wage disparity in high-
income economies. This positive effect was due to a decrease in discrimination and/or an 
increase in the relative demand for female workers in the wave of globalisation. Meanwhile, 
there is little evidence that FDI and trade help bridge the female-to-male pay gap in lower-
income countries.         
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3.2.2 Wage spillovers 
Recent evidence suggests that foreign entrants can exert indirect impacts on wages of 
domestic firms, causing wage spillovers. Compared to the extensive literature on wage 
differentials, this wage spillover effect is much less researched. Wage spillovers can take 
place via labour market competition and productivity spillovers. Of these, the entry of 
generally higher-paying foreign firms can significantly shift up the labour demand, 
triggering domestic firms to increase wage rates to attract and retain workers, particularly 
high-quality labour (Aitken et al., 1996; Driffield & Taylor, 2006; Girma et al., 1999; Hoi 
& Pomfret, 2010). The subsequent upward pressure on wage level paid by domestic firms is 
more likely to occur if the FDI projects are greenfield investments (with additional labour 
demand) and the local labour market is highly competitive (with limited supply of skilled 
workers).  
Moreover, the existence of productivity spillovers from FDI may be crucial in 
generating wage spillovers (Barry et al., 2005; Görg & Greenaway, 2004). In this case, 
domestic firms can enhance labour productivity, enabling them to pay higher wages to 
workers. Conversely, negative productivity spillovers may result in negative wage spillovers 
to domestic firms. The empirical findings of wage spillovers are scarce and mixed for both 
developed and developing host economies. Of these, positive spillovers are mainly found in 
the latter group. 
The study of Aitken et al. (1996) is the pioneering work that examines wage spillovers 
and compares wages by foreign and domestic manufacturing firms in Mexico, Venezuela 
and the US. The basic approach to test wage spillovers is regressing domestic firms’ average 
wages on a number of explanatory factors, including foreign presence (measured by 
employment share of FDI firms). Although foreign firms are found to offer higher wages in 
all three countries, wage spillovers only exist for the US. The lack of wage spillovers for 
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Mexico and Venezuela might be due to significant wage differentials between these two 
groups of firms, and low absorptive capacity of local firms. It is worth noting that the study 
uses cross–sectional data for the US (in 1987) and data are aggregated at the industry level 
instead of the firm level.  
Adopting a similar approach, Feliciano and Lipsey (2006) investigate wage differentials 
and wage spillovers from FDI to US firms but extend the analysis by including non-
manufacturing industries. Using firm level panel data for 1987 and 1992, the study reveals that 
foreign firms pay approximately 30 per cent higher than domestic counterparts, with a larger 
margin for non-manufacturing firms. More importantly, some positive wage spillovers are 
found in the non-manufacturing sector. However, there is no evidence of such effect in the 
manufacturing sector, which contradicts the findings of Aitken et al. (1996). Axarloglou and 
Pournarakis (2007) also examine the case of US manufacturing industries with an emphasis 
on employment and wage impacts of FDI across states from 1974 to 1994. The results indicate 
rather weak effects of foreign entrants on local wages and employment in most states. Such 
effects are dependent on subgroups of industries, suggesting the importance of industry 
characteristics in explaining spillovers from FDI to local labour market.  
Several empirical papers analyse FDI-induced wage spillovers in the UK – another 
developed and high-wage economy. Girma et al. (1999) examine productivity and wage 
differentials and spillovers from FDI to the UK manufacturing firms. Using firm-level panel 
data for the period of 1991-1996, the study suggests five per cent and ten per cent higher 
average wage and labour productivity of foreign firms, respectively. Surprisingly, no wage 
and productivity spillovers from FDI are found. Nevertheless, the inclusion of firm level 
characteristics (skill mix, competition, technology gap) results in some positive spillovers. 
Similarly, Driffield and Girma (2003) test for wage spillovers from FDI to domestic firms 
in the UK electronics industry over the years of 1980-1992. Contrary to Girma et al. (1999), 
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this study shows significant evidence of wage spillovers. Specifically, significant wage 
spillovers are uniformly distributed across regions for skilled workers. Meanwhile, wage 
spillovers for unskilled workers are more pronounced in assisted areas with high 
unemployment levels. Positive wage spillovers are also supported by Driffield and Taylor 
(2006) who examine inter-industry and inter-regional wage spillovers from FDI in the UK 
manufacturing industries. 
Barry et al. (2005) contribute to the literature by separately estimating the impact of FDI 
on wages of domestic exporters and non-exporters in Irish manufacturing industries. The 
study employs firm-level panel data (1990-1998) estimated by linear generalised methods 
of moments with instruments estimator and accounts for the endogeneity problem of FDI 
presence. The main findings indicate that foreign presence negatively affects wages of 
domestic exporting firms. The negative spillover effect of FDI on domestic exporters occurs 
due to the crowding out effect of FDI through the labour market when FDI firms poach the 
best workers away from local counterparts via higher wages. Meanwhile, domestic non-
exporting firms appear to neither benefit nor suffer from foreign entry. The absence of 
spillovers is attributable to the low absorptive capacity of local non-exporters. While 
extending the literature by testing for wage spillovers based on exporting behaviour of 
domestic firms, Barry et al. (2005) only control for firms’ productivity and size in the model, 
which may omit important firm-level variables in the wage determination functions.   
Using a similar approach, Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno (2013) analyse the intra-
industry wage spillovers in Spanish manufacturing industries. The study also uses firm level 
panel data (1992-2008) as in Barry et al. (2005) but adopts the random effect model. The 
estimation results suggest no significant evidence of positive wage spillovers from FDI at 
the aggregate level after controlling for firm specific characteristics (share of skilled 
workers, share of foreign workers, size, added value, capital intensity, competition level, 
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share of part-time and share of temporary workers). Further examination of labour skills of 
domestic firms shows that only workers in domestic firms that employ a highly skilled 
workforce will benefit from wage spillovers.   
In a more recent study for Italy, Pittiglio, Reganati, and Sica (2015) test for the wage 
spillovers effect from FDI through both horizontal and vertical channels. Using a firm-level 
dataset between 2002 and 2007, the research fails to find any positive wage spillovers from 
FDI to local firms at both spillovers channels. Nevertheless, significant vertical wage 
spillovers are found when including a proxy for the technology gap (between domestic and 
foreign firms) in the model. Accordingly, domestic firms with small or medium gaps benefit 
from wage spillovers, while domestic firms with large gaps suffer. Therefore, the authors 
recommend FDI to be directed towards the sectoral and local characteristics of the host 
economy.  
The FDI-linked wage spillover effect is also found to be mixed in empirical studies of 
host developing countries. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) test for wage spillovers from FDI on 
domestic manufacturing firms in Indonesia with a cross-sectional dataset for 1996. Apart 
from firm level characteristics (e.g., size, ownership, female share), the analysis is extended 
by including workers’ education levels to control their impacts on firms’ wage 
determination. The main findings suggest significant positive spillovers to domestic firms’ 
wages for both white-collar and blue-collar workers. Furthermore, foreign entry enables 
domestic counterparts to pay higher wages (with greater gains for white-collar workers) 
when examining wage spillovers at the provincial level. Tomohara and Takii (2011) also 
support the positive wage spilliover effect for Indonesian manufacturing firms, using a panel 
dataset from 1989 to 1996.  
Hale and Long (2011) extend the literature by testing wage spillovers from FDI to 
Chinese private and state-owned firms in the manufacturing and service industries. The study 
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uses the World Bank survey dataset of 1,500 firms in 2001, which provides a range of firms 
and workers’ characteristics. The estimation results show different outcomes with respect to 
ownership types of domestic firms. Accordingly, the entry of FDI firms into the same 
industry and region positively affect wages of skilled workers in domestic private firms. 
Meanwhile, foreign presence appears to have no effect on wages of workers in domestic 
state-owned firms. Similarly,  Elliott and Zhou (2015) investigate the case of China but focus 
on manufacturing firms only. Using cross-sectional data from 2004, the paper supports the 
results by Hale and Long (2011). In general, foreign ownership has positive effect on wages 
of domestic manufacturing firms located in the same areas. 
Chidambaran Iyer (2012) analyses the effect of foreign firms on average wages offered 
by Indian manufacturing firms from 1989 to 2004. Similar to Hale and Long (2011), a set of 
firm level characteristics are controlled in domestic firms’ wage equations, including age, 
research and development expenditure, export ratio and size. While previous studies mainly 
use employment share of FDI firms as a proxy for foreign presence, Chidambaran Iyer 
(2012) measures the role of FDI by output share of foreign firms at the three-digit and four-
digit industry levels. The results are contradictory and depend on the aggregation of data 
used. Accordingly, foreign presence measured at the three-digit level has a negative effect 
on domestic firms’ wages while measurement at four-digit level indicates a positive effect. 
The findings imply that the wage spillovers effect may be sensitive to the choice of FDI 
measurement.  
Srithanpong (2014) provides empirical evidence on wage spillovers from inward FDI to 
domestic firms in Thai manufacturing industries. Using cross-sectional firm-level data in 
2007, the study takes into account a number of domestic firms’ characteristics such as capital 
intensity, age, labour quality and ownership type. In contrast to previous studies, Srithanpong 
(2014) adopts two measures of FDI, namely foreign employment share and foreign output 
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share in the industry. The use of an alternative FDI proxy can deal with biases due to 
measurement. The main findings show the positive effect of FDI on the average wages of Thai 
manufacturing firms or positive wage spillovers at both the regional and industry levels.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, Hoi and Pomfret (2010) is the only research 
examining FDI-linked wage spillovers for the case of Vietnam, using data from 2000 to 
2010. The fixed-effect estimations indicate significant positive wage impact from FDI to 
domestic counterparts. Of these, horizontal spillovers occur regardless of labour market 
conditions and firms' characteristics, but vertical spillovers depend on firms and industries’ 
characteristics. While the study by Hoi and Pomfret (2010) provides empirical evidence on 
FDI-linked wage effect on Vietnamese firms, it is restricted to the sample of domestic private 
firms in the manufacturing sector. This thesis extends the literature, particularly for Vietnam, 
by shedding light on differential FDI-induced wage spillovers in the diverse services sector, 
employing a more recent dataset and a rigorous estimation technique (IV-GMM) to address 
the potential endogeneity problem. Furthermore, the empirical models and findings are 
linked back to the theoretical framework, resulting in insightful interpretation and 
implications.  
3.3 FDI and employment 
3.3.1 FDI and overall employment 
FDI is generally viewed as having positive effects on the host labour market by 
generating direct and indirect employment. The entry of foreign firms usually shifts the 
labour demand upward, directly creating new job opportunities for local workers, at least in 
the short run (Axarloglou & Pournarakis, 2007; Coniglio et al., 2015). Moreover, foreign 
affiliates can generate jobs indirectly through facilitating industrial contacts when they are 
suppliers to domestic buyers in upstream industries (forward linkages) and buyers of 
domestic suppliers in downstream industries (backward linkages) (Karlsson et al., 2009). 
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These effects can have considerable implications for policymakers in host countries, 
particularly in labour-abundant developing economies. Host governments normally 
emphasise the employment expansionary effect of FDI as a major benefit and an effective 
solution to reduce unemployment. 
Arguably, the extent of the job creation effect by foreign firms depends largely on the 
modes of FDI (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Ernst, 2005). Of these, greenfield investment (i.e., 
FDI projects establishing a new foreign firm) is considered to have the highest potential of 
employment contribution since it can directly foster substantial labour demand for new 
operation. Meanwhile, another popular entry mode of FDI, namely mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A), is usually considered as having minimal employment expansion effect. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that job creation by FDI entry might vary across industries. 
Intuitively, the FDI impact on employment is more significant if foreign firms enter labour-
intensive industries than capital-intensive ones.      
While the presence of FDI firms is generally expected to stimulate employment, 
especially from policy and theoretical perspectives, the empirical evidence indicates that FDI 
can have insignificant and even contracting effects on the local job market. Girma (2005) 
examines the direct employment effect of acquisition FDI in the UK manufacturing sector. 
The results suggest that by acquiring and restructuring current firms, FDI can improve 
efficiency without causing significant changes in the number of employees. Several 
empirical findings indicate that the quantitative effect of FDI on the local employment is 
modest (Brännlund, Nordström, Stage, & Svedin, 2016; Kurtishi-Kastrati, 2013).  
Furthermore, Moosa (2002) asserts that foreign firms can adversely affect labour 
demand by divestment and closure of production facilities. Job reduction may also occur 
when the entrance of foreign firms forces domestic counterparts to cut production and shut 
down as a result of competitive pressure (Coniglio et al., 2015). Such crowding–out effects 
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of FDI are more likely to take place in open and highly competitive markets, and when FDI 
firms mainly produce for domestic markets rather than exporting. Finally, in the short run, 
the job creation potential of inward FDI might be negatively affected by the introduction of 
labour-saving technologies, notably in highly productive foreign firms (Jenkins, 2006; Jude 
& Silaghi, 2016; Pfaffermayr, 2001).  
3.3.2 FDI and female employment 
From an economics perspective, the gender wage gap (i.e., the ratio of female to male 
wages) and employment gap (i.e., the ratio of female to male employment) are the two 
measures most widely adopted in analysing gender inequality in labour markets (Aguayo-
Tellez, 2012). Within the FDI-gender employment strand, previous studies show consistent 
evidence that foreign firms, particularly large multinationals, tend to employ female workers 
at higher rates than domestic counterparts. By employing more women, FDI firms can reap 
substantial benefits from optimising female labour’ under-utilised skills as well as taking 
advantage of gender wage gaps pervasively found in many recipient economies, notably 
labour abundant developing ones.   
Curd et al. (2007) examine the impact of inward FDI on Chinese women through survey 
data. They find that multinationals show high interest in employing local females who on 
average account for more than 70 per cent of their total workforce. This hiring preference is 
attributed to two main reasons. First, women are perceived to possess skills and attributes 
that enable them to be more suitable and productive (than men) in many FDI-concentrated 
manufacturing industries such as electronics, textile, garment and apparel. As indicated in 
earlier studies (Elson & Pearson, 1981; Fernández-Kelly, 1983), employers normally prefer 
females because of their putative nimble fingers; their obedience and being less prone to 
worker unrest; their being suited to tedious work; and their reliability and trainability relative 
to male counterparts. Second, FDI firms tend to employ more females to benefit from gender 
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wage gaps in China while female labour is under-utilised in local firms (partly resulting from 
gender discrimination in labour markets). In fact, the gender wage gap is significant when 
the average wage of females is approximately 70 per cent that of males.        
In a cross-country study, Hewlett and Rashid (2010) suggest that foreign invested firms 
can significantly improve their prospects by adopting strategies to attract and retain talented 
women in emerging economies. The study employs survey data on 4,350 college-educated 
men and women working in five large multinationals (i.e., Bloomberg, Booz & Company, 
Intel, Pfizer, and Siemens) across five countries (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China, and the 
United Arab Emirates). The sample shows that women demonstrate surprisingly high 
educational attainment, career ambition and commitment. Taking the case of UAE as an 
example, females account for 65 per cent of college graduates; 92 per cent consider 
themselves ambitious; and more than 80 per cent of them express strong work commitment. 
However, the authors find that female talent is under-developed and under-utilised in 
emerging economies, mainly due to family-related responsibilities and gender 
discrimination in the local labour markets. Meanwhile, multinationals have recognised and 
promoted the benefits of hiring this vibrant and growing female workforce to meet their 
talent shortage and boost long-term business prospects.  
Focusing on female employment in managerial positions, Siegel, Pyun, and Cheon 
(2014) provide significant empirical evidence on FDI and female labour in South Korea 
during the period 2005-2007. Their key findings indicate that by hiring more female 
managers, foreign firms gain considerable competitive advantages to improve their 
profitability. Notably, foreign affiliates are more likely to hire women as senior managers 
than domestic firms. In a further analysis, the authors examine female hiring practices of 
multinationals originating from Japan, a society considered to be heavily gender 
discriminatory. They find that Japanese foreign affiliates exhibit different behaviour by 
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showing a higher probability of hiring female managers than parent corporates in their home 
country. This result suggests that foreign firms behave strategically as they can identify the 
opportunity and take the competitive advantage of hiring female workers who are perceived 
as an excluded or disadvantaged group in the local managerial labour market.  
In addition to benefiting from women’s under-utilised skills and gender wage gaps, FDI 
affiliates might employ a higher proportion of females (than domestic firms) simply because 
of corporate culture as suggested by Kodama, Javorcik, and Abe (2016). This study explores 
the impacts of foreign ownership on gender employment outcomes and work practices in 
Japan, which has greater gender inequality than other developed countries.4 The findings 
indicate that foreign affiliates largely transplant their parent corporate culture and norms in 
hiring practices, which are more gender-equal than those of domestic counterparts. 
Accordingly, the share of females in the firm’s total workforce as well as managerial 
positions are all higher in FDI affiliates than in domestic firms. Moreover, foreign firms are 
more likely to have smaller gender wage gaps and provide female-friendly employment 
practices such as flexible working arrangements, telecommuting, and child-care subsidies.   
The FDI-female labour relationship is also discussed in several recent studies examining 
the determinants of female employment. Of these, Fakih and Ghazalian (2015) empirically 
investigate the role of macro and micro factors, including foreign ownership, in determining 
female employment of manufacturing firms in the Middle East and North African (MENA) 
region. The study employs firm-level data obtained from the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys database between 2001 and 2009. Their fractional Logit estimation results indicate 
that local firms’ female employment is largely determined by a set of macro factors (i.e., 
economic development and gender equality) and micro factors (i.e., foreign ownership, 
 
4 According to the Gender Gap Index Report by the World Economic Forum (2014), Japan ranked 104th 
out of 142 countries surveyed.  
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export, size and labour composition). Notably, MENA’s manufacturing firms with higher 
levels of FDI ownership have a higher proportion of female workers in their workforce. 
Specifically, a 10 per cent increase in foreign ownership leads to a 1.4 per cent increase in 
female employment rates of MENA’s manufacturing firms.     
With a similar approach, Ahmed, Feeny, and Posso (2016) contribute to the empirical 
evidence of inward FDI as a determinant of female employment in Bangladesh’s 
manufacturing firms. The study also adopts the fractional Logit model, estimated with firm-level 
panel data covering the years 2007, 2011 and 2013. The findings suggest the important role of 
firm-specific characteristics in influencing female employment, including firm size, export 
activity, technology level and ownership structure. Contrary to Fakih and Ghazalian (2015), 
this study reveals a negative impact of inward FDI on female employment. The authors attribute 
this result to the prevailing gender discrimination in the local labour market and FDI firms’ 
preference for employing higher skilled and educated workers who are more likely to be male.  
While previous studies mostly suggest positive effects of inward FDI on female labour 
within FDI firms, there is surprisingly scant evidence of whether and how FDI firms can 
impact female employment of domestic firms. To the best of my knowledge, Tang and 
Zhang (2017) is the very first study attempting to explore this spillover effect of FDI on 
domestic firms’ female employment, using the empirical case of China’s manufacturing 
firms over the years 2004-2007. First, a theoretical model is constructed to show that 
domestic firms update their beliefs about female workers upon observing FDI firms’ 
decisions in the same labour market, causing so-called ‘cultural spillovers’. The empirical 
results reveal the existence of such spillovers with a one standard-deviation increase in FDI 
presence causing a 0.7 per cent increase in the female employment shares of domestic firms 
in the same industry. Similar to Kodama et al. (2016), this research also provides empirical 
evidence of foreign affiliates transplanting their parent corporate culture in hiring females.  
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3.4 FDI and labour productivity  
Compared to the two strands of literature on the labour market impacts of FDI presence 
discussed in previous sections, the impact of FDI on labour productivity has been far more 
extensively researched. Foreign affiliates are widely perceived to possess superior intangible 
assets such as technological know-how, managerial and marketing skills, export experience 
and reputation (Aitken et al., 1996; Khalifah, Mohd Salleh, & Adam, 2015). These 
productive advantages could enable them to overcome the higher costs of establishing 
facilities overseas and competing with domestic firms who presumably have better 
knowledge of local markets, including contacts with suppliers, demand conditions, legal 
environment and culture  (Girma et al., 1999; Graham & Krugman, 1995). The entry of 
foreign multinationals largely involves the transfer of intangible assets through on-the-job 
training provided to local workers (Aitken et al., 1996; Kim, 2015). Therefore, if these 
productive assets are successfully absorbed by local employees, FDI can directly contribute 
to the human capital accumulation of the FDI sector and the entire host country alike. This 
productivity enhancing effect can provide long-term benefits, which may partially explain 
strong incentives of host governments to attract FDI.     
Furthermore, the entry of FDI firms with advantageous assets can arguably affect the 
labour productivity of domestic firms (Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999; Javorcik, 2004; Newman 
et al., 2015). Such an effect, known as productivity spillovers, can take place via contacts 
between foreign and domestic firms operating in the same industry (horizontal linkages) or 
across industries (vertical linkages). Of these, vertical linkages may comprise forward linkages 
(FDI firms supply inputs to domestic firms) and backward linkages (FDI firms buy inputs from 
domestic firms). The existence of positive productivity spillovers indicates that domestics 
firms can enhance productivity by observing and imitating skills and techniques of FDI 
counterparts (i.e., demonstration and imitation effect), self-innovating to stay competitive 
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(competition effect), and employing workers trained by FDI firms (labour mobility effect) 
(Khalifah et al., 2015; Kokko, 1996). Recent studies suggest that this fundamental form of 
spillovers from FDI can also exert indirect effects on local firms’ performance (e.g., revenues, 
export quality) via so-called ‘cut-off capability’ (Anwar & Sun, 2018; Sun & Anwar, 2017). 
The cut-off capability represents the lowest level of capability that a firm needs to enter the 
market. If foreign firms generate positive productivity spillovers in the host economy, which 
in turn will reduce the cut-off capability, the presence of foreign firms will stimulate the entry 
of new firms in the industry. Nonetheless, negative spillovers may occur if FDI firms push 
up competitive pressure, forcing domestic (less productive) firms to cut production or even 
go bankrupt, which Aitken and Harrison (1999) referred to as the ‘market stealing’ effect.  
Empirical evidence on FDI-induced productivity spillovers is substantial but far from 
unanimous. The pioneering studies of Caves (1974) and Globerman (1979) suggest positive 
productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms of Australia and Canada, respectively. 
Similar evidence is supported in the following works for both developed and developing 
host countries (Blomström & Persson, 1983; Branstetter, 2006; Kokko, 1996; Sun, 2011; Xu 
& Sheng, 2012). Conversely, some empirical papers suggest an insignificant or negative 
spillover effect of FDI on local firms’ productivity (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Sadik & 
Bolbol, 2001). The mixed results are mainly attributable to differences in data used, 
estimation methodology, measurement of key variables, FDI characteristics, and absorptive 
capacity of domestic firms and host countries (Iršová & Havránek, 2013; Lenaerts & 
Merlevede, 2015; Wooster & Diebel, 2010).   
3.5 Summary 
This chapter reviewed previous studies on FDI and the host labour market. The review 
indicates a growing body of literature investigating the relationship between foreign 
ownership and key aspects of the local labour market, namely wages, employment and 
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labour productivity. Notably, four major knowledge gaps could be identified following the 
in-depth review of related literature.   
First, the FDI-host labour market literature has so far paid modest attention to exploring 
the impact of inward FDI on domestic firms’ wages, causing so-called wage spillovers. This 
is in contrast to the extensive evidence on FDI and wage gaps, suggesting the existence of 
foreign wage premium, which unambiguously benefits workers in foreign firms.  
Second, investigating the potential impact of FDI firms on domestic firms’ female 
employment remains a striking gap in the existing FDI literature. By contrast, the finding of 
higher female intensity within FDI firms (compared to domestic counterparts) is relatively 
well documented within the FDI-gendered employment research.  
Third, while productivity spillovers from inward FDI are thoroughly examined, other 
related types of FDI-induced spillovers, such as those on domestic firms’ wages or female 
employment, have received far less attention. Research findings on other forms of FDI 
spillovers would provide the host country’s policymakers with deeper insights and 
implications on the influence of foreign firms, stimulating optimal policy formulation and 
intervention process.  
Last but not least, evidence on all the three research strands of FDI impacts on the host 
labour market is particularly scant in the services sector. On the contrary, the existing 
literature exhibits an overwhelming focus on the manufacturing sector. Compared to firms 
and industries in manufacturing, those in services generally tend to be more diverse, 
implying greater heterogeneity and distinctive impacts of foreign presence. Furthermore, as 
described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.3), there are stark differences between these two sectors 
in terms of wages and female employment for both domestic and FDI firms, which 
underscores the particular need for examining FDI impacts on these labour-market aspects 
in the specific context of the services sector.     
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Data 
 
4.1 Introduction         
This chapter describes the research methodology and data used for the empirical 
analyses in the thesis. Sections 4.2 presents the process of modelling the impact of FDI 
presence on domestic firms’ wages, causing wage spillovers. Whereas, Section 4.3 entails 
the modelling of FDI impact on female employment of domestic firms. First, theoretical 
models are constructed to explain channels via which foreign firms can influence average 
wage levels (Section 4.2) and female-to-male employment ratios (Section 4.3) by domestic 
firms. Next, guided by the theoretical setups, econometric models are specified to estimate 
and test the existence of hypothesised spillover effects from FDI firms in Vietnam’s services 
sector. The empirical models comprise a vector of explanatory variables, of which the 
variable, foreign presence (FDI), captures the effect of FDI firms in the local labour market.  
Section 4.4 presents the strategy adopted to estimate the econometric models specified in 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3. In particular, the potential endogeneity of the key variable (FDI) is 
highlighted, which requires the use of the IV-GMM estimation technique to address the bias 
and inconsistency due to the problem. This section entails a novel approach to constructing 
instrumental variables to satisfy the simultaneous conditions of relevance and validity. The 
thesis employs a number of diagnostic tests that are also presented in this section. Next, Section 
4.5 describes the research data, including data source, data screening and panel construction, 
and data management and analysis tool. Finally, Section 4.6 summarises the chapter.   
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4.2 Modelling FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages 
4.2.1 Theoretical modelling 
4.2.1.1 Labour demand  
This section establishes a link between the presence of FDI firms and the equilibrium 
wage rate of domestic firms, using the standard framework of profit maximisation with 
Melitz-type heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003). In a monopolistically competitive product 
market,5 firms employ workers from the local labour market to produce outputs. On the 
demand side of the product market, a representative consumer has the following constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function:6   
𝑈 = [∫ 𝑞(𝜔)𝜌𝑑𝜔𝜔∈Ω ]
1
𝜌                            (4.2.1) 
where 𝜔 indexes the products; Ω refers to the set of all available products; q is the quantity 
of consumption. All products are substitutes for each other (0 < ρ < 1) and have a constant 
elasticity of substitution of 
1
1−𝜌
 . Maximization of utility function, subject to a budget 
constraint, yields the following demand function: 
𝑞 = Φ𝑝
1
𝜌−1                                            (4.2.2) 
where p is the price; Φ ≡
𝑌
∫ 𝑝(𝜔)
𝜌
𝜌−1𝑑𝜔𝜔∈Ω
 measures the level of aggregate demand; and Y is 
the consumer’s income. Each firm takes Φ as given because they are small relative to the 
 
5 In theoretical modelling, monopolistic competition is a widely-held assumption, and it is more consistent 
with data as compared to monopoly or perfect competition (see for example, Melitz (2003); Egger and 
Kreickemeier (2009); Sun (2014); Tang and Zhang (2017)). In this research, the empirical analyses in 
Chapters 5 and 6 indicate that the services sector in Vietnam comprises a large number of heterogeneous 
firms, providing substantially differentiated products. Besides, the summary statistics also show the average 
Herfindahl index, as a proxy of market competition, is notably low at 0.01. Thus, the examined sector can 
be categorised as being monopolistically competitive.      
6 Other researchers also utilise the CES utility function to model the impacts of FDI firms on domestic 
firms’ output performance indicators, such as revenues and export quality (Anwar & Sun, 2018; Sun & 
Anwar, 2017). This thesis develops the framework to incorporate the role of foreign presence in 
determining the input-related aspect of local firms, namely average wages.   
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industry. Therefore, the impact of a change in each firm’s output on the industry’s aggregate 
demand (Φ) is negligible. 
On the production side, the industry consists of both domestic and FDI firms located in 
different regions of the country, where γ measures the level of foreign presence in the 
industry-region (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1). Upon entry into the industry, each firm pays a fixed entry cost, 
including costs of business registration and market research. After entering the industry and 
paying the fixed cost of production (f) (e.g., setting up plant and purchasing machine), firms 
employ one unit of labour to produce s units of output.  
The production process can be described by the production function F(l) = sl, where l is 
labour used, and s is labour productivity. Labour productivity (s) depends on a set of 
observed firm-specific characteristics (namely 𝜂 = 𝑥1
𝜆1𝑥2
𝜆2𝑥3
𝜆3𝑥4
𝜆4, where η is an aggregate 
index that depends on x1, x2, x3 and x4 which represent size, ownership, age and capital 
intensity respectively) and an unobserved capability endowment (θ). The capability 
endowment is randomly drawn from a Pareto distribution upon entry, with the probability 
density function given by: 
𝑔(𝜃) = {
𝜇𝜃 𝜇
𝜃𝜇+1
, 𝜃 ≥ 𝜃   
   0, 𝜃 < 𝜃                
                  (4.2.3) 
where 𝜇 is a shape parameter and 𝜃 is the minimum value of θ. 
Moreover, the FDI literature suggests that the presence of FDI firms with advantageous 
assets (such as technological know–how, managerial and marketing skills, export experience 
and reputation) can affect labour productivity of domestic firms, causing productivity 
spillovers (Javorcik, 2004; Kathuria, 2001; Newman et al., 2015). Thus, labour productivity 
of domestic firm i depends on the firm characteristics (η), capability endowment (θ), and 
foreign presence (γ) as follows:  
𝑠 = 𝜂𝜃𝑒𝛼𝛾                           
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where parameter α captures the sign and the magnitude of the FDI–induced productivity 
spillover effect. A positive value of this parameter implies that FDI firms enhance the 
productivity of domestic firms. On the contrary, a negative value of this parameter suggests 
that FDI firms adversely affect the productivity of domestic counterparts.  
Given that 
1
𝑠
 units of labour are employed to produce one unit of output, the marginal cost 
of production for domestic firm i can be written as: 
                          𝑀𝐶 =
𝑤
𝑠
=
𝑤
𝜂𝜃𝑒𝛼𝛾
      
where MC represents marginal cost of production and w denotes the firm’s wage rate. If the 
productivity spillover is positive, an increase in foreign presence (FDI) reduces domestic 
firms’ marginal cost of production, everything else equal. 
Given the MC, the profit of domestic firm i can be written as follows: 
𝜋 = (𝑝 −
𝑤
𝜂𝜃𝑒𝛼𝛾
) 𝑞 − 𝑓                             (4.2.4) 
The first-order condition of the profit maximization problem is as below: 
𝑝∗ =
𝑤
𝜌𝜂𝜃𝑒𝛼𝛾
 
where 𝑝∗represents the optimal price. 
Substituting this condition into the profit function, the optimal profit for firm i can be 
obtained as follows:   
𝜋∗ =
1−𝜌
𝜌
𝜌
𝜌−1
Φ ( 𝑤
𝜂𝜃𝑒𝛼𝛾
)
𝜌
𝜌−1 − 𝑓                 (4.2.5) 
The firm will enter the industry if it makes non-negative profit (𝜋∗ ≥ 0). The condition 
𝜋∗ = 0 defines a cut-off capability (θ*), which can be written as below:  
𝜃∗ =
1
𝜌(1−𝜌)
1−𝜌
𝜌
 Φ
𝜌−1
𝜌 𝑤𝜂−1𝑒−𝛼𝛾𝑓
1−𝜌
𝜌                 (4.2.6) 
Equation (4.2.6) implies that if FDI-induced productivity spillover effect is positive (𝛼 >
0), an increase in foreign presence leads to a decrease in the cut-off capability of domestic 
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firms. Subsequently, the lower cut-off capability allows more firms to enter and survive in 
the industry. Given the demand function and optimal pricing, the optimal quantity (𝑞∗) 
produced by firm i is derived as below: 
𝑞∗ = Φ (
𝑤
𝜌𝜂𝜃𝑒𝛼𝛾
)
1
𝜌−1                     
Using the production function (F(l) = sl), we can obtain the labour demand (𝑙𝑑) of 
domestic firm i as follows: 
𝑙𝑑 = Φ𝜌
1
1−𝜌𝑤
1
𝜌−1𝜂
𝜌
1−𝜌𝜃
𝜌
1−𝜌𝑒
(
𝜌
1−𝜌
)𝛼𝛾
                
Therefore, the aggregate demand can be written as: 
𝐿𝑑(𝑤) =
𝜇𝜃𝜇
𝜇−
𝜌
1−𝜌
𝜌𝜇(1 − 𝜌)
1−𝜌
𝜌
𝜇−1
Φ
1−𝜌
𝜌
𝜇
𝑤−1−𝜇𝑒𝛼𝜇𝛾𝑓
1−
1−𝜌
𝜌
𝜇
∫ 𝜂𝜇?̃?(𝜂)𝑑𝜂         (4.2.7) 
where ?̃?(𝜂) is the probability density function of 𝜂; and 𝜇 >
𝜌
1−𝜌
.               
4.2.1.2 Labour supply  
In each region, workers are faced with job offers from firms in the region. If a worker 
rejects job offers, s/he will enjoy leisure. The value of such leisure is the worker’s reservation 
wage (𝑤𝑟), and a job offer will only be accepted if it is higher than the worker’s reservation 
wage. The reservation wage depends on various factors. For example, individuals with high 
qualifications or having children might have higher reservation wages. In addition, job 
seekers in a region with high unemployment rate might have lower reservation wages 
because of the unfavourable job market. We assume the reservation wage is exogenously 
distributed, with a probability density function of 𝑔(𝑤𝑟).  
Each region has a labour endowment, ?̅?. For simplicity, we assume that workers make 
decision on whether to accept a job offer in a first–come–first–accept manner, namely they 
will accept a job offer as long as its wage rate is higher than their reservation wage, and will 
not hold an acceptable job offer to wait for better offers. This non-strategic behaviour 
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facilitates the formulation of labour supply function, and it is the case when firms’ job offers 
require workers to make decisions in a very short time frame.  
Subsequently the aggregate labour supply with which firms are faced is the labour 
endowment in the region, times the probability that the firm’s job offer is accepted, as 
follows:  
𝐿𝑠(𝑤) = 𝐿𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤 ≥ 𝑤𝑟) = 𝐿 ∫ 𝑔(𝑤𝑟)𝑑
𝑤
0
𝑤𝑟                            (4.2.8) 
Assume that 𝑤𝑟  is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 𝑤𝑟] where 𝑤𝑟 is the upper 
bound of the reservation wage in region j, the labour supply facing domestic firm i can be 
expressed as below: 
𝐿𝑠(𝑤) = 𝐿
𝑤
𝑤𝑟
                 (4.2.9) 
Note that the term 
𝐿
𝑤𝑟
 is region specific and does not vary across firms.  
4.2.1.3 The equilibrium in the labour market 
Equating the aggregate demand of labour (𝐿𝑑) with the aggregate supply of labour (𝐿𝑠), 
we can derive the equilibrium wage rate (𝑤∗) as follows: 
 𝑤∗ = [ 𝜇𝜃
𝜇
𝜇−
𝜌
1−𝜌
𝜌𝜇(1 − 𝜌)
1−𝜌
𝜌
𝜇−1
𝑓
1−
1−𝜌
𝜌
𝜇 𝑤𝑟
𝐿
∫ 𝜂𝜇?̃?(𝜂)𝑑𝜂]
1
2+𝜇
Φ
1−𝜌
𝜌
𝜇
2+𝜇𝑒
𝜇
2+𝜇
𝛼𝛾           (4.2.10) 
Later in our empirical estimation, the equilibrium wage rate is unobserved. Instead, we 
have data of firm average wage. Motivated by the equilibrium wage rate in Equation (4.2.10), 
we specify the average wage function as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1lnΦ + 𝛽2ln
𝑤𝑟
𝐿
+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝜂 + 𝛽4𝛾 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝜃                           (4.2.11) 
where 𝑤 represents average wage and  𝛽s are the coefficients. Note that the equilibrium 
wage in Equation (4.2.10) has industry-region-time variations while the firm average wage 
has firm-industry-region-time variations. Accordingly, we add firm characteristics and 
capability endowment to capture the firm-level variations in the data. 
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The firm will only survive in the industry and pay wages to employees, if it makes profit. 
That is, firms are observed in the sample only if its capability endowment is higher than the 
cut-off level (θ ≥ θ*). Therefore, the conditional expectation of the firm’s average wage can 
be derived as follows: 
𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝑤| 𝜃 ≥ 𝜃∗] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1lnΦ + 𝛽2ln
𝑤𝑟
𝐿
+ 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝜂 + 𝛽4𝛾 + 𝛽5𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝜃|𝜃 ≥ 𝜃
∗]           (4.2.12) 
                               Direct          Indirect 
Equation (4.2.12) indicates that the expected (average) wage by domestic firm i depends 
on aggregate demand level (Φ), regional fixed effect (
𝑤𝑟
𝐿
), firm’s characteristics (η), 
capability endowment and foreign presence (γ). Note that FDI presence affects the firm’s 
average wage through two channels: (i) a direct impact via productivity spillovers (𝛽4 which 
is a monotone increasing function of α) and (ii) an indirect impact via the cut-off capability 
(𝜃∗). 
Using the Pareto distribution given in Equation (4.2.3), we can derive the conditional 
probability density function of the firm capability endowment as follows: 
𝑔(𝜃|𝜃 ≥ 𝜃∗) = {
𝜇(𝜃∗)𝜇
𝜃𝜇+1
, 𝜃 ≥ 𝜃∗   
   0, 𝜃 < 𝜃∗                
 
Therefore, the conditional expectation of the firm capability endowment can be written 
as below: 
 𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝜃|𝜃 ≥ 𝜃∗] = 𝜇(𝜃∗)𝜇 ∫ 𝜃−(𝜇+1)𝑙𝑛𝜃𝑑𝜃
∞
𝜃∗
= 𝜇2 ln
1
𝜌(1−𝜌)
1−𝜌
𝜌
+ 𝜇2 (
𝜌−1
𝜌
) 𝑙𝑛Φ +
𝜇2𝑙𝑛𝑤 − 𝜇2𝑙𝑛𝜂 − 𝜇2𝛼𝛾 + 𝜇2 (
1−𝜌
𝜌
) 𝑙𝑛𝑓 + 𝜇                (4.2.13) 
By differentiating Equation (4.2.12) with respect to γ, together with Equation (4.2.13), 
we can derive the marginal impact of foreign presence on the expected equilibrium wage 
rate of domestic firm i as follows: 
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𝜕𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝑤|𝜃 ≥ 𝜃∗]
𝜕𝛾
= ?̃?
4
+ ?̃?
5
𝜕𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝜃|𝜃≥𝜃∗]
𝜕𝛾
= ?̃?
4
− ?̃?
5
2𝜇2
2+𝜇
𝛼              (4.2.14) 
                Direct       Indirect     Direct    Indirect 
 Equation (4.2.14) illustrates that foreign presence affects the expected (average) wage 
via two contrasting channels. For instance, if positive productivity spillovers exist (i.e., α > 
0 or 𝛽4 > 0), the direct effect of an increase in FDI presence on the domestic firm’s wage is 
positive. Meanwhile, the indirect effect is negative as it decreases the cut–off capability, 
putting a downward pressure on the expected average wage (i.e., −?̃?
5
2𝜇2
2+𝜇
𝛼 < 0). The net 
impact of FDI presence on the firm average wage depends on the relative strength of these 
two channels.7  
4.2.2 Econometric modelling 
The theoretical model in Section 4.2.1 indicates that domestic firms’ average wage 
depends on the presence of FDI firms (i.e., wage spillovers) and a set of other factors, 
including firm-specific characteristics. Therefore, the theoretical setting provides a 
foundation to specify the following econometric model, which is further expanded from 
Equation (4.2.11), to empirically test and estimate wage spillover effect from FDI firms to 
domestic counterparts in Vietnam’s services sector: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐾_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘
+ 𝛽9𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 
 
7 Given the Pareto distribution, the impact of FDI presence on domestic firms’ equilibrium wage depends 
on the shape parameter 𝜇. 
    
(4.2.15) 
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In Equation (4.2.15), the average wage (𝑤) of domestic firm i in service industry k in 
region j at time t is calculated as total wages (TW) divided by the total employment (L) (i.e., 
𝑤 =
𝑇𝑊
𝐿
), then transformed to the natural logarithmic form (𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡). Total wages include 
salaries, commissions, bonuses, overtime and vacation pay and other benefits.  
Notably, later in the estimations, I restrict the sample to domestic firms, in order to 
capture the FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages, namely wage spillovers, and thus 
disentangle any influence of FDI firms on their own wages. This restriction also enables one 
to eliminate possible bias due to foreign wage premium that has largely been found in the 
FDI-wage literature (Aitken et al., 1996; Barry et al., 2005; Pittiglio et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, compared to the cross-sectional data, using panel data enables me to separate 
the FDI effects resulting from observed firm and industry characteristics from those due to 
unobserved factors (Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 2013; Sjöholm & Lipsey, 2006). 
Following the setup of the theoretical model, a vector of explanatory variables is 
included in the empirical model to capture the role of factors which potentially affect 
domestic firms’ average wages. Of these, foreign presence (FDI) is the variable of interest 
and is measured by the employment share of FDI firms as follows: 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝐹𝑘𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝐹𝑘𝑗𝑡∪𝐷𝑘𝑗𝑡
            (4.2.16) 
where y is the total employment of firm i in service industry k in region j at time t; F is 
the set of foreign firms and D is the set of domestic firms. 
The employment share of FDI firms is a preferred proxy of foreign presence in previous 
studies on FDI-linked wage spillovers as it can essentially capitalise the contribution and 
potential impacts of foreign firms on local labour markets (see for example, Barry et al. 
(2005); Driffield and Girma (2003); Hoi and Pomfret (2010); Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-
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Bueno (2013); Pittiglio et al. (2015)). However, the measurement of FDI in this research 
differs from many previous studies in that it allows for variations in three dimensions. 
Specifically, Equation (4.2.16) shows that the measure of FDI presence varies across 
industry, region and over time, while previous literature mostly allows FDI presence to vary 
across industry and/or time. 
Other control variables comprise firm size (𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡); ownership structure (𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡); 
firm age (𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡); capital intensity (𝑙𝑛𝐾_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡); technology gap between 
domestic and foreign firms (𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡); competitive pressure in the local market 
(𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡); industry, region and time dummies (𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘, 𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗, 𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡); 
and error term (𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡). The construction of these explanatory and their expected impact on 
domestic firms’ average wages are described in more details in Section 4.2.3.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the impact of aggregate demand (Φ) is captured by 
time dummies and regional fixed effect (
𝑤𝑟
𝐿
) is controlled by the fixed effects in the 
regression. Equation (4.2.6) suggests that the cut-off capability is a function of a set of 
explanatory variables, including firm characteristics, which is absorbed into the explanatory 
variables in Equation (4.2.15).8 The elasticity of substitution (ρ) is an underlying structural 
parameter embedded in the reduced-form parameters (βi) in the empirical model. Estimating 
unobserved structural parameters is not the objective of this research.  
4.2.3 Variable construction  
Apart from the key variable, FDI presence, the theoretical model in Section 4.2.1 also 
shows the relevance of other factors in explaining firms’ average wages, notably firm-
specific characteristics. Additionally, the previous empirical evidence suggests considerable 
 
8 The set of firm-level variables include firm size (lnSizeikjt), ownership structure (Ownikjt), firm age 
(lnAgeikjt), capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt), and technology gap (TechGapikjt). 
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influence of firm and industry features on wage differences among domestic firms as well 
as between domestic and foreign firms (Aitken et al., 1996; Brown & Medoff, 2003; 
Driffield & Girma, 2003; Elliott & Zhou, 2015; Feliciano & Lipsey, 2006; Hoi & Pomfret, 
2010). Thus, a vector of firm-level and industry-level variables is included in the specified 
econometric model (Equation 4.2.15) to control for the impacts of firm and industry 
heterogeneity, which, if not, is likely to result in the omitted variable problem. 
Firm size or scale (lnSizeikjt) has been considered an important determinant of wages in 
previous studies. This variable is measured by a domestic firm’s total sales in natural 
logarithm. The previous empirical evidence generally finds a positive influence of operation 
size on firms’ average wages (Girma et al., 1999; Hoi & Pomfret, 2010; Pittiglio et al., 2015; 
Sjöholm & Lipsey, 2006; Villarreal & Sakamoto, 2011). Compared to small firms, larger 
firms are more financially capable and have well-established compensation policies, 
allowing them to offer workers with better wages and other benefits.   
The impact of ownership structure (Ownikjt) on domestic firms’ average wages is also 
captured in the empirical analysis. It is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for privately-
owned firms, and 0 for state-owned firms. State-owned firms usually have stronger and more 
secure financial bases for funding their wage systems, but are faced with constraints in the 
wage settings. Meanwhile, privately-owned firms have considerable flexibility in 
determining wage structures and incentive policies, which may also be subject to unexpected 
changes due to poor financial conditions. Empirical findings show that state-owned firms 
tend to pay higher average wages than non-state counterparts (De Fraja, 1993; Démurger, 
Li, & Yang, 2012; Hale & Long, 2011; Melly, 2005).  
Firm age (lnAgeikjt), measured by years of operation in natural logarithm, can exert 
contrasting impacts on firm wage determination. On the one hand, newly-established firms 
are more likely to have higher labour productivity, which may enable them to pay higher 
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wages (Aitken et al., 1996; Bellak, 2004). On the other hand, well-established firms tend to 
claim a solid foothold in the market and are usually larger, which may signal their business 
success and capability to offer higher wages (Hoi & Pomfret, 2010; Pittiglio et al., 2015; 
Villarreal & Sakamoto, 2011).  
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) can play an essential role in affecting firm wages. 
This variable is calculated as the natural logarithm of fixed assets to total employment ratio. 
Higher capital intensity implies a lower labour cost share in total cost structure, which may 
induce firms to meet high wage demands and employ competent high-paid workers. 
Empirical findings from previous studies largely show a positive effect of capital intensity 
on firms’ average wages (Arai, 2003b; Hoi & Pomfret, 2010; Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-
Bueno, 2013; Sjöholm & Lipsey, 2006; Villarreal & Sakamoto, 2011).  
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) is introduced into the empirical model to capture the 
potential impact of technological differences on domestic firms’ average wages. Technology 
gap is defined as the difference in labour productivity level (measured by output per worker) 
between each domestic firm and that of average FDI firms in the industry.9 Domestic firms 
may find it challenging to compete with FDI firms and benefit from foreign presence given 
a large technology gap, which leads to lower wages in domestic firms (Hoi & Pomfret, 2010). 
Meanwhile, domestic firms are less likely to gain positive spillovers from FDI presence 
given small technological gaps due to negligible learning potential. Therefore, technology 
gap is expected to influence domestic firms’ average wages but the direction of impact is 
found to be mixed in the literature (Conyon et al., 2002; Pittiglio et al., 2015). 
 
9 Following the existing literature, technology gap is proxied by productivity gap as an FDI firm’s higher 
productivity level is arguably associated with technological differences between foreign and domestic firms 
(Anwar & Nguyen, 2011; Chuang & Hsu, 2004; Kohpaiboon, 2006; Kokko, 1996; Pittiglio et al., 2015).   
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The level of competition in each industry, measured by the Herfindahl index, can 
contribute to wage differences among firms (Hoi & Pomfret, 2010). A low value of 
Herfindahl index indicates a low level of concentration or equivalently a high competitive 
pressure. Accordingly, intense competition is likely to induce domestic firms to cut 
production, putting downward pressure on average wages. The index is calculated as 
follows:  
𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑘𝑗𝑡 = ∑ (
𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡
𝑋𝑘𝑡
)
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where xikjt denotes the sales of domestic firm i in region j industry k at time t and Xkt refers 
to the total sales of industry k. 
In Equation (4.2.15), a set of industry dummies (dIndustryk), regional dummies 
(dRegionj), and year dummies (dTimet) are included to allow average wages of domestic 
firms to vary across regions, industries and years. The error term (𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡) is added to capture 
the impacts of all omitted variables, and is assumed to be normal, independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) ( 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2).  
Finally, it should also be noted that domestic firms in a given industry are largely subject 
to the same macroeconomic environment in Vietnam’s economy; hence, the effects of 
macroeconomic factors are captured by the time dummies in the specified econometric 
model. Table 4.1 summarises the measurement of key explanatory variables and their 
expected impacts on domestic firms’ average wages.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of variable measurement and expected signs  
(Econometric model of FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages) 
Variable Measurement Expected sign 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) The employment share of FDI 
firms in the total employment of 
industry k in region j at time t; 
+/- 
Firm size  (lnSizeikjt) Total sales in natural log form; 
+ 
Ownership structure 
(Ownikjt) 
Dummy variable with the value of 
1 for privately-owned and 0 for 
state-owned; 
+/- 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) Firm market experience proxied by 
the number of years in operation in 
natural log form; 
+/- 
Capital intensity 
(lnK_intensityikjt) 
Ratio of fixed assets to total 
employment in natural log form; 
+ 
Technology gap  
(TechGapikjt) 
The difference in the labour 
productivity level (measured by 
total output per worker) of 
domestic firm i and that of 
average FDI firms in each 
industry k; 
+/- 
Competition  (Herfindahlkjt) Competitive pressure measured by 
the Herfindahl index (
=





n
i kt
ikjt
X
x
1
2
) 
where xikjt is the sales of domestic 
firm i and Xkt is the total sales of 
industry k. 
- 
4.3 Modelling FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment 
4.3.1 Theoretical modelling 
In order to model the impact of FDI presence on domestic firms’ employment of female 
workers, I expand the theoretical model in Section 4.2.1 to allow firms to make optimal 
decision on hiring male and female workers. As a result, some components of the theoretical 
model are similar to those in Section 4.2.1. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, I still 
present them in this section. 
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The labour market is composed of both male (m) and female (f) workers, differing in 
productivity. Firms employ male and female labour to produce output in a monopolistically 
competitive product market. Consumers have constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
preferences ,10 with the utility function [∫ 𝑞(𝜔)𝜌𝑑𝜔𝜔∈Ω ]
1
𝜌 where ω denotes the products; Ω 
refers to the set of all available products; q is the quantity of consumption; and 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄  is 
the elasticity of substitution (0 < ρ < 1).  
Similar to Section 4.2, subject to their budget constraint, consumers maximise the CES 
utility function, which yields the following demand function: 
𝑞(𝜔) = Φ𝑝
1
𝜌−1                                (4.3.1) 
where p is the price, Φ ≡
𝑌
∫ 𝑝(𝜔)
𝜌
𝜌−1𝑑𝜔𝜔∈Ω
 measures the level of aggregate demand, and Y is 
consumer income. Each firm is small relative the industry and thus takes Φ as given.  
The industry is composed of both domestic and foreign firms that are located in different 
regions of the country, where γ proportion of firms are FDI-invested firms in the industry-
region (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, namely γ measures the level of foreign presence). Foreign presence varies 
across industries and regions and can be proxied by a number of measures (e.g., output share, 
employment share or asset share of FDI firms in the industry-region).  
When firms enter the industry, they draw capability endowment (θ) from an exogenous 
distribution. After entry, firms pay the fixed cost of production (f), and then employ one unit 
of male labour and c units of female labour to produce s units of output. Accordingly, c 
denotes the combination of female and male workers in the workforce (i.e. female-to-male 
labour ratio) and s measures the productivity of workers, which depends on capability 
 
10 The CES utility function has been used to model the impacts of FDI firms on domestic firms’ output 
performance indicators such as revenues and export quality (Anwar & Sun, 2018; Sun & Anwar, 2017). 
This thesis develops the framework to incorporate the role of foreign presence in determining the input-
related aspect of local firms, namely the employment of female workers. 
74 
 
endowment (θ) and firm-specific characteristics (𝜂) (for instance, size, ownership structure, 
age and capital intensity). Moreover, it has been well documented that the presence of FDI 
firms (γ) can generate spillover effects on the productivity of domestic firms, resulting in so-
called technological or productivity spillovers (Blomström & Sjöholm, 1999; Gorg & Strobl, 
2001; Haskel, Pereira, & Slaughter, 2007; Javorcik, 2004; Newman et al., 2015; Takii, 2005; 
Zhou, Li, & Tse, 2002). Accordingly, the relationship between productivity (s) and its impact 
factors can be specified as follows: 
𝑠 = 𝜃𝜂χ𝑒𝛼𝛾                  (4.3.2) 
where the coefficient α captures the direction and strength of spillover effects of FDI on 
domestic firms’ productivity; χ denotes a set of unobserved factors.  
In order to hire workers, firms pay wage rates, wm and wf, to male and female workers 
respectively. There exists a wage gap between male and female workers, namely wm = λwf  
where 𝜆 ≠ 1.  Given that 
1
𝑠
 and 
𝑐
𝑠
 units of male and female workers, respectively, are 
employed to produce one unit of output, the marginal costs of production (MC) can be 
written as: 
𝑀𝐶 =
𝑤𝑚+𝑐𝑤𝑓
𝑠
=
 (𝜆+𝑐)𝑤𝑓
𝑠
                 (4.3.3) 
In the production process, firms combine male and female workers as follows: 
𝐿 = [𝐿𝑚
𝜏 + (?̂?𝐿𝑓)
𝜏
]
1 𝜏⁄
                (4.3.4) 
where L is the aggregate labour; Lm and Lf refer to male and female labour inputs, 
respectively; τ is the aggregation parameter (0 < 𝜏 < 1) and ?̂? denotes the female labour 
augmented productivity, which is specified by the following equation: 
?̂? = 𝜃?̂?𝑒𝛽𝛾                     (4.3.5) 
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Equation (4.3.5) allows female labour augmented productivity to vary across different 
levels of FDI presence (γ), capability endowment (θ) and a subset of firm-specific 
characteristics (?̂?) (for example, firm size and capital intensity).11  
Notably, recent studies suggest that FDI firms may generate asymmetric productivity 
spillovers to male and female workers, as their labour forces tend to be more female-
intensive than those of domestic counterparts (Ahmed et al., 2016; Curd et al., 2007; Fakih 
& Ghazalian, 2015; Hewlett & Rashid, 2010; Kodama et al., 2016; Siegel et al., 2014; Tang 
& Zhang, 2017). FDI firms employ female workers more intensively, mainly to benefit from 
female workers’ under-exploited skills and gender wage gaps, and transplant corporate 
culture across borders. This hiring practice, together with the experience and knowledge of 
fully utilising female labour force, by foreign firms may spill over to domestic counterparts. 
As a result, domestic firms can learn these skills to stimulate the productivity of female 
workers. Therefore, the presence of FDI firms is likely to affect female labour augmented 
productivity, and the coefficient β indicates the direction and strength of FDI-linked 
asymmetric spillovers. If β > 0, FDI firms exert female-labour biased spillovers and β < 0 
suggests male-labour biased spillovers.  
Given the demand function (Equation 4.3.1) and marginal cost of production (Equation 
4.3.3), the profit function is derived as below: 
𝜋 =  [𝑝 −
(𝜆+𝑐)𝑤𝑓
𝑠
] 𝑞 − 𝑓                                 (4.3.6)             
Firms then set the following price to maximise their profit: 
𝑝∗ =
(𝜆+𝑐)𝑤𝑓
𝜌𝑠
                    (4.3.7) 
 
11 A subset of firm-specific characteristics can be gender biased (Almeida & Carneiro, 2009; Bridges, 1980; 
Caraway, 2007; Ilmakunnas & Maliranta, 2005).   
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The optimal profit (π*) is obtained by substituting the optimal price into the profit 
function (Equation 4.3.6), as follows:   
𝜋∗ =
1−𝜌
𝜌
𝜌
𝜌−1
Φ [
(𝜆+𝑐)𝑤𝑓
𝜃𝜂𝜒𝑒𝛼𝛾
]
𝜌
𝜌−1 − 𝑓                  (4.3.8) 
Firms then endogenously choose the combination (c) of male and female workers to 
maximize their profit. To do so, firms equate the ratios of marginal product against wage 
rate between male and female workers (𝑖. 𝑒.
𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑚
𝑤𝑚
=
𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑓
𝑤𝑓
), which yields the following 
optimal female-male labour ratio: 
  𝑐 =
𝐿𝑓
𝐿𝑚
= 𝜆
1
1−𝜏?̂?
1
1−𝜏 = 𝜆
1
1−𝜏(𝜃?̂?𝑒𝛽𝛾)
1
1−𝜏 = 𝜆
1
1−𝜏𝜃
1
1−𝜏?̂?
1
1−𝜏𝑒
𝛽
1−𝜏
𝛾                (4.3.9) 
Taking logarithm of both sides of Equation (4.3.9), we obtain the following equation: 
𝑙𝑛𝑐 =
1
1−𝜏
𝑙𝑛𝜆 +
1
1−𝜏
𝑙𝑛𝜃 +
1
1−𝜏
𝑙𝑛?̂? +
𝛽
1−𝜏
𝛾                 (4.3.10) 
Equation (4.3.10) indicates that the optimal female-to-male labour ratio of domestic 
firms depends on their capability endowment, firm-specific characteristics, male-to-female 
wage gap and the presence of FDI firms in the industry-region. 
A firm will only remain in the industry if it makes profit (𝜋∗ ≥ 0). Therefore, the break-
even condition (i.e., 𝜋∗ = 0) defines a cut-off capability (θ*) as a function of FDI presence 
and other factors as follows: 
𝜃∗ = 𝜓(𝛾, 𝜆, 𝑤𝑓 , 𝑓, ?̂?, Φ, 𝜌)                  (4.3.11) 
As a result, the expectation of the firm’s optimal female-to-male labour ratio, 
conditional on the firm being observed in the sample, can be written as:  
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(4.3.12) 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝑐| 𝜃 ≥ 𝜃∗] =
1
1 − 𝜏
𝑙𝑛𝜆 +
1
1 − 𝜏
𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝜃|𝜃 ≥ 𝜃∗] +
1
1 − 𝜏
𝑙𝑛?̂? +
𝛽
1 − 𝜏
𝛾 
=
1
1−𝜏
𝑙𝑛𝜆 +
1
1−𝜏
[
∫ 𝑙𝑛𝜃𝑔(𝜃)𝑑(𝜃)
∞
𝜃∗
𝑃𝑟𝑜(𝜃≥𝜃∗)
] +
1
1−𝜏
𝑙𝑛?̂? +
𝛽
1−𝜏
𝛾  
             Indirect                          Direct 
Accordingly, FDI presence in the industry exerts two contrasting effects on domestic 
firms’ expected optimal female-to-male labour ratio. The direct channel is via the augmented 
female productivity spillovers and the indirect channel is via the cut-off capability. For 
example, if an increase in FDI presence (γ↑) results in positive spillovers to the productivity 
of female workers, domestic firms tend to employ more females relative to males via the 
direct channel (i.e., 
𝛽
1−𝜏
𝛾 ↑), everything else equal. Meanwhile, the positive productivity 
spillovers from FDI lower the cut-off capability, enabling less capable firms to enter the 
industry and lowering the conditional expected capability in the industry  (i.e., 
∫ 𝑙𝑛𝜃𝑔(𝜃)𝑑(𝜃)
∞
𝜃∗
𝑃𝑟𝑜(𝜃≥𝜃∗)
↓). Subsequently, the conditional expected female-to-male labour ratio is 
decreased. The net impact of FDI presence on domestic firms’ female-to-male labour ratio 
depends on the relative strength of these two channels.  
4.3.2 Econometric modelling 
As demonstrated in the theoretical model in Section 4.3.1, the female-to-male labour 
ratio of a domestic firm depends on the presence of FDI firms and a number of factors such 
as gender wage gap, capability endowment and firm-specific characteristics.12 Accordingly, 
 
12 Note that the capability of a surviving firm must be equal to or greater than the cut-off capability level 
(i.e., θ ≥ θ*), which is a function of a set of firm-level characteristics subsequently controlled by the 
explanatory variables in Equation (4.3.13). The set of firm-level variables include firm size (𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡), 
capital intensity (𝑙𝑛𝐾_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡), and ownership structure (𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡). 
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(4.3.13) 
the following econometric model is specified to empirically estimate and test FDI spillovers 
on domestic firms’ female employment in Vietnam’s services sector:   
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝐾_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑘𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘 + 𝛼9𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛼10𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 
The dependent variable, lnFMRikjt, denotes the female-to-male labour ratio of domestic 
firm i in service industry k located in region j at time t. It is measured by the firm’s total 
number of female workers divided by total number of male workers and transformed to the 
natural logarithm form (hereinafter also referred to as female employment). This measure of 
female employment is consistent with the setting from the theoretical model.  
An alternative measure adopted in previous studies is the share of female workers in 
total labour (Ahmed et al., 2016; Fakih & Ghazalian, 2015). Note that the female-to-male 
labour ratio (i.e., 
𝐿𝑓
𝐿𝑚
) is linked to the female share (i.e., 
𝐿𝑓
𝐿𝑚+𝐿𝑓
=
1
𝐿𝑚
𝐿𝑓
+1
), and compared with 
the share, the ratio has an advantage that it is unconstrained (by definition the share is 
constrained between 0 and 1). Furthermore, in the estimation, the sample is restricted to 
domestic firms to capture the influence of FDI firms on domestic counterparts’ female 
employment, as well as to avoid possible bias due to higher female intensity in FDI firms.   
The key variable is foreign presence (FDIkjt), which as shown in the theoretical model, 
can exert contrasting effects on domestic firms’ expected female employment via 
asymmetric spillovers and the cut-off effect. Foreign presence is proxied by the employment 
share of FDI firms in each three-digit industry: 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝐹𝑘𝑗𝑡 / ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡𝑖∈𝐹𝑘𝑗𝑡∪𝐷𝑘𝑗𝑡  
where L is the total employment of firm i in service industry k in region j at time t; F is the 
set of foreign firms; and D is the set of domestic firms in industry k in region j at time t. 
Hence, this proxy allows the presence of FDI firms to vary over three-digit industries, 
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locations and years. It can be noted that this approach to measuring foreign presence is 
similar to the one in modelling the FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages (Section 4.2.2). 
This measurement is preferred since it is likely to capture the contribution and potential 
influence of foreign affiliates on host labour force (see for example, Barry et al. (2005); 
Driffield and Girma (2003); Hoi and Pomfret (2010); Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno 
(2013); Pittiglio et al. (2015)).  
The empirical model in Equation (4.3.13) also comprises a set of other explanatory 
variables, namely firm size (𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡), capital intensity (𝑙𝑛𝐾_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡), ownership 
structure (𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡), competitive pressure in the local market (𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡), gender 
wage gap (𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑗𝑡), industry female intensity (𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑘𝑡), industry, region and 
time dummies (𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑘, 𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗, 𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡), and error term (𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡). Section 4.3.3 
provides detailed description of the construction of these remaining right-hand-side variables 
as well as their expected influence on female employment of domestic firms. Also note that 
the capability of a surviving firm must be equal to or greater than the cut-off capability level 
(i.e., θ ≥ θ*), which is a function of a set of firm-level characteristics subsequently influenced 
by the explanatory variables in Equation (4.3.13). 
4.3.3 Variable construction  
Section 4.3.1 indicates that a domestic firm’s female-to-male employment ratio is 
determined by FDI presence and a set of other factors, which are then included as a set of 
control variables in the empirical model. Of these, firm size (lnSizeikjt) can play a significant 
role, despite that existing literature finds the direction and magnitude of its effect rather 
inconclusive. On the one hand, larger size suggests a better capability of acquiring high-
skilled and high-paid workers, who are more likely to be male (Arai, 2003a; Bridges, 1980; 
Ozler, 2000). On the other hand, large firms may employ greater proportions of female (than 
small firms) because they have stronger incentives to demonstrate a good record of 
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complying with labour regulations, including those on workplace gender-equity (Ahmed et 
al., 2016; Almeida & Carneiro, 2009).  
As a proxy of technological upgrading, the capital intensity of a firm (lnK_intensityikjt) 
has been well documented to have a negative correlation with female employment13. More 
capital-intensive firms are associated with mechanically and technologically sophisticated 
tasks that are presumably more suitable for male (Caraway, 2007). This gender norm results 
in a lower representation of women in such work (Kucera & Tejani, 2014; Ozler, 2000). 
Furthermore, capital-intensive firms tend to have fewer incentives to employ relatively 
cheaper female labour, given a smaller fraction of labour cost in total cost (Seguino, 2005; 
Tejani & Milberg, 2016).  
The potential impact of ownership structure on female employment is controlled by 
including a dummy variable (Ownikjt). Whether a firm is state-owned or privately owned 
might have significant but contrasting implications for female employment. Compared to 
the privately-owned firms, the state-owned firms are considered to be more favourable to 
women in terms of working conditions and benefits as well as labour law supervision 
(Hewlett & Rashid, 2010; Ibrahim, 1989). Hence, state-owned firms tend to have higher 
proportions of female employees in their workforce compositions than their private 
counterparts (Ahmed et al., 2016; Fakih & Ghazalian, 2015). Nevertheless, Çağatay and 
Berik (1990) asserted that patron-client relationships in job allocations, weakening 
government commitment to enforcing labour regulations, and shrinking public sector might 
disadvantage women in the state-owned firms.  
 
13 This proxy is more associated with potential capability in upgrading tangible technology such as 
machinery and equipment. Meanwhile, in the earlier empirical model (Section 4.2.3), the variable 
‘technology gap (TechGap)’ refers to the domestic-foreign gap in overall (tangible and intangible) 
technological capacity, which is generally measured by differences in productivity levels, following the 
existing literature (Anwar & Nguyen, 2011; Chuang & Hsu, 2004; Kohpaiboon, 2006; Kokko, 1996; 
Pittiglio et al., 2015).     
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The competitive pressure faced by a domestic firm (measured by the Herfindahl index, 
Herfindahlkjt) is likely to be an important determinant of female employment. In light of the 
widely-documented relationship between gender wage gaps and growing competition, firms 
are more likely to adopt a cost-minimising strategy by employing more women to cut labour 
cost and stay competitive (Seguino, 1997; Standing, 1999). In addition, competition can 
reduce employers’ discrimination, increasing female shares in the labour force (Tang & 
Zhang, 2017). Conversely, a higher level of competition in the market may drive domestic 
firms to attract high-skilled and competent workers via higher wages (Hoi & Pomfret, 2010), 
which tends to favour male job seekers (Arai, 2003a). As firms vary substantially in their 
approaches under increased competition pressure, the direction of this factor’s impact on 
female employment remains unclear.  
The role of gender wage gap (lnWageGapjt) in determining a domestic firm’s female 
employment is accounted for in the empirical model.14 A widening male-to-female wage gap 
implies a lower cost of employing women. Thus, firms are likely to hire a larger proportion 
of female to take advantage of significant pay gaps and reduce labour costs (Curd et al., 
2007; Fakih & Ghazalian, 2015). Nonetheless, the wage gap between male and female might 
reflect or signal their differences in productivity and skill levels. Therefore, firms aiming to 
lure and retain a high-skilled and productive workforce might prefer male if the wage gap 
implies skill difference.     
The industry female intensity (lnIndFemalekt) proxies the relative importance of female 
employment level in each two-digit industry. Furthermore, this variable captures the 
possibility that firms operating in more female-intensive industries are likely to have a higher 
 
14 Since the gender wage gap is not available in GSO’s Enterprise Surveys, data from GSO’s Labour Force 
Surveys are used to calculate male-to-female wage gaps, which vary across regions and years.  
82 
 
female share in the labour composition, and foreign firms may prefer to invest in industries 
with higher female ratios.  
The empirical model also allows domestic firms’ female employment to vary across 
three-digit industries, regions and years. Therefore, industry dummies (dIndustryk), regional 
dummies (dRegionj) and year dummies (dTimet) are included as control variables.15 Finally, 
𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 is an error term and assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
(𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2). Table 4.2 details the measurement of main explanatory variables in the 
empirical model and their expected impacts on domestic firms’ female employment.  
Table 4.2: Summary of variable measurement and expected signs  
(Econometric model of FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment) 
Variable Measurement Expected sign 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) The employment share of FDI firms in 
the total employment of industry k in 
region j at time t; 
+/- 
Firm size  (lnSizeikjt) Total sales in natural log form; 
+/- 
Capital intensity 
(lnK_intensityikjt) 
Ratio of fixed assets to total 
employment in natural log form; 
- 
Ownership structure 
(Ownikjt) 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 for 
privately-owned and 0 for state-owned; 
+/- 
Competition level  
(Herfindahlkjt) 
Competition level measured by the 
Herfindahl index (
=





n
i kt
ikjt
X
x
1
2
) where 
xikjt is the sales of domestic firm i and 
Xkt is the total sales of industry k; 
+/- 
Gender wage gap 
(lnWageGapjt) 
Ratio of average male wages to average 
female wages in region j at time t in 
natural log form; 
+/- 
Industry female intensity 
(lnIndFemalekt) 
Ratio of female to male workers in 
industry k at time t in natural log form. 
+ 
 
15 Note that all domestic firms are subject to the same macroeconomic environment in the host economy; 
hence, the effects of macroeconomic factors are captured by the time dummies in the econometric model. 
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4.4 Estimation strategy 
4.4.1 Endogeneity problem  
In estimating the specified econometric models of FDI impacts on domestic firms’ 
average wages (Equation (4.2.15)) and female employment (Equation (4.3.12)), it is critical 
to note that foreign presence (FDIkjt) is potentially endogenous due to the possible two-way 
causality with the dependent variables. A simultaneous causation may exist between the FDI 
presence and each of the dependent variable, namely domestic firms’ average wages 
(𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡)) and female-to-male labour ratio (𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡). Failure to take into account the 
endogeneity problem results in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.  
On the one hand, the presence of FDI firms can impact average wages and female 
employment of domestic counterparts as shown in the constructed theoretical models 
(Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1). Notably, likely effects of foreign firms are expected to take place 
via two contrasting channels, namely direct and indirect ones. The net impact of FDI 
presence depends on the relative strength of the two channels. Furthermore, the review of 
FDI-host labour market literature presented in Chapter 3 suggests that, compared to local 
firms, FDI firms tend to pay higher wages (Aitken et al., 1996; Barry et al., 2005; Elliott & 
Zhou, 2015; Feliciano & Lipsey, 2006; Girma et al., 1999) and employ female labour more 
intensively (Curd et al., 2007; Fakih & Ghazalian, 2015; Hewlett & Rashid, 2010; Kodama 
et al., 2016; Tang & Zhang, 2017). Arguably, these persistent gaps between FDI and 
domestic firms can allow the presence of foreign affiliates to exert significant impacts, both 
directly and indirectly, on local firms’ labour practices, notably in terms of wages and female 
employment.     
On the other hand, domestic firms’ wages and female employment can impact the 
presence of FDI firms in the host economy. The reverse causality may occur due to the 
possibility that wages and gendered workforce abundance at the local labour market can be 
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essential factors in attracting inward FDI. Of these, average local wages (as a proxy for 
labour costs and labour quality of the host workforce) may arguably be an important ground 
in foreign investors’ decisions (Cheng & Kwan, 2000; Villaverde & Maza, 2015). Moreover, 
higher female representation might indicate a relatively ‘cheaper’ and under-utilised labour 
force, which can be a key determinant of stimulating foreign entry (Braunstein, 2000; Busse 
& Nunnenkamp, 2009). Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect and, more importantly, to take 
into consideration the likely reverse causation from the variable of foreign presence (FDIkjt) 
to the respective dependent variables in the two econometric models (i.e., 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡) and 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡).       
4.4.2 The IV-GMM estimation method 
In order to address the possible endogeneity problem encountered in estimating the two 
specified econometric models in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2, this thesis employs the feasible 
two-step IV-GMM estimator. The GMM estimator was introduced by Hansen (1982) and 
has become an increasingly popular estimation method in applied economics. Unlike the 
maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), the GMM approach does not require any 
distributional assumption (Hall, 2005). Moreover, compared to the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS), fixed effect or random effect estimators, this estimation technique has the advantage 
of providing consistent, asymptotically normal and efficient estimates, particularly in the 
presence of the endogeneity problem with appropriate instrumental variables (Doytch & 
Uctum, 2011; Hall, 2005; Yin, Ma, Liang, & Yuan, 2011).  
To employ the IV-GMM estimator, it is critical to select appropriate instrumental 
variables, which are required to be correlated with the likely endogenous variable (i.e., 
FDIkjt), and uncorrelated with the error term (i.e., 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 in Equation (4.2.15) and 𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 in 
Equation (4.3.13)). In practice, it is challenging to find suitable instruments, notably in 
complicated models comprising a large number of right-hand-side variables. This is mostly 
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attributable to data unavailability for constructing instrumental variables that can satisfy the 
above-mentioned conditions both economically and statistically.  
As a result, previous studies on FDI impacts tend to rely on lagged values of FDI 
presence as instruments (Driffield & Girma, 2003). While the use of lags as instruments is 
relatively convenient, it may lead to considerable loss of information due to decreased 
sample size. This drawback of using lags in the IV-GMM estimator can become more severe 
if the examined dataset is a short panel (i.e., large N and small T), which is the case for the 
empirical analysis in this thesis. Therefore, using lags as instruments is not a preferred 
strategy in estimating the specified models. Instead, the thesis takes an alternative method 
of IVs construction, which is detailed in the following section.    
4.4.3 IVs construction 
Adopting a novel approach to IVs selection, the thesis constructs two instrumental 
variables, which capitalises on the geographical and industry segmentation of the labour 
market in Vietnam16. For each service industry under examination, two respective 
instruments, IV1 and IV2, are constructed. Of these, the first instrument, IV1, is defined as 
the employment share of FDI firms in manufacturing industry 1 in region j (a region different 
from where the domestic service firm is located) at time t. Whereas, the second instrument, 
IV2, is calculated as the employment share of FDI firms in the manufacturing industry 2 in 
region j (also a region different from where the domestic service firm is located) at time t. 
The two instruments of FDI shares in the distinctive manufacturing industries are then 
matched with FDI presence in an examined service industry across the same year t and 
different regions. That is, the FDI presence of service industry k in region j is instrumented 
by the FDI presence of the two manufacturing industries in a region that does not neighbour 
 
16 In one of the publications based on the empirical analyses from this thesis (D. T. H. Nguyen, 2019), I utilised an 
alternative technique to construct IVs, also known as a ‘shift-share’ or ‘supply-push’ approach (Bartik, 1991; McLaren & 
Yoo, 2017; Moretti, 2010). 
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j. For example, if the examined service industry is tourism, then tourism FDI in region 1 
(i.e., Red River Delta) is instrumented by leather FDI (IV1) and electronics FDI (IV2) in 
region 4 (i.e., Central Highlands).  
The remaining matched regions for respective service and manufacturing FDI include 
Northern Midland and Mountain – Southeast (2-5); Central Coast – Mekong River Delta (3-
6); Central Highlands – Red River Delta (4-1); Southeast – Northern Midland and Mountain 
(5-2); and Mekong River Delta – Central Coast (6-3). The selection of IVs for each 
estimation will be further explained in the empirical analyses and discussions presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Figure 4.1 shows the regional map of mainland Vietnam, which 
demonstrates the geographical segmentation among the matched pairs of regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Regional map of mainland Vietnam 
Source: Adaption based on the regional map for Vietnam’s urban development plan 
(Vietnamtimes, 2015) 
Central Highlands 
Mekong River Delta 
 
Red River Delta 
Northern Midland and Mountain 
Central Coast 
Southeast 
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The constructed IVs are expected to be closely correlated with the potentially 
endogenous variable (i.e., FDI presence in a selected service industry – FDIkjt). Arguably, 
inward FDI in the manufacturing and services sectors largely share common macro-level 
determinants at the host economy of Vietnam. As shown in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4), foreign 
investors in both sectors are, to a certain extent, attracted by and beneficial from major 
competitive advantages of Vietnam as an FDI destination, including such factors as  growing 
domestic market; preferential tax incentives; political and macroeconomic stability; strategic 
geographical location; rich natural and cultural resources; and abundant and cost-
competitive workforce.  
Besides, the chosen IVs are unlikely to directly affect the equilibrium wages and female-
to-male ratios of domestic firms in the service industry (i.e., 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 in Equation (4.2.15) and 
𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 in Equation (4.3.13)). Arguably, the manufacturing industries demand labour skill sets 
that are substantially different from those of the service industries. More importantly, the 
above-described IV construction ensures that FDI firms in selected two manufacturing 
industries are located in a region non-adjacent to that of the examined service domestic firms. 
The matched regions are distinctive in various respects, including the differences in real wages 
and female intensity as observed consistently in the data for both domestic and foreign firms 
in the examined service industries (see the data description sections of Chapters 5 and 6 for 
more details). 
4.4.4 Diagnostic testing 
In the empirical analyses of the thesis, a number of key diagnostic tests are performed 
to examine the reliability of the specified econometric models and the chosen estimation 
techniques. These tests allow one to affirm the validity of the empirical results as well as the 
prediction and generalisation power of the estimates obtained by the research. Specifically, 
major tests are conducted for evaluating: (i) potential endogeneity; (ii) relevance of selected 
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instruments; (iii) validity of selected instruments; (iv) multicollinearity; (v) heterokedasticity 
and autocorrelation; and (vi) overall model significance. 
4.4.4.1 Potential endogeneity  
As discussed earlier in Section 4.4.1, the key variable of interest, foreign presence 
(FDIkjt), is likely to violate the exogeneity assumption due to potential reverse causality with 
the dependent variables (𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡) and 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡) in the two specified models. This 
problem, if found and unaddressed, can lead to biased, inconsistent and inefficient estimates. 
Therefore, it is critical to test for the existence of endogeneity to employ appropriate 
estimation method and ensure the validity of model estimation results.  
In the empirical exercises presented in Chapters 5 and 6, endogeneity tests are 
implemented to verify whether the variable of interest, FDIkjt, is exogenous or not. The test, 
based on the C-statistic (also known as a ‘GMM distance’ or ‘difference-in-Sargan’ statistic), 
specifies a null hypothesis that the suspect regressor can be treated as exogenous and the 
alternative hypothesis is otherwise (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003). Respective 
hypotheses for the two specifications can be written as follows:  
➢ Model of FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages (Equation (4.2.15)):  
H0: 𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡|𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑗𝑡] = 0 
H1: 𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡|𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑗𝑡] ≠ 0 
➢ Model of FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment (Equation (4.3.13)): 
H0: 𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡|𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑗𝑡] = 0 
H1: 𝐸[𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡|𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑘𝑗𝑡] ≠ 0 
Accordingly, a rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the variable under 
examination (FDIkjt) is endogenous. Thus, the IV-GMM estimator is the appropriate 
estimation technique for the dataset. Furthermore, the use of relevant and valid instrumental 
variables is required. Conversely, a failure to reject the null indicates that the suspect 
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explanatory variable satisfies the exogeneity assumption hence the conventional non-IV 
estimation techniques (i.e., OLS, FE, RE) are feasible while the IV-GMM method does not 
provide more efficient estimates.    
4.4.4.2 Relevance of instruments 
If the suspect regressor, foreign presence (FDIkjt) in either specification, is found to be 
endogenous, the IV-GMM estimator demands the use of appropriate instruments, which 
must be both relevant and valid. Instrumental variables are considered relevant if they are 
closely correlated with the endogenous regressor. To assess the relevance of the selected 
instruments, the thesis employs the underidentification test. The underidentification test can 
be interpreted as a Langrange Multiplier (LM) test, using the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk 
statistic. It allows one to determine whether the minimal canonical correlation between the 
endogenous regressor and the selected instruments is statistically different from zero. Of 
these, it tests the null hypothesis that excluded instruments have insufficient explanatory 
power to predict the endogenous variable in the specified model for the identification of the 
parameters.  
Essentially, the LM test checks whether the equation is identified or not. Thus, it is the 
test of the rank of matrix: under the null that the equation is underidentified, the matrix of 
reduced form coefficients on the number of excluded instruments (IVs) has the rank 𝛤 =
𝑥 − 1 where 𝑥 is the number of endogenous regressors. Given the discussions in Sections 
4.4.1 and 4.4.3, the null and alternative hypotheses of the underidentificaiton test for the two 
examined models can be stated as below:  
 𝐻0: 𝛤 = 0 (𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑) 
𝐻1: 𝛤 = 1 (𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑)  
Based on the associated p-values for the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, if the null is 
rejected, the matrix is full column rank. This means that the excluded instruments are 
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relevant or being correlated with the endogenous regressor. Whereas, failure to reject the 
null indicates that the selected instruments are irrelevant and should not be selected for the 
IV-GMM estimation of the specified models.  
4.4.4.3 Validity of instruments 
The qualified instruments must be not only relevant but also valid (i.e., being 
uncorrelated with the error term). To evaluate the validity of the selected instruments, this 
thesis adopts the overidentification test since I have more instruments than the number of 
endogenous variables. It is also known as the Sargan-Hansen test, which has a joint null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Respective hypotheses for the two empirical 
models can be expressed as follows: 
➢ Model of FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages (Equation (4.2.15)):  
H0: 𝐸 [𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡|𝐼𝑉1𝑘1𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑎 , 𝐼𝑉2𝑘2𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑎 ] = 0 
H1: 𝐸 [𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡|𝐼𝑉1𝑘1𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑎 , 𝐼𝑉2𝑘2𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑎 ] ≠ 0 
➢ Model of FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment (Equation (4.3.13)): 
➢ H0: 𝐸 [𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡|𝐼𝑉1𝑘1𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑡
𝑏 , 𝐼𝑉2
𝑘2
𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑡
𝑏 ] = 0 
➢ H1: 𝐸 [𝜖𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡|𝐼𝑉1𝑘1𝑏𝑗∗𝑡
𝑏 , 𝐼𝑉2
𝑘2
𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑡
𝑏 ] ≠ 0 
where specific sets of two constructed instruments for each model, namely 
(𝐼𝑉1𝑘1𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑎 , 𝐼𝑉2𝑘2𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑎 ) and (𝐼𝑉1
𝑘1
𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑡
𝑏 , 𝐼𝑉2
𝑘2
𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑡
𝑏  ), have the subscripts denoting two selected 
manufacturing industries (𝑘1
𝑎, 𝑘2
𝑎/𝑘1
𝑏, 𝑘2
𝑏) in regions (𝑗𝑎/𝑗𝑏) different from those of domestic 
firms (j) in the same year (t).   
For the efficient GMM estimator, the test statistic is Hansen's J statistic that is the 
minimised value of the GMM criterion function. A rejection of the null hypothesis in the 
overidentification test casts doubt on the validity of the selected instruments. Meanwhile, a 
failure to reject the null in the overidentification test confirms that the constructed 
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instruments are valid to be utilised in the IV-GMM estimation to address the endogeneity 
bias and inconsistency. 
4.4.4.4 Multicollinearity  
The empirical analysis of this thesis also takes into account the possible 
multicollinearity problem in the two econometric models. Basically, multicollinearity can 
occur if two or more explanatory variables in a regression model are moderately or highly 
correlated. As the degree of multicollinearity increases, the estimated coefficients become 
unstable and the standard errors of the coefficients can be greatly inflated. Severe 
multicollinearity can cause misleading estimates, weakening the statistical power of 
regressions. Given the nature of survey data used and relatively large number of right-hand-
side variables in the specified models, multicollinearity is likely to exist. Therefore, it is 
important to detect multicollinearity and provide proper treatment to reduce the severity of 
the problem, if present.    
To detect potential multicollinearity of key explanatory variables in the two 
specifications, the thesis employs two widely used indicators, namely the correlation matrix 
and variance inflation factor (VIF), including VIF-related measures (e.g., square root of VIF 
(SQRT VIF) and tolerance (
1
𝑉𝐼𝐹
)). Of these, an examination of the correlation matrix of 
regressors can reveal the strength of relationship between pairs of variables. Meanwhile, a 
VIF quantifies how much the variance of an estimated coefficient is inflated by the existence 
of correlation among the regressors.  
To determine the severity of multicollinearity, several rules of thumb are suggested and 
widely exercised (Alin, 2010; Dormann et al., 2013; Fox, 1991; Morrow-Howell, 1994). 
Generally, multicollinearity warrants further investigation if the correlation matrix shows 
that absolute correlation coefficient between two variables is greater than 0.7. Furthermore, 
multicollinarity is considered problematic when the value of VIF for individual explanatory 
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variable is greater than 10, which is equivalent to SQRT VIF greater than 2.0 or tolerance 
less than 0.2. 
4.4.4.5 Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are two other major problems likely encountered 
in estimating regression models, which lead to severe violation of classical assumptions. 
Notably, heteroscedasticity arises if the variance of the errors is not constant or 
homoscedastic across observations. Whereas, autocorrelation in error, also known as serial 
correlation, exists when error terms are correlated over time. While an OLS estimation with 
these two problems (if found in the data and untackled) can still produce unbiased 
coefficients, the associated standard errors and variance are incorrect and misleading. 
Consequently, statistical interval estimation and inference procedures based on the OLS 
estimated coefficients are no longer strictly applicable.  
To check for potential heteroscedasticity, a commonly used method is to plot the squared 
residuals against the fitted values and/or regressors. Additionally, a non-graphical approach 
is to use the White’s test or Breusch-Pagan test, which has the null hypothesis that the error 
terms are homoscedastic. To detect whether the error terms are serially correlated or not, the 
Durbin-Watson test or the Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002) can be easily employed. 
Nonetheless, an efficient and increasingly popular approach to dealing with these biases is 
computing robust standard errors (R.S.E) (Petersen, 2009; Stock & Watson, 2008). In the 
IV-GMM estimations, this thesis also employs this procedure of computing standard errors.     
4.4.4.6 Overall model significance  
As a standard test, Fisher’s Wald/F-tests are conducted to evaluate the overall 
significance of the fitted models for FDI impacts on domestic firms’ wages and female 
employment. Differing from the t-test, the F-test enables an investigation of multiple 
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hypotheses jointly. The null and alternative hypotheses for each specified model can be 
expressed as follows: 
➢ Model of FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages (Equation (4.2.15)):  
H0: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = β8 = β9 = β10 = 0 
                             H1: βk ≠ 0 for at least one k, k = 1,…,10 
➢ Model of FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment (Equation (4.3.13)): 
H0: α1 = α2 = α3 = α4= α5 = α6 = α7 = α8 = α9 = α 10= 0 
H1: αs ≠ 0 for at least one s, s = 1,…,10 
Given the p-values associated with the F-tests, if the null hypothesis is rejected, it implies 
that estimated coefficients are jointly different from zero or the model is overall statistically 
significant. Hence, the fitted model can reliably predict the dependent variable under 
examination. If we fail to reject the null, there is no evidence of explanatory power of the 
empirical model. 
4.5 Data  
4.5.1 Data source  
The thesis utilises the firm-level panel data for the services sector in Vietnam over the 
period 2009-2013. The research data were obtained from the comprehensive Enterprise 
Surveys commissioned by GSO and conducted by Provincial Statistical Offices. This is also 
known as the establishment census, which has been the largest and most widely used 
database for firm-level studies on Vietnam’s economy (see, for example, Anwar and Nguyen 
(2011); Hoi and Pomfret (2010); A. N. Nguyen and Nguyen (2008); K. T. Nguyen ( 2014); 
T. B. N. Pham (2013); Truong, Jongwanich, and Ramstetter (2015)). Notably, this source 
provides highly relevant and large-scale data for empirical studies on the impacts of FDI on 
the local firms and the economy of Vietnam as it covers all business entities across the state, 
private and foreign sectors. 
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Enterprise Surveys collect rich information on characteristics and operation indicators. 
The adopted questionnaires comprise a vast array of firm-specific data. Major sections 
include: (i) identity (e.g., registered name, tax file number, location, start year of operation, 
ownership structure, industry classification); (ii) labour force (e.g., number of total workers, 
number of female workers, wages, insurance, other compensations); (iii) financial capacity 
(e.g., total capital, fixed asset; long-term investment); (iv) business performance (e.g., total 
sales of goods and services, inventory, total and net profit, costs, taxes); and other indicators 
on R&D activities, information and technology application. 
GSO employs two methods of data gathering to conduct nation-wide surveys:  
(i) Direct method:  
Staff of Provincial Statistical Offices interview enterprise representatives to explain the 
survey and ask for specific information required. Accordingly, these staff fill in all sections 
of the questionnaires. This method provides direct assistance and only applies to 
establishments that encounter constraints in meeting accounting standards (e.g., those of 
small size, under preparation for dissolving, or under investigation).  
(ii) Indirect method:  
Staff of Provincial Statistical Offices organise seminars to give detailed instructions to 
enterprise representatives (usually chief accountants) on how to fill in each section of 
questionnaires as well as where, when and how to send the completed surveys. Additionally, 
establishments can download and fill in questionnaires if they have previous experience of 
survey procedure and have internet access. This second approach is more cost-effective and 
widely adopted. 
An alternative micro-level data source is from World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys 
conducted for selected developing countries worldwide, including Vietnam (WB, 2018a). 
While the World Bank’s database also provides firm-level indicators, it only constitutes a 
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representative sample of an economy’s private businesses and dominantly focuses on the 
manufacturing sector. Given the focus of this thesis being the services sector across domestic 
state and private firms, the GSO’s enterprise survey database is a better fit than that of the 
World Bank. Additionally, the GSO’s comprehensive surveys allow an examination of firms 
at a larger scale, which can enhance the generalisation power of the empirical results 
obtained in this study.    
4.5.2 Data screening and procedure of panel construction  
The main empirical analysis of the thesis employs the GSO’s enterprise survey data on 
15 service industries at the two-digit level of VSIC (as the latest version of 2007). Table 4.3 
presents the list of included service industries, ranging from Section D to Section S. While 
some industries are relatively concentrated in a few activities (e.g., real estate activities; 
education), others are more diverse with a wide range of services (e.g., professional, 
scientific and technical activities; information and communication).        
Table 4.3: List of included two-digit service industries 
Two-digit code                                                        Service industry
D35 
E36-39 
 
F41-43 
G45-47 
 
H49-53 
I55-56 
J58-63 
K64-66 
L68 
M69-75 
N77-82 
P85 
Electricity, gas, stream and air conditioning supply 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
Transportation and storage 
Accommodation and food service activities 
Information and communication 
Financial and insurance activities 
Real estate activities 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 
Administrative and support service activities 
Education 
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Q86-88 
R90-93 
S94-96 
Human health and social work activities 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 
Other service activities 
Within the services sector, three industries were excluded from the analysis, namely (i) 
public administration and defense; compulsory social security (Section O); (ii) activities of 
households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of 
households for own use (Section T); and (iii) activities of extraterritorial organisations and 
bodies (Section U). These industries constitute establishments engaging mostly in non-
business activities (i.e., public goods by government, non-profit activities by extraterritorial 
bodies or self-supply services by households). Thus, they do not fall within the research 
scope of this thesis, which involves the business activities of FDI firms and their impacts on 
the local labour market outcomes. 
As the enterprise surveys contain extensive raw information on firm-level indicators, it 
is critical to conduct data screening and cleaning. This process ensures that the final 
constructed datasets are usable and reliable for subsequent empirical analyses. Major steps 
include checking raw data and recoding firms within research scope; recoding and 
constructing variables while taking into account inflation impact; inspecting data for outliers 
and missing values; constructing panel data. Further details are described below.   
First, based on the reported codes of major business activities, data for each year are 
screened out to keep firms operating in selected service industries only. Industry 
classifications are then recoded and labeled consistently. The classifications include two-
digit level (for the analysis on the whole services sector) and three-digit level (for the 
analysis on subsets of selected service industries).  
Second, dependent and explanatory variables in each empirical model are calculated and 
constructed, following the specifications in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Variables are recoded and 
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labeled consistently across years. Of these, the related monetary variables (e.g., wages, sales, 
assets) are measured in national currency (Vietnam Dong – VND). To take into account the 
likely impact of inflation, all the monetary values are deflated to 2009 constant price, using 
the Consumer Price Index obtained from GSO. Based on the database, a foreign firm is 
defined as an FDI firm if it is 100 per cent foreign owned or joint ventured with a local 
(private/state-owned) firm.    
Third, the dataset for each year is inspected for possible errors, including identifying 
outliers and missing values. As mentioned earlier, GSO’s surveys were conducted 
dominantly by the indirect method (i.e., self-reported by enterprise representatives), and 
survey respondents generally differ in their levels of attention and effort when filling 
questionnaires. Hence, it is imperative to expect and address errors in survey data. A number 
of screening techniques (including scatter plotting, tabulating data or summary statistics) are 
adopted to identify systematic missing values and extreme/unrealistic outliers. Observations 
that report non-positive values of key variables (e.g., wages, employment, sales, years of 
operation, assets) are dropped from the datasets.  
Finally, the screened and constructed datasets for five years (2009-2013) are combined 
to generate a panel dataset. The panels are set up by matching firms’ identity numbers across 
years. The usable datasets for empirical exercises are unbalanced panels, which capture the 
fact firms enter and exit the services sector over the five-year period. Detailed descriptions 
of the panel dataset for each empirical analysis are presented in Chapters 5 and 6.    
4.5.3 Data management and analysis tool 
The statistical software Stata version 14.1 is utilised as the preferred tool for data 
management and analysis in the thesis. It is known as a comprehensive and powerful 
statistical package with useful features and up-to-date techniques, which can help enhance 
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the quality and efficiency of empirical research. Compared to other alternative tools such as 
SPSS, SAS, Eviews or R, Stata is more widely used in empirical studies in economics and 
econometrics. Notably, this software offers strong statistical features for the management 
and analysis of survey data (Mitchell, 2007), which is the case of this thesis.  
4.6 Summary 
This chapter deals with methodological issues. It illustrates that the presence of FDI 
firms in the industry can be an important determinant of local firms’ pay and employment 
decisions. Of these, FDI firms can influence the expected average wage of domestic firms 
through two contrasting channels, namely productivity spillovers and cut-off capability. 
Furthermore, FDI firms can also affect female-to-male labour ratios of domestic firms, 
directly via augmented female productivity spillovers and indirectly via cut-off capability. 
Given the contrasting nature of the identified channels, the net impact of FDI presence on 
the firms’ wage and female employment depend on the relative strength of these two forces. 
Following the theoretical settings, econometric models are then specified for empirically 
estimating and testing spillover effects from FDI firms to wages and female employment. 
The specifications include the variable of interest (foreign presence – FDIkjt) and a set of 
control variables that are likely to influence the average wages and female-to-male labour 
ratios of domestic service firms. To estimate these models, FDIkjt is potentially endogenous 
due to the possible two-way causality with the dependent variables. To take into account this 
possible bias, it was determined that the thesis would employ the feasible two-step IV-GMM 
estimator. Furthermore, key diagnostic tests are to be performed to examine the reliability 
of the specified models and the estimation techniques, which also allows verifying the 
validity, prediction and generalization power of the results. 
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The empirical analyses of the thesis utilise the firm-level panel data for the services 
sector in Vietnam over the period 2009-2013. The data were extracted from the 
comprehensive Enterprise Surveys commissioned by GSO. To conduct large-scale surveys, 
GSO adopts two methods of direct and indirect data gathering. The GSO’s enterprise data 
source is most suitable for the purpose of this research. Since survey data are extremely raw, 
data screening and cleaning procedure is performed to ensure the reliability and usability of 
final datasets. They involve checking raw data and recoding firms that fall into the research 
scope of this thesis; recoding and constructing variables; inspecting data for errors; 
constructing panel data. The thesis uses the statistical software Stata as a tool for data 
management and analysis. 
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Chapter 5: FDI Impact on Domestic Firms’ Wages – Empirical 
Results and Analyses 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results and analyses regarding the impact of FDI 
presence on domestic firms’ wages, using rich firm-level panel data of Vietnam’s services 
sector over the period 2009-2013. Section 5.2 provides empirical evidence for the whole 
services sector. It first describes the data at the sectoral level, including the distribution of 
firms by ownership across 15 two-digit service industries, the distribution of firms by region 
and ownership, average real wage by two-digit industry and ownership, and average real 
wage by region and ownership. This section also reports the estimation results and relevant 
analyses, which comprise diagnostic testing, the existence of FDI-linked wage spillovers and 
other determinants of domestic firms’ wages for the entire services sector. Furthermore, 
Section 5.2 distinguishes the differences in FDI-linked wage spillovers between high-wage 
and low-wage service industries, pointing to the need for further analyses. 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 report the empirical evidence on FDI-induced wage spillovers from 
a high-wage and a low-wage service industry in Vietnam, respectively. The former is the 
financial, banking and insurance industry whereas the latter is the accommodation and food 
service industry. These two sections also present main findings on wage spillovers from FDI 
and other determinants, which are compared to the overall sector results. Extended analyses 
are conducted to further investigate the heterogeneity of wage spillovers, which is based on 
firm-specific characteristics. Finally, Section 5.5 summarises the chapter.  
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5.2 FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages: Evidence from the whole sector  
5.2.1 Data description 
5.2.1.1 Distribution of firms by two-digit service industry and ownership  
Table 5.1 presents the distribution of firms by ownership structure across 15 two-digit 
service industries. Of these, domestic privately-owned firms account for a dominant 
presence in all industries, ranging from 78 per cent to 99 per cent. This group of firms operate 
in the top three industries, namely wholesale and retail (G45-47); construction (F41-43); 
professional, scientific and technical activities (M69-75). They together account for about 
76 per cent of the total number of privately-owned firms. The bottom three industries, ranked 
in terms of firm number, consist of human health and social work activities (Q86-88); water 
supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (E36-39); arts, 
entertainment and recreation (R90-93), which all have less than 4,000 privately-owned 
firms. On the contrary, state-owned firms represent a modest proportion in the sample, 
having the total number of firms close to that of FDI firms. Similar to the private sector, the 
state-owned sector is also concentrated in the first two industries (G45-47; F41-43), but its 
third largest industry is transportation and storage (H49-53).  
While FDI firms are present in all 15 service industries, their relative importance varies 
substantially. In terms of total number of firms, the top industries in attracting FDI are the 
professional, scientific and technical activities (M69-75); information and communication 
(J58-63); wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (G45-47), 
which constitute roughly 50 per cent of total FDI firms in the sector. Meanwhile, if the 
relative share of FDI firm number is calculated, foreign presence is largest in J58-63, L68 
and Q86-88. Finally, when the employment contribution of FDI firms is considered, the 
relative importance of foreign firms in each industry changes, with the share greater than the 
share of number of FDI firms. For example, in the accommodation and food service 
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activities, FDI firms account for only 1.5 per cent of total number of firms but their respective 
employment share in the industry is much larger, at 12.4 per cent.        
Table 5.1: Distribution of firms by two-digit industry and ownership in the whole sector 
VSIC 
Code 
Two-digit service 
industry 
Number of 
domestic firms 
Number 
of 
FDI 
firms 
Share 
of 
FDI 
firms 
(%) 
Share of 
FDI 
employment 
 (%) 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
D35 Electricity, gas, steam and 
air conditioning supply 
402 7,321 26 0.337 0.213 
E36-39 Water supply, sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities 
873 3,095 39 0.983 0.770 
F41-43 Construction 2,206 157,415 1,047 0.656 1.002 
G45-47 Wholesale and retail trade, 
repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
2,357 443,955 1,341 0.300 1.339 
H49-53 Transportation and storage 1,133 64,266 959 1.466 4.538 
I55-56 Accommodation and food 
service activities 
676 40,624 604 1.462 12.396 
J58-63 Information and 
communication 
386 17,426 1,363 7.652 12.227 
K64-66 Financial and insurance 
activities 
314 10,395 333 3.110 5.799 
L68 Real estate activities 419 16,309 782 4.675 12.124 
M69-75 Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 
679 82,666 1,968 2.361 5.514 
N77-82 Administrative and 
support service activities 
375 30,947 361 1.153 2.333 
P85 Education 22 7,763 288 3.699 11.283 
Q86-88 Human health and social 
work activities 
2 2,980 120 4.024 5.724 
R90-93 Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 
371 3,619 128 3.208 18.684 
S94-96 Other service activities 30 7,377 82 1.107 7.641  
 Industry average 10,245 896,158 9,441 2.413 6.773 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
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5.2.1.2 Distribution of firms by region and ownership in the whole sector 
The distribution of firms across six regions for different ownership types is reported in 
Table 5.2. Notably, the Southeast (including Ho Chi Minh City – known as the country’s 
economic hub) is the largest region for both domestic and FDI firms in the services sector. 
This leading area comprises 37 per cent and 55 per cent of privately-owned and foreign 
firms, respectively. Furthermore, the Red River Delta (including Hanoi – the country’s 
capital city) is the second major region for private and FDI services firms while being the 
dominant location for domestic state-owned firms (37 per cent). On the contrary, the Central 
Highlands region is the least popular among all types of ownership. It only accounts for 
minimal shares of 0.4 per cent, 0.3 per cent and 0.04 per cent of total domestic state-owned, 
privately-owned and FDI firms in the sector, respectively.  
Compared to the data across two-digit industries in the sector, FDI firms exhibit rather 
modest proportions across regions. Of these, Southeast and Red River Delta are the most 
favoured locations where foreign firms represent 1.5 per cent and 1.3 per cent of total service 
firms in the two regions, respectively. It is also worth noting that similar to the distribution 
by industry, FDI firms’ contribution in terms of employment is much more significant than 
respective shares of firm numbers. On average of all regions, FDI share of employment (2.00 
per cent) is 3.3 times greater than FDI share of firm number (0.61 per cent). Notably, in the 
Central Highlands, the employment share of FDI is 13.4 times higher than FDI share of firm 
number. Finally, in the most concentrated area of services FDI firms, namely Southeast, 
while foreign firms represent 1.5 per cent of total number of firms, they contribute 5.1 per 
cent of total employment in the region.  
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Table 5.2: Distribution of firms by region and ownership in the whole sector 
Region 
Number of 
domestic firms 
Number 
of 
FDI 
firms 
Share 
of 
FDI 
firms 
(%) 
Share of 
FDI 
employment 
 (%) 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
Red River Delta 3,754 281,263 3,624 1.272 3.139 
Northern Midland and Mountain 853 42,703 121 0.278 0.605 
Central Coast 1,867 135,031 397 0.290 1.010 
Central Highlands 427 27,276 35 0.126 1.697 
Southeast 2,315 331,213 5,154 1.545 5.106 
Mekong River Delta 1,028 77,476 110 0.140 0.465 
Regional average 10,244 894,962 9,441 0.609 2.004 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
5.2.1.3 Average real wage by two-digit industry and ownership in the whole sector 
Table 5.3 displays the average real wage by ownership across 15 two-digit industries. 
The highest paying industry among FDI firms is financial and insurance activities (K64-66), 
which is also the case among domestic state-owned firms. Privately-owned firms offer 
highest pay in real estate activities (L68). Meanwhile, accommodation and food service (I55-
56) is the lowest paying industry among FDI firms. Domestic state-owned and privately 
owned firms pay the lowest in education (P85) and electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply (D35), respectively. Overall, the data present significantly higher 
average real wages for state-owned than privately owned firms in the sector, except 
education. Notably, FDI firms pay markedly higher than domestic counterparts in all two-
digit industries with an average wage premium of 3.4 times (foreign-domestic private firms) 
and 1.86 times (foreign-domestic state firms). 
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Table 5.3: Average real wage by two-digit industry and ownership in the whole sector 
VSIC 
Code 
Two-digit service industry 
Average real wage 
(domestic firms) 
Average 
real 
wage 
(FDI 
firms) 
Average 
real 
wage 
(All 
firms) 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
D35 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 
61.600 16.524 134.232 19.257 
E36-39 
  
Water supply, sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities 
40.157 24.504 62.321 28.282 
F41-43 Construction 42.330 32.205 82.350 32.671 
G45-47 
  
Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
47.392 28.485 96.634 28.788 
H49-53 Transportation and storage 60.061 30.021 88.694 31.382 
I55-56 
Accommodation and food service 
activities 
30.999 18.117 40.169 18.643 
J58-63 Information and communication 56.993 39.231 100.860 43.970 
K64-66 Financial and insurance activities 101.284 37.772 274.224 46.709 
L68 Real estate activities 59.589 42.393 110.703 45.855 
M69-75 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 
65.981 39.051 136.825 41.521 
N77-82  
Administrative and support 
service activities 
50.029 31.124 91.093 32.032 
P85 Education 28.524 30.553 108.416 33.326 
Q86-88  
Human health and social work 
activities 
64.173 29.429 97.469 32.084 
R90-93 Arts, entertainment and recreation 71.170 25.484 44.064 30.178 
S94-96 Other service activities 34.632 18.628 49.853 19.034 
  Industry average 54.328 29.568 101.194 32.249 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
5.2.1.4 Average real wage by region and ownership in the whole sector 
The average real wage across regions for domestic and FDI firms is presented in Table 
5.4. Notably, Southeast is the largest area of FDI firms and also the highest paying region 
for all ownership types in the sector. Meanwhile, Northern Midland and Mountain is the 
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lowest paying region among domestic state-owned and foreign firms. Privately-owned firms 
have the lowest average real wage in Mekong River Delta. Compared to the data by two-
digit industry, the data by region also show that private sector pays the lowest and foreign 
sector pays the highest. Nonetheless, foreign-domestic wage gaps across regions are less 
substantial than those across two-digit industries. Overall, average foreign wage premium 
across regions are 2.39 times (foreign-domestic private firms) and 1.37 times (foreign-
domestic state firms). 
Table 5.4: Average real wage by region and ownership in the whole sector 
Region 
Average real wage 
 (domestic firms) 
Average 
real wage 
(FDI 
firms) 
Average 
real wage 
(All firms) State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
Red River Delta 50.731 32.748 91.929 33.725 
Northern Midland and Mountain 34.797 26.153 28.851 26.329 
Central Coast 40.376 21.928 48.977 22.257 
Central Highlands 42.004 28.536 54.317 28.775 
Southeast 67.889 34.375 123.814 35.965 
Mekong River Delta 52.338 20.864 46.225 21.311 
Regional average 48.023 27.434 65.685 28.060 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
5.2.1.5 Summary statistics: Wage spillover estimation for the whole sector 
Table 5.5 summarises statistics of key variables in the econometric model specified in 
Equation 4.2.15 (Section 4.2, Chapter 4) for the empirical study of the entire services sector. 
In Table 5.5, one can observe considerable variations for the continuous variables, reflecting 
the heterogeneity of firms in the sample. Regarding the dummy variable of ownership 
structure, the mean indicates that the majority of domestic firms are privately owned (98.87 
per cent). The dominant presence of privately-owned firms across two-digit service 
industries and regions have also been described in detail in previous sections.  
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Table 5.5: Summary statistics – Wage spillover estimation for the whole sector 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average wage (𝑙𝑛𝑤) 906,403 3.2142 0.6554 -5.5514 10.3752 
Foreign presence (FDI) 915,844 0.0315 0.0482 0.0000 0.5342 
Firm size (lnSize) 906,046 7.2360 2.2651 -2.7202 18.7037 
Ownership structure (Own) 906,403 0.9887 0.1057 0.0000 1.0000 
Firm age (lnAge) 816,795 1.2838 0.8436 0.0000 7.6074 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 778,390 3.8151 1.5313 -6.3042 13.4354 
Technology gap (TechGap) 906,046 1469.232 11444.99 -5813793 19822 
Competition (Herfindahl) 915,844 0.0106 0.0258 0.0009 0.1826 
Notes: Obs is acronym for number of observations, Std.Dev. for standard deviation, Min for minimum, Max for 
maximum. 
Notably, FDI firms exhibit a moderate presence in the services sector, constituting 3.15 
per cent of total employment in the two-digit industry-region. The maximum employment 
share of FDI firms is 53.42 per cent, and the minimum share is zero, implying no presence 
of FDI firms. It should be noted that FDI firms are present across all 15 service industries in 
two major regions, namely Red River Delta and Southeast. Nonetheless, in other four less 
popular locations, there is no foreign investment in a number of two-digit industries, which 
demonstrates the heterogeneity of FDI across these two dimensions. For example, there is 
no FDI firm operating in information and communication industry in Central Highlands, 
which results in a zero value of foreign presence in this particular industry-region. 
Finally, as shown in Table 5.5, the average Herfindahl index as a proxy of market 
competition is relatively low at 0.01. Furthermore, a closer look at the sample shows that 
nearly 83 per cent of domestic firms in the services sector have Herfindahl index below the 
mean. In addition, a large number of firms, particularly privately-owned ones, across service 
industries provide substantially diverse activities. Therefore, the examined services sector 
can be categorised as being monopolistically competitive, which plausibly fits the theoretical 
framework in Section 4.2.1.   
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5.2.2 Estimation results and analyses 
5.2.2.1 Diagnostic testing  
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 display the correlation matrix and collinearity measures of key 
explanatory variables in the model, respectively. Severe multicollinearity can cause 
misleading estimates, weakening the statistical and forecasting power of regressions. As a 
rule of thumb adopted in the literature, multicollinearity is generally considered problematic 
if absolute correlation coefficient between two variables is greater than 0.7 and the individual 
value of variance inflation factor (VIF) is greater than 10 (equivalently, square root of VIF 
(SQRT VIF) greater than 2.0 or tolerance (
1
𝑉𝐼𝐹
) less than 0.2) (Alin, 2010; Dormann et al., 
2013; Fox, 1991; Morrow-Howell, 1994).  
The reported figures in Table 5.6 indicate that the correlation coefficients between major 
independent variables are notably small (being less than 0.35), accounting for negligible 
common variance. Moreover, the collinearity measures given in Table 5.7 show low values 
of VIF and SQRT VIF (being less than 2.0), and equivalently high value of tolerance (being 
greater than 0.2). Thus, it is highly unlikely that severe multicollinearity can arise. Moreover, 
potential arbitrary heteroscedasticity is taken into account by employing robust standard 
errors in the IV-GMM estimations (Petersen, 2009; Stock & Watson, 2008). 
Table 5.6: Correlation matrix – Wage spilliover estimation for the whole sector 
  FDI lnSize Own lnAge lnK_intensity TechGap Herfindahl 
FDI 1 
      
lnSize -0.0949 1 
     
Own -0.0337 -0.1884 1 
    
lnAge -0.0227 0.3414 -0.161 1 
   
lnK_intensity -0.0348 0.0697 -0.061 0.0520 1 
  
TechGap -0.0392 -0.1139 0.0147 -0.0132 -0.0249 1 
 
Herfindahl 0.2883 -0.0730 -0.0460 0.0192 -0.0257 0.0249 1 
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Table 5.7: Collinearity measures–Wage spilliover estimation for the whole sector 
Regressor 
Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) 
Square root of the 
VIF (SQRT VIF) 
Tolerance 
FDI 1.1000 1.0500 0.9064 
lnSize 1.1900 1.0900 0.8395 
Own 1.0600 1.0300 0.9473 
lnAge 1.1500 1.0700 0.8711 
lnK_intensity 1.0100 1.0000 0.9905 
TechGap 1.0200 1.0100 0.9824 
Herfindahl 1.1000 1.0500 0.9100 
Table 5.8 presents the main estimation results for FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages 
in the whole services sector. Regarding the overall model significance, the test obtains an F-
statistic of 3113.91 with p<0.01, indicating the joint significance of the estimated 
coefficients. Notably, the null hypothesis (i.e., FDI is exogenous) is rejected at the one per 
cent level given the C-statistic for the endogeneity test being 91.36 (p<0.01). This result 
indicates that the IV-GMM estimator is an appropriate method to account for the 
endogeneity bias.  
The adoption of the IV-GMM estimator requires the use of proper excluded instrumental 
variables. This empirical exercise utilises two instruments, namely the employment share of 
FDI firms in the beverage manufacturing industry in region j at time t (i.e., IV1), and the 
employment share of FDI firms in the furniture manufacturing industry in region j at time t 
(i.e., IV2), of which region j is different from where domestic service firms are located. The 
description of IVs construction as well as their appropriateness in terms of theoretical 
rationale were detailed in Section 4.4.3. Furthermore, the relevance and validity of these 
selected instruments are statistically examined by the underidentification and 
overidentification tests. The LM statistic (for underidentification test) is 2.0e+04 (p<0.01), 
hence the null hypothesis (i.e., excluded instruments are irrelevant) can be rejected at the 
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one per cent level. Moreover, the reported statistic of the overidentification test is 2.66 
(p>0.1), which fails to reject the null hypothesis (i.e., selected instruments are valid). 
Overall, the test results affirm the appropriateness of the model and estimation method, 
including the relevance and validity of the instruments for the dataset. 
Table 5.8: Estimation results – Wage spillovers for the whole sector 
Variable 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard error 
p-value 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) 1.1535 0.1447 0.0000 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) 0.0733 0.0005 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) -0.1886 0.0096 0.0000 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) 0.0430 0.0012 0.0000 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0529 0.0006 0.0000 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) 0.000001 0.0000002 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) -1.1006 0.0860 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Included   
Year dummies (dTimet) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
2.0e+04 (0.0000) 
Overidentification test 
(Hansen J statistic) 
 2.6580 (0.1030) 
Endogeneity test 
(C-statistic) 
Model significance test 
91.3620 (0.0000) 
(F-statstic) 3113.9100 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 906,403 
     Notes: p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses; the estimation accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
5.2.2.2 Evidence of FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages in the whole sector 
The estimation results in Table 5.8 confirm the existence of positive wage spillovers 
from FDI firms to domestic firms in the whole services sector in Vietnam. The estimated 
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coefficient of foreign presence (FDI) is positive and statistically significant at the one per 
cent level. Therefore, not only do foreign firms pay much higher wages across 15 two-digit 
service industries and six regions, they also exert considerable upward pressure on average 
wages of domestic counterparts in the sector. A one per cent increase in foreign presence in 
the industry-region is associated with average wages that are 1.15 per cent higher among 
domestic firms. This empirical finding for Vietnam’s services sector (in terms of direction of 
spillovers) is meaningful and relatively consistent with most previous findings for the 
manufacturing sector in developing host economies (Chidambaran Iyer, 2012; Hale & Long, 
2011; Hoi & Pomfret, 2010; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004; Srithanpong, 2014; Tomohara & Takii, 
2011; Villarreal & Sakamoto, 2011). Besides, the estimation suggests a more profound 
magnitude of wage spillovers as compared to that in Vietnam’s manufacturing sector (Hoi & 
Pomfret, 2010).   
The theoretical modelling in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1) indicates that the impact of FDI 
is conditional upon the relative strength of the two contrasting channels via which FDI firms 
affect domestic firms’ average wages. The estimated coefficient reported in Table 5.8 
captures the net impact of FDI in the entire services sector. Of which, a positive coefficient 
is resulted from the dominant effect of the positive channel over the negative one. For 
instance, if FDI firms exert positive productivity spillovers and its net impact on domestic 
firms’ average wages is positive, then the direct channel (i.e., productivity spillovers) 
dominates the indirect one (i.e., cut-off capability), putting an upward pressure on the 
conditional expectation of domestic firms’ average wages. Intuitively, domestic firms in the 
services sector are inclined to pay higher to their workers as they gain significant beneficial 
productivity spillovers from foreign firms, which increases the marginal product of labour. 
Whereas, the downward effect on local wages by the entry of firms with lower capability 
seems negligible. 
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5.2.2.3 Other determinants of domestic firms’ wages in the whole sector 
The estimation results in Table 5.8 suggest the importance of other factors in 
determining wages by domestic firms in Vietnam’s services sector. The coefficients of 
control variables are all statistically significant at the one per cent level. Of these, a one per 
cent increase in firm size (lnSize) is associated with average real wages that are 0.07 per cent 
higher. This finding is unsurprising as previous literature mostly suggests that larger firms 
tend to possess stronger financial capacity and adopt better compensation practices, which 
allow them to pay higher than smaller firms (Girma et al., 1999; Hoi & Pomfret, 2010; 
Pittiglio et al., 2015). 
Domestic service firms’ ownership structure plays a considerable role in explaining their 
wage differences. The estimated coefficient of variable Own is negative and statistically 
significant at the one per cent level. This suggests that, on average, private firms pay 0.19 per 
cent lower than state counterparts in the entire sector. In fact, the data description reported in 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 shows overwhelmingly higher average real wages by domestic state-owned 
firms across two-digit service industries and regions over the study period. Related literature, 
for example, De Fraja (1993) and Hale and Long (2011), also supports the same conclusion, 
asserting that state-owned firms may possess more favourable funding access than privately-
owned firms, allowing the former to employ more competent and higher paid workers.  
Two other major firm-specific variables, namely age (lnAge) and capital intensity 
(lnK_intensity), also show positive and statistically significant influence on wages by domestic 
firms in the services sector. Besides, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is more or 
less close to each other. A one per cent increase in firm age and capital intensity causes 
domestic firms to push up average real wages by 0.04 per cent and 0.05 per cent, respectively. 
Well-established firms tend to have notable business success, more solid experience in both 
product and labour markets, enhancing their capability to pay higher. Similarly, capital-
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intensive firms are more likely to achieve strong financial capability and sound compensation 
systems, allowing them to pay higher than labour-intensive counterparts. These findings are 
expected since previous studies generally suggest a positive correlation between these two 
variables and firms’ wage levels (Arai, 2003b; Brown & Medoff, 2003; Hoi & Pomfret, 2010; 
Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 2013; Pittiglio et al., 2015; Sjöholm & Lipsey, 2006).  
Finally, Table 5.8 also indicates that the last two control variables in the empirical model, 
namely technology gap (TechGap) and competition (Herfindahl), exert statistically significant 
but contrasting effects on average real wages by domestic service firms. Nevertheless, the 
effect of technology gap appears negligible because the estimated coefficient of variable 
TechGap is notably small (0.000001). Meanwhile, the influence of competition on local firms’ 
wages is more pronounced. Accordingly, a one per cent increase in competitive pressure (i.e., 
lower Herfindahl index) is associated with average real wages that are 1.10 per cent higher. 
This finding implies that, facing increased competitive forces, domestic firms in Vietnam’s 
services sector tend to adopt the strategy of attracting and retaining a productive and competent 
workforce, putting upward pressure on their average wage levels. 
5.2.3 High-wage versus low-wage industries 
Two-digit industries, notably in the services sector, are heterogeneous in a wide array 
of aspects, including average wage levels. In fact, the data description presented in Section 
5.2.1 highlights the substantial differences in average real wages across 15 two-digit 
industries of Vietnam’s services sector. Furthermore, the relative importance of FDI firms 
across two-digit service industries varies markedly. To obtain a graphical overview of how 
FDI-linked wage spillovers might differ by the industry wage level, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
depict the scatterplots of the data for low-wage and high-wage service industries. Of these, 
low-wage group is defined to have average real wage equal or less than sample mean for all 
domestic firms. Whereas, high-wage group has average real wage greater than sample mean. 
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The graphs seem to suggest divergent patterns of FDI-induced wage spillovers, exhibiting a 
positive impact in the high-wage group while having a negative impact in the low-wage 
group. Therefore, it is of analytical and policy interest to conduct further estimations to 
distinguish the direction and magnitude of FDI-linked wage spillovers between high-wage 
and low-wage service industries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Scatterplot of foreign presence and domestic firms’ average real 
wages in high-wage service industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Scatterplot of foreign presence and domestic firms’ average real 
wages in low-wage service industries 
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The sample of the whole services sector is divided into two subsets of low-wage and 
high-wage groups. Table 5.9 lists the two-digit service industries by wage level. Of these, 
the high-wage group comprises of eight two-digit industries and the top three highest paying 
ones are real estate activities (L68); financial and insurance activities (K64-66); information 
and communication (J58-63). The low-wage group consists of seven two-digit industries and 
the bottom three lowest paying ones are accommodation and food service activities (I55-56); 
other service activities (S94-96); electricity, gas, stream and air conditioning supply (D35).   
Table 5.9: List of two-digit industries by wage level in the services sector 
VSIC Code High-wage group 
F41-43 Construction 
H49-53 Transportation and storage 
J58-63 Information and communication 
K64-66 Financial and insurance activities 
L68 Real estate activities 
M69-75 Professional, scientific and technical activities 
N77-82 Administrative and support service activities 
P85 Education 
VSIC Code Low-wage group 
D35 Electricity, gas, stream and air conditioning supply 
E36-39 Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
G45-47 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
I55-56 Accommodation and food service activities 
Q86-88 Human health and social work activities 
R90-93 Arts, entertainment and recreation 
S94-96 Other service activities 
Table 5.10 displays the estimation results, which confirm the graphical patterns plotted 
above. Notably, FDI firms exert a positive and statistically significant effect on average real 
wages of domestic firms operating in high-wage service industries with a one per cent 
increase in foreign presence causing domestic firms in the high-wage group to raise wages 
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by 3.34 per cent. On the contrary, FDI-linked wage spillover effect is negative and 
statistically significant in the low-wage group, with a one per cent increase in foreign 
presence lowering domestic firms’ average real wages by 0.85 per cent. The finding might 
reflect weak absorptive capacity by firms in low-wage industries to realise beneficial FDI-
induced spillovers. According to the theoretical framework in Section 4.2, the adverse net 
impact in this group implies the dominance of the negative channel. For example, given the 
positive productivity spillovers, the downward effect on local wages by the entry of lower 
capable firms (i.e., cut-off capability) is more pronounced than the upward effect to pay 
higher (i.e., productivity spillovers). This interesting and important evidence warrants the 
need for more in-depth analyses of FDI wage effect at the sub-sector level.17 Hence, the 
following Sections 5.3 and 5.4 provide further insights at lower levels of disaggregation.18 
Table 5.10: Estimation results: High-wage versus low-wage industries  
  High-wage service industries Low-wage service industries 
Variable 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-value 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-value 
Foreign presence 
(FDIkjt) 
3.3363 0.2229 0.0000 -0.8538 0.1617 0.0000 
Firm size  
(lnSizeikjt) 
0.0196 0.0006 0.0000 0.0520 0.0006 0.0000 
Ownership 
structure (Ownikjt) 
-0.0506 0.0107 0.0000 -0.0652 0.0115 0.0000 
Firm age  
(lnAgeikjt) 
0.0134 0.0019 0.0000 0.0179 0.0012 0.0000 
Capital intensity 
(lnK_intensityikjt) 
0.0235 0.0008 0.0000 0.0251 0.0006 0.0000 
Technology gap 
(TechGapikjt) 
0.0000005 0.0000001 0.0000 0.0000007 0.0000003 0.0000 
Competition 
(Herfindahlkjt) 
-0.4775 0.1196 0.0000 -0.5776 0.0906 0.0000 
 
17 A study on another low-wage industry, namely wholesale and retail trade, also reveals the evidence of 
negative wage spillovers from FDI firms and the divergent effects of foreign presence at different ends of 
the wage scale (D. T. H. Nguyen, 2019). See Table A5.10 in the Appendices for the main estimation results 
of this study.   
18 The choices of industries for the sub-sector analyses are based on the data in Table 5.3. Accordingly, the 
financial, banking and insurance industry, and the accommodation and food service are the highest and 
lowest paying industries in the sector, respectively.  
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Regional dummies 
(dRegionj) 
Included   Included   
Industry dummies 
(dIndustryk) 
Included   Included   
Year dummies 
(dTimet) 
Included   Included   
LM statistic  4433.9140 (0.0000) 9084.1940 (0.0000) 
Hansen J statistic  37.7950 (0.0000) 4.5740 (0.0325) 
C-statistic 214.8870 (0.0000) 12.7450 (0.0000) 
F-statistic 180.2800 (0.0000) 1407.7400 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 357,526 548,877 
Notes: (i) High-wage group is defined to have average real wage greater than sample mean, and low-wage group 
has average real wage equal or less than sample mean; (ii) p-values for the tests statistics are in parentheses; 
(iii) the estimations accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
5.3 FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages: Evidence from a high-wage service industry  
5.3.1 Data description: FDI and wages in the financial, banking and insurance industry 
The distribution of firms by ownership type across 10 three-digit financial, banking and 
insurance industries is presented in Table 5.11. Similar to the sectoral pattern, domestic 
privately-owned firms constitute the leading proportion in almost all industries, with one 
exception of reinsurance (K652). Notably, pension funding activities (K653) engage only 
private ownership. Furthermore, domestic privately-owned firms are largely concentrated in 
monetary intermediation (K641); other financial service activities (K649) (e.g., financial 
leasing, credit granting); and activities auxiliary to financial service activities (K661) (e.g., 
administration of financial markets, security and commodity contracts brokerage). These 
three major industries account for nearly 85 per cent and 78 per cent of domestic privately-
owned firms and all firms, respectively. The top two industries by state ownership are also 
K641 and K649 while the third largest is K651 (Insurance).    
Compared to the entire sector, FDI firms exhibit rather mixed figures of importance across 
three-digit financial, banking and insurance industries. Particularly, foreign firms are not present 
in trust, funds and other financial vehicles (K643); reinsurance (K652); and pension funding 
(K653). Regarding the number of firms, FDI is mainly attracted to monetary intermediation 
(K641); insurance (K651); and activities auxiliary to financial service activities (K661), which 
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comprise 83 per cent of all foreign firms. While the whole sector sample shows consistently 
greater foreign contribution in terms of employment than respective shares of firm number (with 
an average gap of nearly three times), the financial, banking and insurance shows a rather 
different trend at the three-digit level. Of these, FDI employment shares are smaller than their 
respective shares in firm number in three out of seven FDI-present industries (i.e., K641, K651, 
and K663). Overall, the sample average in this high-wage industry still indicates slightly higher 
employment share (5.36 per cent) than the share of firm number (4.48 per cent). 
Table 5.11: Distribution of firms by three-digit level and ownership in the 
financial, banking and insurance industry 
VSIC 
Code 
Three-digit financial, 
banking and insurance 
industry 
Number of 
domestic firms 
Number 
of 
FDI 
firms 
Share 
of FDI 
firms 
(%) 
Share of 
FDI 
employment 
 (%) 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
K641 Monetary intermediation 92 1,952 164 7.428 5.406 
K642 Activities of holding company 13 49 1 1.587 6.844 
K643 Trust, funds and other 
financial vehicles 
6 269 0 0.000 0.000 
K649 Other financial service 
activities* 
69 3,125 23 0.715 3.883 
K651 Insurance 68 403 79 14.364 9.439 
K652 Reinsurance 1 0 0 0.000 0.000 
K653 Pension funding 0 6 0 0.000 0.000 
K661 Activities auxiliary to financial 
service activities*  
46 1,066 30 2.627 3.769 
K662 Activities auxiliary to 
insurance and pension funding 
1 293 17 5.466 12.408 
K663 Fund management activities 5 92 14 12.613 11.867 
 
Industry average 301 7,255 328 4.480 5.362 
* Except insurance and pension funding activities 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
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Table 5.12 reveals the distribution of firms by region and ownership in the financial, 
banking and insurance industry. Resembling the distribution of the services sector, both 
domestic and foreign firms in this industry operate dominantly in two major regions of Red 
River Delta and Southeast where Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are respectively located. 
While the whole sector data show Southeast as the most favoured location among domestic 
and FDI firms, the data by the finance, banking and insurance industry display Red River 
Delta as the top region for domestic firms.  
Moreover, three regions (i.e., Northern Midland and Mountain, Central Highlands, and 
Mekong River Delta) have no FDI firms in this high-wage industry. The lack of foreign 
presence in Vietnam’s less developed regions results in lower average FDI shares in terms 
of firm number (1.90 per cent) and employment (2.30 per cent) as compared to the sectoral 
distribution. Nevertheless, the relative importance of FDI firms in this industry in the top 
two regions is much greater than that of the sector average. Notably in Southeast, FDI shares 
of firm number and employment are 7.37 per cent and 9.16 per cent, respectively, while 
those of the entire sector are 1.55 per cent and 5.11 per cent.            
Table 5.12: Distribution of firms by region and ownership in the financial, banking 
and insurance industry 
Region 
Number of 
domestic firms 
Number 
of 
FDI 
firms 
Share 
of FDI 
firms 
(%) 
Share of 
FDI 
employment 
 (%) 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
Red River Delta 180 2,766 120 3.914 4.451 
Northern Midland and Mountain 2 284 0 0.000 0.000 
Central Coast 9 993 1 0.100 0.173 
Central Highlands 12 114 0 0.000 0.000 
Southeast 75 2,526 207 7.372 9.157 
Mekong River Delta 23 565 0 0.000 0.000 
Regional average 301 7,248 328 1.898 2.297 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
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The average real wage by ownership structure at the three-digit level of the financial, 
banking and insurance industry is shown in Table 5.13. As reported in Table 5.3, this 
industry is the highest paying in the entire services sector. Similar to the observation of the 
two-digit industry data, wages vary extensively across three-digit industries and ownership 
types. Notably, the top three highest paying industries among FDI firms are fund 
management activities (K663); monetary intermediation (K641); and activities auxiliary to 
insurance and pension funding (K662). Furthermore, K663 is also the top paying industry 
among domestic state-owned and privately-owned firms. In contrast, FDI firms in activities 
of holding company (K642) pay the lowest, whereas insurance (K651) and other financial 
service activities (K649) offer the lowest wages among state-owned and privately-owned 
firms, respectively. Overall, the average wage gap of 1.82 times (foreign-domestic state 
firms) is close to that of the sector (1.86 times) but the gap of 4.71 times (foreign-domestic 
private firms) is higher than that of the entire sector (3.4 times). 
Table 5.13: Average real wage by three-digit level and ownership in the financial, 
banking and insurance industry 
VSIC 
Code 
Three-digit financial, 
banking and insurance 
industry 
Average real wage 
(domestic firms) 
Average 
real 
wage 
(FDI 
firms) 
Average 
real 
wage 
(All 
firms) 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
K641 Monetary intermediation 100.564 44.677 316.197 67.173 
K642 Activities of holding company 107.033 33.930 42.620 48.544 
K643 Trust, funds and other 
vehicles 
86.945 39.934 _______ 40.960 
K649 Other financial service 
activities* 
112.614 25.009 178.927 27.988 
K651 Insurance 86.137 43.755 221.681 74.551 
K652 Reinsurance 225.527 ________ _______ 225.527 
K653 Pension funding _______ 37.417 _______ 37.417 
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K661 Activities auxiliary to 
financial service activities*  
90.722 57.578 192.280 62.452 
K662 Activities auxiliary to 
insurance and pension funding 
111.525 39.006 273.285 52.045 
K663 Fund management activities 260.537 135.308 484.998 185.054 
 
Industry average 131.289 50.735 238.804 82.171 
* Except insurance and pension funding activities 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
Table 5.14 presents the average real wage by region for domestic and FDI firms in the 
financial, banking and insurance industry. While Southeast remains the highest paying 
region among foreign firms (which is similar to the sector sample average), Red River Delta 
becomes the highest paying region among domestic firms in this industry. Moreover, Central 
Coast is the lowest paying region across domestic privately-owned and foreign firms while 
it is Northern Midland and Mountain among domestic state-owned firms. Contrary to the 
whole services sector, data by the financial, banking and insurance industry reveal that 
regional foreign-domestic wage gaps are markedly larger than the industry foreign-domestic 
wage gaps. On average, foreign wage premium across regions are 6.97 times (foreign-
domestic private firms) and 2.95 times (foreign-domestic state firms). Notably, the reported 
regional pay differentials in this industry are more substantial than those of the sectoral 
average (i.e., FDI firms pay 2.39 and 1.37 times higher than domestic privately-owned and 
state-owned firms in the sector, respectively).   
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Table 5.14: Average real wage by region and ownership in the financial, 
banking and insurance industry 
Region 
Average real wage 
(domestic firms) 
Average 
real wage 
(FDI 
firms) 
Average 
real wage 
(All firms) State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
Red River Delta 109.327 42.780 273.745 55.726 
Northern Midland and Mountain 53.103 29.008 _______ 29.176 
Central Coast 78.539 25.332 183.308 25.967 
Central Highlands 64.529 42.107 ______ 44.242 
Southeast 94.360 42.632 278.552 61.405 
Mekong River Delta 98.366 29.314 ______ 32.015 
Regional average 83.037 35.195 245.202 41.422 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
The summary statistics of key variables for the empirical study of the financial, banking 
and insurance industry is reported in the appendices (Table A5.1). Similar to the whole sector 
statistics, the figures also suggest significant heterogeneity in the sample due to the sizable 
variations for continuous explanatory variables. Compared to the sector average, private 
ownership in this high-wage industry remains dominant, though to a lower extent of 96.02 
per cent (as compared to the sector mean of 98.87 per cent). Notably, FDI firms exhibit 
stronger presence compared to the whole sector sample, accounting for 5.01 per cent of total 
employment in the three-digit industry-region. The maximum employment share of FDI 
firms is 87.93 per cent (for fund management activities in Southeast), which is higher than 
the maximum share across two-digit service industries and regions (i.e., 53.42 per cent). The 
minimum share of FDI firms’ employment is zero, reflecting heterogeneous foreign presence 
in various three-level industries and regions.   
5.3.2 Estimation results and analyses 
Table 5.15 presents the estimation results of FDI firms’ impact on average wages of 
domestic firms in the financial, banking and insurance industry. It indicates the existence of 
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wage spillovers from foreign firms to domestic counterparts in this high-wage industry over 
the study period. The estimated coefficient of foreign presence (FDI) is positive and 
statistically significant at the one per cent level. Specifically, a one per cent increase in 
foreign presence causes the average wages of domestic firms to rise by 4.65 per cent. 
Compared to the estimation for the entire sector, the magnitude of FDI-linked wage 
spillovers in this high-wage service industry appears more profound. This finding implies 
substantial influence of high-wage and highly skilled foreign affiliates via the two spillover 
channels (i.e., productivity spillovers and cut-off capability) as described in the theoretical 
modelling in Chapter 4. Of these, the positive effect from one channel dominates the 
negative effect from the other, resulting in higher average wages among domestic firms in.  
Regarding the diagnostic testing, the F-statistic and C-statistic suggest the significance 
of overall model as well as the presence of endogeneity bias. Accordingly, both statistic for 
overidentification and underidentifiction tests confirm the relevance and validity of selected 
instruments (i.e., foreign employment share in the fabricated metal product manufacturing 
and in the electrical equipment manufacturing at time t in region j non-adjacent to domestic 
financial firms). Furthermore, Tables A5.3 and A5.4 in the Appendices respectively report 
the correlation matrix and collinearity measures of main explanatory variables, which show 
that severe multicollinearity problem is unlikely to exist. 
Table 5.15: Estimation results – Wage spillovers for the financial, banking and 
insurance industry  
Variable 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-value 
Foreign presence (FDI) 4.6484 1.5936 0.0040 
Firm size (lnSize) 0.1033 0.0161 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Own) 0.2212 0.2225 0.3200 
Firm age (lnAge) 0.0316 0.0317 0.3190 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 0.0814 0.0130 0.0000 
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Technology gap (TechGap) 0.000001 0.000003 0.7490 
Competition (Herfindahl) 0.1997 0.1857 0.2820 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustry) Included   
Year dummies (dTime) Included   
Underidentification test  
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
60.6050 (0.0000) 
Over-identification test  
(Hansen J statistic) 
0.2610 (0.6093) 
Endogeneity test  
(C-statistic) 
8.2130 (0.0042) 
Model significance test  
(F-statstic) 
33.3200 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 7,556 
Notes: p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses; the estimation accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
Similar to the overall sector estimation results, Table 5.15 also suggests the positive role 
of two key firm-specific characteristics, namely firm size (lnSize) and capital intensity 
(lnK_intensity), in determining wages of local firms in the financial, banking and insurance 
industry. Such findings are expected and consistent with previous literature (Arai, 2003b; 
Brown & Medoff, 2003; Girma et al., 1999; Hoi & Pomfret, 2010; Muñoz-Bullón & 
Sánchez-Bueno, 2013; Pittiglio et al., 2015). Notably, these two variables seem to exert 
greater impact in this industry since their estimated coefficients are marginally greater than 
those in the whole sector model. Accordingly, a one per cent increase in firm size and capital 
intensity is associated with average real wages that are 0.10 per cent and 0.08 per cent higher, 
respectively. 
Contrary to the entire sector estimation results, Table 5.15 indicates statistically 
insignificant impact of other firm-level variables on domestic firms’ average real wages in 
the financial, banking and insurance industry. Accordingly, ownership structure (Own), firm 
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age (lnAge), technology gap (TechGap) play an insignificant role in explaining wage 
differences among local firms in this specific industry. Such evidence might further suggest 
relatively pronounced wage impact absorbed by the two crucial characteristics of firm size 
and capital intensity. Moreover, the competitive pressure (Herfindahl) appears unimportant 
in determining local firms’ wages in the financial, banking and insurance industry whereas 
this factor shows significant impact on average wages for the overall sector estimation.   
5.4 FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages: Evidence from a low-wage service industry  
5.4.1 Data description: FDI and wages in the accommodation and food service industry 
Table 5.16 displays the distribution of firms by ownership structure across five three-
digit accommodation and food service industries. Notably, these categorised services 
(reported in Section I) comprise the core activities of the tourism industry (UNCTAD, 2007), 
representing a rising attraction of both domestic and foreign investment. Similar to the data 
for the whole sector and the financial, banking and insurance industry, firms in the 
accommodation and food services are overwhelmingly privately owned and unevenly 
distributed across three-digit categorised activities. Of these, the top two industries among 
both domestic and foreign firms comprise short-term accommodation (including hotels and 
resorts) (I551); restaurants and mobile food services (I561). These services account for 83 
per cent, 55 per cent, and 56 per cent of total number of domestically state-owned, privately-
owned, and FDI firms, respectively.  
It is also worth noting that while FDI firms represent rather modest proportion in terms 
of firm number (with an average share of 0.94 per cent), their employment contribution is 
far greater, being approximately nine times higher (with an average share of 8.165 per cent). 
This difference in relative importance by foreign firms in accommodation and food service 
industry is markedly higher than that of the entire sector (2.8 times) and the financial, 
banking and insurance industry (1.2 times). Particularly, foreign firms in the short-term 
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accommodation (K551) and event catering (I562) represent considerable employment shares 
of nearly 18.5 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively.   
Table 5.16: Distribution of firms by three-digit level and ownership in the 
accommodation and food service industry 
VSIC 
Code 
Three-digit financial, 
banking and insurance 
industry 
Number of 
domestic firms 
Number 
of 
FDI 
firms 
Share 
of FDI 
firms 
(%) 
Share of 
FDI 
employment 
 (%) 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
I551 Short-term accommodation 387 17,988 294 1.575 18.487 
I559 Other accommodation 0 11 0 0 0 
I561 Restaurants and mobile 
food services 
75 12,560 212   1.650 6.311 
I562 Event catering 3 1,467 20 1.342 15.921 
I563 Beverage serving activities 0 720 1 0.139 0.104  
Industry average 465 32,746 527 0.941 8.165 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
The distribution of firms by region and ownership in the accommodation and food 
service industry is provided Table 5.17. Differing from the data of the overall sector and the 
financial, banking and insurance industry, the regional distribution of firms in this industry 
is more diverse. While Red River Delta and Southeast remain major locations, Central Coast 
becomes the largest and second largest region of domestically state-owned firms and 
privately-owned firms, respectively. In addition, this well-known tourism region (including 
highly developed tourist destinations in coastal provinces of Da Nang, Quang Nam, Khanh 
Hoa, Hue) attracts a bigger proportion of FDI firms (18.5 per cent of all FDI firms), as 
compared to 4 per cent of all FDI firms in the services sector. Hence, the relative importance 
of foreign firms in this service industry is also more remarkable across six regions, of which 
the maximum employment share by FDI firms is 20.4 per cent in Red River Delta. Notably, 
the average regional share of FDI employment is notably high at 10 per cent, as compared 
to about 2 per cent for the overall services sector.   
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Table 5.17: Distribution of firms by region and ownership in the accommodation 
and food service industry 
Region 
Number of 
domestic firms 
Number 
of 
FDI 
firms 
Share 
of FDI 
firms 
(per 
cent) 
Share of 
FDI 
employment 
 (per cent) 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
Red River Delta 137 7,054 269 3.741 20.441 
Northern Midland & Mountain 25 708 12 1.637 4.394 
Central Coast 159 7,179 97 1.322 7.510 
Central Highlands 29 1,030 5 0.472 7.681 
Southeast 85 13,982 134 0.953 15.152 
Mekong River Delta 30 2,746 10 0.360 5.406 
Regional average 465 32,699 527 1.414 10.097 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
Table 5.18 reports average real wages of FDI, domestic and all firms across three-digit 
accommodation and food service industries. The highest paying industry among FDI firms 
is the short-term accommodation industry, which is also the industry with the highest level 
of foreign investment, comprising more than 55 per cent of foreign firms in the sample. 
Notably, the foreign-domestic pay gaps across industries are significant at 2.96 times (short-
term accommodation), 2.09 times (beverage serving activities), 1.56 times (event catering), 
and 1.38 times (restaurants and mobile food services). Overall, foreign firms pay 
considerably higher than domestic counterparts in all FDI-present three-digit industries with 
an average wage premium of 2.25 times. 
Table 5.18: Average real wage by three-digit level and ownership in the 
accommodation and food service industry 
VSIC 
code 
Three-digit industry 
Average 
real wage 
(FDI firms) 
Average 
real wage 
(Domestic 
firms) 
Average 
real wage 
(All 
firms) 
I551 Short-term accommodation 53.6834 18.1556 18.7151 
I559 Other accommodation N.A. 24.1005 24.1005 
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I561 Restaurants and mobile food services 26.0139 18.9142 19.0314 
I562 Event catering 33.3975 21.4494 21.6097 
I563 Beverage serving activities 36.0214 17.2545 17.2805 
 Industry average 41.7492 18.5724 18.9345 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
Table 5.19 shows the real wage differences between domestic and FDI firms across 
regions. Among FDI firms, the highest paying region is Southeast (including Ho Chi Minh 
City – the economic centre), and the lowest one is the Northern Midland and Mountain. 
Meanwhile, domestic firms pay the highest and lowest in Red River Delta (including Hanoi – 
the capital city) and Mekong River Delta, respectively. Generally, FDI firms pay much higher 
than domestic counterparts, regardless of geographical locations. Nevertheless, the foreign-
domestic pay gaps are more substantial compared to those across three-digit industries. The 
smallest gap is found in the Northern area where FDI firms pay approximately 1.5 times higher 
than domestic firms. 
Table 5.19: Average real wage by region and ownership in the accommodation 
and food service industry 
No. Region 
Average 
real wage 
(FDI firms) 
Average real 
wage 
(Domestic 
firms) 
Average 
real wage 
(All firms) 
1 Red River Delta 41.1582 20.8046 21.5386 
2 Northern Midland & Mountain 26.7577 17.9042 18.0468 
3 Central Coast 29.4456 16.5769 16.7448 
4 Central Highlands 29.5450 17.6969 17.7525 
5 Southeast 53.3053 19.1587 19.4809 
6 Mekong River Delta 46.2324 15.6672 15.7769 
 Regional average 41.7492 18.5724 18.9345 
    Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
The descriptive statistics of the main variables for the empirical study of the 
accommodation and food service industry is reported in the appendices (Table A5.6). As 
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observed in the data for the entire sector and the financial, banking and insurance industry, 
the statistics of this low-wage industry shows heterogeneous characteristics of firms across 
explanatory variables. Furthermore, private ownership in this industry accounts for 98.6 per 
cent of all domestic firms, which is rather close to the sector average (98.87 per cent). 
Notably, FDI firms constitute 13.34 per cent of employment in the industry-region. This 
average employment share is more than four times that of the whole sector (3.15 per cent), 
suggesting more considerable importance of FDI to the accommodation and food service 
industry. The maximum employment share of FDI firms is 38.01 per cent, and the minimum 
share is zero, implying no FDI presence. 
5.4.2 Estimation results and analyses 
Table 5.20 reports the estimation results for FDI impact on domestic firms’ average 
wages in the accommodation and food service industry. The estimation reveals the existence 
of negative wage spillovers from FDI to domestic firms in this low-wage service industry. 
While FDI firms pay much higher across three-digit industries and regions, they put 
downward pressure on average wages of domestic counterparts. The coefficient of foreign 
presence (FDI) is negative and statistically significant at one per cent level. Specifically, a 
one per cent increase in FDI presence will lower domestic firms’ average wages by 2.03 per 
cent. This finding is in contrast to those for the entire services sector (Section 5.2.2) and the 
financial, banking and insurance industry (Section 5.3.3), which both exhibit positive wage 
spillovers from FDI firms. The negative spillover outcome is also interesting since previous 
studies mostly suggest the opposite evidence. 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Table 5.20: Estimation results – Wage spillovers for the accommodation and 
food service industry  
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
p-value 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) -2.0339 0.3840 0.0000 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) 0.1304 0.0054 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) -0.0090 0.0501 0.8580 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) 0.0232 0.0089 0.0090 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0365 0.0036 0.0000 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) -1.4675 0.3117 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Included   
Year dummies (dTimet) Included   
Underidentification test  
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
665.8570 (0.0000) 
Over-identification test  
(Hansen J statistic) 
0.0040 (0.9524) 
Endogeneity test  
(C-statistic) 
21.4290 (0.0042) 
Model significance test  
(F-statstic) 
101.9400 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 20,715 
Notes: p-values for the tests statistics are in parentheses; the estimation accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
In fact, as shown in the theoretical model in Section 4.2.1 (Chapter 4), it is possible that 
the impact of FDI firms is negative, as foreign presence generates two contrasting effects on 
the expected average wage. On the one hand, FDI affects domestic firms via productivity 
spillovers (a direct channel), and on the other hand, it creates an indirect impact via the cut-off 
capability (an indirect channel). If FDI generates positive productivity spillovers (namely the 
direct channel being positive), which tends to increase firms’ average wages due to increase 
in the marginal product of labour, it lowers the cut-off capability. Subsequently, firms that 
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previously cannot survive will now enter the industry, which lowers firms’ expected average 
wages. Similarly, if there are negative productivity spillovers that lower firms’ average wages, 
the cut-off capability will be raised and expected firm average wages will be increased. The 
significantly negative estimate in Table 5.20 occurs as one channel dominates the other. 
Similar to the analyses in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.3.3, conventional diagnostic procedure is 
conducted to examine the reliability of the econometric model, estimation approach and 
findings. The reported F-statistic and C-statistic confirm the overall model significance and 
the existence of endogeneity problem. Additionally, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistic 
and Hansen J statistic indicate the relevance and validity of the constructed instruments (i.e., 
foreign employment share in the leather and related products manufacturing and in the 
computer, electronic and optical products manufacturing at time t in region j non-neighbouring 
to domestic accommodation and food service firms). Finally, based on diagnostic results 
(Tables A5.7 and A5.8 in the Appendices), it is unlikely that serious multicollinearity problem 
occurs, which, otherwise, will result in misleading estimates for the adopted model. 
Table 5.20 also indicates that most control variables have considerable influence on 
domestic firms’ average wages in the examined industry. Compared to the estimation for the 
overall sector, the signs of the estimated coefficients are relatively consistent whereas the 
magnitude varies significantly, implying the importance of firm-level characteristics to this 
specific industry. For example, firm size (lnSize) also has a positive but more important impact 
as a one per cent increase in this variable leads to a 0.13 per cent increase in average wages, 
of which the magnitude is nearly twice that of the average sector (0.07 per cent). Nonetheless, 
firm age (lnAge) and capital intensity (lnK_intensity) exert positive but slightly less important 
influence on local wages in this industry, having their respective coefficients smaller than those 
of the overall sector. Furthermore, ownership structure (Own) appears unimportant in 
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explaining wage differentials among domestic firms in the accommodation and food service 
industry while this factor is crucial at sectoral analysis. 
5.4.3 Heterogeneity of FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages 
The negative wage spillovers from FDI firms to local counterparts in the low-wage 
accommodation and food service industry is contrary to the positive effect of the overall 
sector result. This warrants further investigation. Thus, the empirical model is then estimated 
for subgroups of domestic firms to examine whether all domestic firms in this low-wage 
industry are negatively impacted to the same extent or FDI-linked spillovers are 
heterogeneous and conditional upon specific characteristics of domestic and FDI firms. 
Arguably, domestic firms with different features will respond differently to the presence of 
FDI and different types of FDI can generate various impact on local counterparts (Hoi & 
Pomfret, 2010; D. T. H. Nguyen & Sun, 2012; Smeets, 2008). Therefore, extended analyses 
of firm heterogeneity can provide deeper insights into the FDI impact on domestic firms’ 
average wages.  
5.4.3.1 Privately-owned versus state-owned firms 
Table 5.21 provides the estimation results by domestic firms’ ownership, indicating 
substantial wage spillovers to privately-owned firms. Meanwhile, state-owned firms’ 
average wages appear not to be affected by FDI firms. This finding can be attributed to the 
rigid wage setting of state-owned firms in Vietnam, which may reduce flexibility in wage 
adjustment. Furthermore, state-owned firms account for less than one per cent and about 10 
per cent of total firm number and total employment in the examined industry, respectively. 
This modest presence together with less flexible compensation mechanism makes state-
owned firms, on average, less likely to face fierce competition from FDI counterparts, 
causing insignificant variation in their average wages. 
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Table 5.21: FDI wage spillovers by ownership structure of domestic firms 
Variable 
Privately-owned firms State-owned firms 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) -2.0791*** 0.3878 -3.7271 2.4269 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) 0.1301*** 0.0055 0.0214 0.0429 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) 0.0232** 0.0091 -0.0449 0.0442 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0363*** 0.0037 0.0180 0.0243 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0011*** 0.0003 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) -1.5482*** 0.3165 -0.0262 2.3844 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (dTimet) Yes   Yes   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 656.3360***  27.178
***   
Hansen J statistic 0.0820  0.0240  
C-statistic 22.1600***  0.9660  
F-statistic 105.4900***  5.700
***  
No. of obs 20,251  426  
Notes: *** and ** denote one and five per cent levels of significance, respectively; the estimations 
accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
5.4.3.2 Small versus large firms 
As shown in Table 5.22, both small and large firms’ average wages experience negative 
wage spillovers from FDI, with a more pronounced effect for the former. Domestic firms of 
small scale are less likely to benefit from FDI-linked productivity spillovers and compete 
with higher-paying FDI firms (and large domestic firms alike) for competent workers in the 
local labour market (Pittiglio et al., 2015; Sjöholm & Lipsey, 2006; Villarreal & Sakamoto, 
2011). Hence, this group is more likely to be left with less skilled and lower paid workforce 
given increased FDI presence. The sample reveals that small domestic firms are the lowest 
paying firms, with the average wage being only 38 per cent of FDI firms, and 73 per cent of 
large domestic firms. 
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Table 5.22: FDI wage spillovers by size of domestic firms 
Variable 
Small firms Large firms 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) -3.4280*** 1.1357 -1.3101*** 0.3916 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) -0.3851 0.2428 -0.0547 0.0553 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) 0.0416*** 0.0145 0.0273** 0.0125 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0101* 0.0060 0.0509*** 0.0053 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) -0.0039*** 0.0003 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) -0.8820 0.9381 -0.8017** 0.3810 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (dTimet) Yes   Yes   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 243.1580***  375.0010
***   
Hansen J statistic 0.1190  2.1980  
C-statistic 4.6450**  10.1940
***  
F-statistic 43.8300***  39.2700
***  
No. of obs 8,492   10,313   
Notes: (i) A small firm has the size of less than or equal to the sample mean; (ii) A large firm has the 
size greater than the sample mean; (iii) ***, ** and *denote one, five and ten per cent levels of 
significance, respectively; (iv) the estimations accounted for firm-fixed effects..     
5.4.3.3 Young versus old firms  
The estimations by market experience of domestic firms are presented in Table 5.23. 
While FDI presence exerts negative and significant influence on wages of both groups, the 
effects are more profound for newly established firms. Young firms tend to be more exposed 
to external forces, including the entry of foreign affiliates in the host labour market. They 
might be less able to compete with FDI firms (and well-established domestic firms) to attract 
and build up a productive workforce via high wages. Besides, the data suggest that on 
average, young domestic firms pay about 10 per cent and 57 per cent less than old domestic 
and FDI firms, respectively. These factors might explain stronger negative spillovers from 
FDI to young domestic firms. 
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Table 5.23: FDI wage spillovers by age of domestic firms 
 
Variable 
Young firms Old firms 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) -3.3704*** 0.9277 -1.3748** 0.5483 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) 0.1285*** 0.0106 0.1265*** 0.0070 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) 0.1206 0.1818 -0.0454 0.0551 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0369*** 0.0068 0.0340*** 0.0050 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) -0.6093 0.8251 -1.1590*** 0.3909 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (dTimet) Yes   Yes   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 147.7190***  281.2820
***   
Hansen J statistic 0.3580  0.2920  
C-statistic 10.1290***  4.6490
**  
F-statistic 33.8300***  54.0100
***  
No. of obs 7,213   10,728   
Notes: (i) A young firm has the age of less than or equal to the sample mean; (ii) An old firm has the 
age greater than the sample mean; (iii) *** and ** denote one and five per cent levels of 
significance, respectively; (iv) the estimations accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
5.4.3.4 Wholly foreign-owned versus partially foreign-owned firms 
Table 5.24 reveals the empirical findings across two main types of FDI, namely wholly 
foreign-owned and partially foreign-owned firms (or joint ventures with local partners). The 
estimations suggest that only wholly foreign-owned firms can generate significant influence 
on domestic counterparts’ average wages. Whereas, there is no evidence of such spillover 
effects from partially foreign-owned firms in the examined industry. Compared to joint 
ventures, firms with full foreign equity might possess greater ownership advantages 
(including superior management, marketing and hiring practices) extensively transferred 
from their parent companies, enabling them to compete and exert stronger impact on the host 
labour market. While this finding provides preliminary insights, more in-depth analysis is 
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warranted to better understand the role of heterogeneous FDI in determining the extent of 
wage spillovers.       
Table 5.24: FDI wage spillovers by type of foreign firms 
 
Variable 
Wholly foreign-
owned firms 
Partially foreign-
owned firms 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) -2.7831*** 0.6424 0.1717 0.1198 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) 0.1302*** 0.0061 0.1323*** 0.0054 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) -0.0330 0.0567 -0.0154 0.0486 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) 0.0083 0.0106 0.0253*** 0.0089 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0367*** 0.0041 0.0390*** 0.0036 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0001*** 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) -0.9899*** 0.3620 -1.4546*** 0.3168 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (dTimet) Yes   Yes   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 69.3310***  751.3710
***   
Hansen J statistic 2.2660  26.9070
***  
C-statistic 26.3020***  2.9820  
F-statistic 86.1900***  101.3400
***  
No. of obs 20,715   20,715   
Notes: *** and ** denote one and five per cent levels of significance, respectively; the estimations 
accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter reports empirical findings and relevant analyses for wage spillovers from 
FDI firms to domestic counterparts in Vietnam’s services sector. Data of the whole sector 
indicate that domestic privately-owned firms account for dominant presence in all two-digit 
industries, ranging from 78 per cent to 99 per cent. While FDI firms are present in all 15 
service industries, their relative importance varies substantially. The regional distribution 
shows that Southeast (including the economic hub of Ho Chi Minh City) is largest region 
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for both domestic and FDI firms. Notably, FDI firms pay much higher than domestic 
counterparts in all two-digit industries with an average wage premium of 3.4 times (foreign-
domestic private firms) and 1.86 times (foreign-domestic state firms).  
The estimation results confirm the existence of positive wage spillovers from FDI firms 
to domestic firms in the whole services sector in Vietnam. A one per cent increase in foreign 
presence in the industry-region will induce domestic firms to raise average wages by 1.15 
per cent. Furthermore, the findings also suggest that larger, state-owned, more capital 
intensive, well-established domestic firms tend to pay higher wages. Increased competitive 
pressure appears to put upward pressure on local wages. Two-digit industries, notably in the 
services sector, are heterogeneous in a wide array of aspects, including average wage level. 
The graphical overview and econometric results suggest differences in FDI-linked wage 
spillovers by industry wage level. While positive wage spillovers are found for domestic firms 
operating in high-wage service industries, a negative estimate is found for the low-wage group. 
Further insights are provided for a high-wage industry (i.e., financial, banking and 
insurance) and a low-wage industry (i.e., accommodation and food service). The estimation 
indicates the existence of positive wage spillovers in the former industry with a one per cent 
increase in foreign presence resulting in the average wages of domestic firms to rise by 4.65 
per cent. Compared to the estimation for the whole sector, the magnitude of wage spillovers 
in this high-wage industry is more profound. There are negative spillovers in the low-wage 
industry, implying the dominance of the negative channel over the positive one. Additional 
analyses on this industry reveal that wage spillover effect is only for private firms but not 
for state-owned ones. Besides, small and newly-established domestic firms encounter more 
pronounced negative wage spillovers from FDI. Finally, FDI typologies also play an 
important role as fully foreign-owned firms are the key players in affecting local firms’ 
wages whereas joint ventures show insignificant impact.  
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Chapter 6: FDI Impact on Domestic Firms’ Female Employment 
– Empirical Results and Analyses 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the estimation results and related analyses on the impact of FDI on 
domestic firms’ female employment, using comprehensive panel data of firms in Vietnam’s 
services sector. Section 6.2 presents findings for the whole sector. It first provides 
descriptive statistics of the data at the sectoral level that are related to female employment, 
including average female-to-male labour ratio by two-digit industry and ownership, average 
female-to-male labour ratio by region and ownership, and summary statistics of key 
variables. Next, this section reports the empirical results and analyses, which consist of 
diagnostic testing, the existence of FDI-linked spillovers and other determinants of domestic 
firms’ female employment for the whole sector. Besides, Section 6.2 presents differences of 
the FDI impacts between female-intensive and male-intensive service industries, suggesting 
further analyses based on female intensity level. 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 extend the evidence on FDI-induced spillovers on local gendered 
employment from a female-intensive and a male-intensive service industry. The former is 
the education industry and the latter is the professional, scientific and technical service 
industry. This section then presents key findings on the FDI impact and other determinants 
of domestic firms’ female employment, including comparison with the overall sector 
findings. Extended analyses are carried out to further examine the heterogeneity of FDI 
impact on domestic firms’ female employment. Finally, Section 6.5 summarises this chapter.  
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6.2 FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment: Evidence from the whole sector  
6.2.1 Data description 
6.2.1.1 Female employment by two-digit industry and ownership  
Table 6.1 presents the average female-to-male labour ratio by ownership across 15 two-
digit industries in the services sector. The calculated ratios vary markedly across activities 
and types of ownership structure, indicating heterogeneous gender mixture in the sample. 
Among the domestic firms, the top three male-dominant industries include electricity, gas, 
steam and air conditioning supply (D35); construction (F41-43); and transportation and 
storage (H49-53), having on average six to eight male workers in every 10 workers. Among 
foreign firms, activities classified in Sections D and F are also the top two male-intensive 
industries and the third one is information and communication (J58-63).  
On the contrary, some service industries are more female dominant. Among domestic 
firms, the top three female-intensive industries are education (P85); human health and social 
work activities (Q86-88); and accommodation and food service activities (I55-56). On 
average in these industries, the share of women approximately doubles that of men in the 
total labour force. Furthermore, privately-owned firms tend to hire more women than state-
owned counterparts in the sector. Among FDI firms, activities classified in Sections P and 
Q also employ largest proportions of female workers while the other industry in the top three 
is financial and insurance activities (K64-66), having the share of women about twice and 
three times larger than the share of men in the workforce.  
Notably, the data in Table 6.1 show much higher female-to-male labour ratios by FDI 
firms, as compared to domestic firms in almost all two-digit service industries, except 
accommodation and food service (I55-56).  At the industry average, the female-to-male 
labour ratio in foreign firms is more than 1.4 times that of domestic counterparts. The 
substantial differences between foreign and domestic firms exist in professional, scientific 
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and technical activities (M69-75) and transportation and storage (H49-53), of which the 
ratios are 2.04 and 2.4 times higher for FDI firms, respectively. 
Table 6.1: Female employment by two-digit industry and ownership in the whole sector 
 
VSIC 
Code 
Two-digit service industry 
Average female-to-male labour ratio 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
All 
domestic 
firms 
FDI 
firms 
D35 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 
0.222 0.203 0.205 0.255 
E36-39 
Water supply, sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities 
0.721 0.937 0.889 1.051 
F41-43 Construction 0.252 0.301 0.300 0.511 
G45-47 
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.834 0.748 0.749 1.236 
H49-53 Transportation and storage 0.366 0.461 0.459 1.115 
I55-56 
Accommodation and food 
service activities 
1.544 1.664 1.662 1.467 
J58-63 
Information and 
communication 
0.830 0.760 0.762 0.792 
K64-66 
Financial and insurance 
activities 
1.123 1.015 1.019 1.826 
L68 Real estate activities 0.526 0.776 0.770 0.944 
M69-
75 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 
0.399 0.644 0.642 1.310 
N77-82 
Administrative and support 
service activities 
1.617 1.023 1.030 1.434 
P85 Education 1.377 2.027 2.025 2.948 
Q86-88 
Human health and social 
work activities 
2.186 1.775 1.776 3.163 
R90-93 
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 
0.996 0.997 0.997 1.266 
S94-96 Other service activities 0.722 1.408 1.405 1.423 
  Industry average 0.914 0.983 0.979 1.383 
   Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
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6.2.1.2 Female employment by region and ownership  
Table 6.2 reports the average female-to-male labour ratio by ownership and region for 
firms in the entire services sector. Compared to the industry average, the regional data 
indicate a rather different pattern regarding the gender workforce composition among types 
of ownership. In particular, in all regions, both domestic privately-owned and state-owned 
firms are overwhelmingly male dominant in their employment. None of the six regions has 
an equal or greater share of female relative to male workers. Of these, domestic firms of both 
ownership types employ the smallest proportion of women in Mekong River Delta. State-
owned firms have the highest share of women in Northern Midland and Mountain (0.88) 
whereas it is Red River Delta among privately-owned counterparts (0.74). 
Table 6.2: Female employment by region and ownership in the whole sector 
 
Region 
Average female-to-male labour ratio 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
All domestic 
firms 
FDI firms 
Red River Delta 0.703 0.741 0.740 1.122 
Northern Midland and Mountain 0.877 0.653 0.657 1.418 
Central Coast 0.645 0.730 0.728 1.194 
Central Highlands 0.686 0.674 0.674 1.094 
Southeast 0.657 0.711 0.711 1.232 
Mekong River Delta 0.477 0.589 0.588 0.843 
Regional average 0.674 0.683 0.683 1.151 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
In contrast, FDI firms show consistently higher female intensity across six regions. 
Except the least female-intensive location of Mekong River Delta, foreign firms employ the 
share of women greater than that of men in their workforce across other five regions. 
Notably, Northern Midland and Mountain is the most female-dominant region among FDI 
firms in the services sector, having the highest female-to-male ratio of 1.42. Finally, similar 
to industry pattern, FDI firms consistently demonstrate higher female intensity in their 
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workforce than domestic counterparts across regions. The differences between the two 
groups of firms range from 1.43 times (in Mekong River Delta) to 2.16 times (in Northern 
Midland and Mountain). On regional average, the female-to-male labour ratio by FDI firms 
(1.15) is slightly smaller than that of the industry average (1.38) but the foreign-domestic 
gap is larger at 1.7 times (as compared to 1.4 times on industry average).  
6.2.1.3 Summary statistics – Female employment estimation for the whole sector 
Table 6.3 presents the summary statistics of key variables in the econometric model 
specified in Equation 4.3.13 (Section 4.3, Chapter 4) for the empirical study of the entire 
services sector. Overall, the data suggest significant heterogeneity for the continuous 
variables. Furthermore, the mean of ownership structure (a dummy variable) indicates that 
domestic privately-owned firms account for the dominant proportion of 98.87 per cent. For 
the key variable of interest, foreign presence, it shows that FDI firms comprise more than 
3.15 per cent of total employment in the industry-region. The minimum employment share 
of FDI firms is zero, implying no FDI in a specific two-digit service industry k in region j 
(for example, in water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation industry in 
Central Coast). Whereas, foreign firms contribute the highest employment share of 53.42 
per cent in arts, entertainment and recreation industry in Northern Midland and Mountain.   
Table 6.3: Summary statistics – Female employment estimation for the whole sector 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female-to-male labour 
ratio (lnFMR) 
847,122 -0.6724 0.8611 -6.4036 6.0379 
Foreign presence  
(FDI) 
915,844 0.0315 0.0482 0.0000 0.5342 
Firm size   
(lnSize) 
906,046 7.2360 2.2651 -2.7202 18.7037 
Capital intensity  
(lnK_intensity) 
778,390 3.8151 1.5313 -6.3042 13.4354 
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Ownership structure  
(Own) 
906,403 0.9887 0.1057 0.0000 1.0000 
Competition level   
(Herfindahl) 
915,844 0.0106 0.0258 0.0009 0.1826 
Gender wage gap  
(lnWageGap) 
906,403 0.1471 0.0464 -0.0120 0.2584 
Industry female 
intensity 
(lnIndFemale) 
915,844 -1.8338 0.9355 -5.4486 -0.9427 
6.2.2 Estimation results and analyses 
6.2.2.1 Diagnostic testing 
Similar to the analyses conducted to investigate FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages 
(Chapter 5), standard diagnostic testings are performed to warrant the reliability of the model 
and estimation results for the FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment in the 
services sector. As a rule of thumb (Alin, 2010; Dormann et al., 2013; Fox, 1991; Morrow-
Howell, 1994), multicollinearity considered problematic if the correlation matrix shows that 
absolute correlation coefficient between two variables is greater than 0.7 and/or the value of 
VIF for individual explanatory variable is greater than 10 (equivalently to SQRT VIF greater 
than 2.0 or tolerance less than 0.2). Hence, the figures reported in Table 6.4 on correlation 
matrix and Table 6.5 on collinearity measures suggest the absence of serious multicollinearity. 
Table 6.4: Correlation matrix – Female employment estimation for the whole sector 
  FDI lnSize lnK_intensity Own Herfindahl lnWageGap lnIndFemale 
FDI 1 
      
lnSize -0.1044 1 
     
lnK_intensity -0.0287 0.0800 1 
    
Own -0.0301 -0.1781 -0.0579 1 
   
Herfindahl 0.2912 -0.0881 -0.0299 -0.0477 1 
  
lnWageGap 0.0984 0.0658 -0.0060 -0.0042 0.0135 1 
 
lnIndFemale -0.5203 0.2465 0.0052 0.0717 -0.4512 0.0256 1 
144 
 
Table 6.5: Collinearity measures – Female employment estimation for the whole sector 
Regressor 
Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) 
Square root of the 
VIF (SQRT VIF) 
Tolerance 
FDI 1.40 1.18 0.7122 
lnSize 1.12 1.06 0.8917 
lnK_intensity 1.01 1.01 0.9895 
Own 1.05 1.02 0.9519 
Herfindahl 1.27 1.12 0.7904 
lnWageGap 1.02 1.01 0.9786 
lnIndFemale 1.69 1.30 0.5907 
Table 6.6 shows the empirical results for FDI impact on domestic firms’ female 
employment in the whole services sector. To determine the overall model significance, the 
reported F-statistic of 5335.15 with p<0.01 implies that the estimated coefficients are jointly 
significant at the one per cent level. More importantly, the C-statistic for the endogeneity 
test is 13.98 (p<0.01), which rejects the null hypothesis of absence of endogeneity at the one 
per cent level of significance. That is, the test result confirms that foreign presence (FDI) 
violates the exogeneity condition. Thus, the estimation for the services sector requires to the 
use of the IV-GMM estimator and appropriate excluded instrumental variables. 
Table 6.6: Estimation results – Female employment model for the whole sector 
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Foreign presence (FDI) 2.1756 0.4578 0.0000 
Firm size (lnSize) -0.0472 0.0006 0.0000 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 0.0156 0.0009 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Own) 0.0504 0.0132 0.0000 
Competition level (Herfindahl) -0.6296 0.1254 0.0000 
Gender wage gap (lnWageGap) 0.0311 0.1637 0.8490 
Industry female intensity (lnIndFemale) 0.2115 0.0212 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Included   
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Industry dummies (dIndustry) Included   
Year dummies (dTime) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
4229.9860 (0.0000) 
Overidentification test 
(Hansen J statistic) 
  1.4980 (0.2210) 
Endogeneity test 
(C-statistic) 
Model significance test 
13.9760 (0.0002) 
(F-statstic) 5335.1500 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 847,122 
     Notes: p-values for the tests statistics are in parentheses; the estimation accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
Based on the IVs construction procedure presented in Section 4.4.3 (Chapter 4), this 
empirical analysis utilises two instruments, namely the employment share of FDI firms in 
the beverage manufacturing industry in region j at time t (i.e., IV1), and the employment 
share of FDI firms in the furniture manufacturing industry in region j at time t (i.e., IV2). 
Notably, region j is not a neighbouring region where domestic service firms are located. 
Next, the underidentification and overidentification tests are conducted to examine the 
relevance and validity of these constructed instruments.  
As shown in Table 6.6, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (for underidentification test) 
of 4229.99 (p<0.01) suggests that the null hypothesis (i.e., excluded instruments are 
irrelevant) can be rejected at one per cent level. Additionally, the reported Hansen J statistic 
for the overidentification test is 2.66 (p>0.1), implying a failure to reject the null hypothesis 
(i.e., selected instruments are valid). Overall, the test results affirm the appropriateness of 
the model and estimation method, including the relevance and validity of the instruments for 
the dataset of the entire services sector. 
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6.2.2.2 Evidence of FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment in the whole sector  
The estimation results in Table 6.6 indicate that the presence of FDI firms (FDI) exerts 
a positive and significant impact on domestic firms’ female employment in Vietnam’s 
services sector. As such, foreign firms not only hire greater proportions of female workers 
across 15 two-digit service industries and six regions, they also induce domestic counterparts 
in the sector to employ more women in the labour force. Specifically, a one per cent increase 
in foreign presence leads to a 2.18 per cent increase in the average female-to-male labour 
ratios of domestic service firms. In other words, a one per cent increase in foreign presence is 
associated with 0.54 per cent increase in the share of female labour in the domestic firms’ total 
workforce.  
The theoretical modelling in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.1) demonstrates that the net impact 
of foreign presence depends on the relative strength of the two contrasting channels through 
which FDI firms influence domestic firms’ female employment. The coefficient estimate in 
the estimation captures the net impact of FDI, and as such a positive coefficient estimate 
arises if the positive channel dominates the negative channel. For example, if FDI firms exert 
a positive impact, the direct channel (i.e., asymmetric spillovers) dominates the indirect one 
(i.e., cut-off effect), putting an upward pressure on the conditional expectation of domestic 
firms’ female employment. Intuitively, local firms tend to hire more females relative to 
males as they realise beneficial spillovers from foreign firms to enhance productivity of 
female workers in the services sector. 
6.2.2.3 Other determinants of domestic firms’ female employment in the whole sector 
The reported results in Table 6.6 also suggest that firm-specific characteristics play a 
crucial role in determining domestic firms’ female employment. Of these, firm size (lnSize) 
shows a statistically significant and negative impact, with a one per cent increase in the size 
of domestic firms being associated with a nearly 0.05 per cent decrease in their female-to-
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male labour ratios. This result is consistent with previous literature suggesting that larger 
firms tend to be more male-intensive in their workforce composition. Compared to small 
and medium firms, large firms have better resources to attract and retain high-skilled and 
high-paid workers who are more likely to be male in many developing countries (Arai, 
2003a; Bridges, 1980; Ozler, 2000).  
On the contrary, the estimation results indicate that the more capital-intensive domestic 
firms are, the more female-intensive they are. The estimated coefficient of the variable 
lnK_intensity suggests that a one per cent increase in the capital intensity of domestic firms 
is associated with their female-to-male ratios that are a 0.02 per cent higher. This finding 
contrasts with those of previous empirical works, asserting that higher capital intensity, as a 
proxy of technological upgrading, could depress female employment (Caraway, 2007; 
Kucera & Tejani, 2014; Ozler, 2000; Seguino, 2005; Tejani & Milberg, 2016). Nevertheless, 
the negative correlation is mostly found in manufacturing industries, evidence for service 
industries is scarce. In fact, service employers might prefer to hire female because of their 
advantageous skills or traits (e.g., communication skills, patience, empathy, and attention to 
details) that are crucial to service jobs (Belt, Richardson, & Webster, 2002; Bridges, 1980).  
The estimation also reveals the impact of firms’ ownership structure (Own) on their 
female employment. Notably, domestic privately-owned firms tend to employ more females 
than state-owned counterparts with the difference in female-to-male labour ratio being 0.05 
per cent. Hence, while the state sector is presumably more favourable for women to work 
(Hewlett & Rashid, 2010; Ibrahim, 1989), they may experience greater disadvantages than 
male fellows in entering this sector. As asserted by Çağatay and Berik (1990), the nature of 
patron-client relationships in job allocations is likely to dampen labour regulation 
enforcement, and sector downsizing might also disadvantage women in state firms. In fact, the 
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sample description in the previous subsections shows that in the services sector, privately-
owned firms have a higher female-to-male labour ratio than state-owned firms.  
Furthermore, Table 6.6 indicates the role of industry-specific characteristics. Notably, 
competition level (Herfindahl) and industry female intensity (lnIndFemale) are significant 
determinants of female employment by domestic firms in the services sector. Accordingly, 
one per cent increase in the competition level (i.e., a one per cent decrease in Herfindahl 
index) and industry female intensity causes domestic firms to raise the female-to-male-ratio 
by 0.63 per cent and 0.21 per cent, respectively. Finally, while the estimated coefficient of 
gender wage gap variable (lnWageGap) is positive, it is statistically insignificant, which 
suggests negligible impact of this factor on female-to-male labour ratios by domestic firms 
in the services sector. 
6.2.3 Female-intensive versus male-intensive industries 
As observed in the sample description (Section 6.2.1), average female-to-male labour 
ratios by both domestic and foreign firms vary substantially across 15 two-digit industries 
of the services sector. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 present the scatterplots of the sector dataset for 
two groups of service industries by their female intensity level, which enables one to first 
graphically examine the different FDI impacts. The graphs show dissimilar patterns of 
FDI-induced spillovers on female employment, displaying an insignificant impact in the 
female-intensive group while exhibiting a positive impact in the male-intensive group. 
Thus, it is of analytical and policy interest to conduct additional empirical investigation on 
this respect so as to shed light on potential distinctions in the FDI impact on domestic 
firms’ female employment.  
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Figure 6.1: Scatterplot of foreign presence and domestic firms’ female-to-male 
labour ratio in female-intensive service industries 
 
Figure 6.2: Scatterplot of foreign presence and domestic firms’ female-to-male 
labour ratio in male-intensive service industries 
Accordingly, the sample of the whole services sector is divided into two subsets of two-
digit industries. Of these, female-intensive group has the average female-to-male labour ratio 
greater than sample mean for all domestic firms. Male-intensive group has average female-
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to-male labour ratio equal or less than sample mean. The list of two-digit service industries 
by female intensity level is presented in Table 6.7. The female-intensive group includes nine 
industries whereas the male-intensive group consists of seven industries.  
Table 6.7: List of two-digit industries by female intensity level in the services sector 
VSCI Code Female-intensive group 
E36-39 Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
I55-56 Accommodation and food service activities 
K64-66 Financial and insurance activities 
L68 Real estate activities 
N77-82 Administrative and support service activities 
P85 Education 
Q86-88 Human health and social work activities 
R90-93 Arts, entertainment and recreation 
S94-96 Other service activities 
VSCI Code Male-intensive group 
D35 Electricity, gas, stream and air conditioning supply 
F41-43 Construction 
G45-47 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
H49-53 Transportation and storage 
J58-63 Information and communication 
L68 Real estate activities 
M69-75 Professional, scientific and technical activities 
Table 6.8 reports the estimations for two subsets of the data to explore heterogeneous 
impacts of foreign entry on local firms’ gender workforce composition. Notably, the 
econometric results reinforce the patterns observed in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. For female-
intensive industries, the estimated coefficient of foreign presence variable (FDIkjt) is 
statistically insignificant, indicating negligible influence of foreign entry on this group of 
domestic firms. For male-intensive industries, however, FDI firms are found to exert a 
positive and statistically significant effect with a one percent increase in foreign entry 
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causing domestic firms in this group to raise their female/male employment by 3.13 percent 
(or equivalent to a 0.769 percent increase in the share of women in total workforce). 
Table 6.8: Estimation results: Female-intensive versus male-intensive service industries 
  
Female-intensive service 
industries 
Male-intensive service 
industries 
Variable 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-value 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-value 
Foreign presence 
(FDIkjt) 0.5382 0.4490 0.2310 3.1251 0.5157 0.0000 
Firm size  
(lnSizeikjt) -0.0178 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0618 0.0006 0.0000 
Capital intensity 
(lnK_intensityikjt) -0.0334 0.0009 0.0000 0.0609 0.0009 0.0000 
Ownership 
structure (Ownikjt) 0.0785 0.0149 0.0000 0.0143 0.0138 0.2980 
Competition level  
(Herfindahlkjt) 0.2532 0.1497 0.0910 -1.2935 0.1243 0.0000 
Gender wage gap 
(lnWageGapjt) -0.0705 0.1799 0.6950 0.7536 0.1592 0.0000 
Industry female 
intensity 
(lnIndFemalekt) -0.0322 0.0249 0.1960 0.2667 0.0199 0.0000 
Regional dummies 
(dRegionj) 
Included   Included   
Industry dummies 
(dIndustryk) 
Included   Included   
Year dummies 
(dTimet) 
Included   Included   
LM statistic  1322.5110 (0.0000) 3331.5260 (0.0000) 
Hansen J statistic  4.1540 (0.0415) 3.9590 (0.0466) 
C-statistic 0.7960 (0.3723) 45.5780 (0.0000) 
F-statistic 764.3300 (0.0000) 2067.0000 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 466,311 380,811 
Notes: (i) Female-intensive group is defined to have average female-to-male labour ratio greater than sample 
mean, and male-intensive group has average ratio equal or less than sample mean;  
(ii) p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses; 
(iii) The estimations accounted form firm-fixed effects. 
 
The above findings might be attributed to several factors. First, the potential of foreign 
entry in boosting the employment of women among the male-intensive group is greater than 
that among the female-intensive one. In other words, female labour is more likely to be 
under-utilised and/or discriminated in the male-intensive group in which foreign firms with 
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female-friendly hiring practices and experience in efficiently utilising female workforce can 
play a more prominent role in promoting job prospect for women among local firms in these 
industries. Second, the increased entry of FDI firms might push up competitive pressure and 
thereby driving domestic counterparts to hire a larger share of relatively cheaper female 
workers as a cost-effective strategy. Indeed, the expectations of positive impact of widening 
gender wage gap (lnWageGap) and rising competition (Herfindahl) on local firms’ female 
employment are only valid in the male-intensive group as indicated by the estimated 
coefficients of these two variables in Table 6.8. Therefore, it is plausible that foreign entry 
can exert a more profound influence on domestic firms operating in male-intensive 
industries. These results suggest the need for further examination of FDI impact on female 
employment at the sub-sector level. Accordingly, Sections 6.3 and 6.4 present empirical 
findings for a female-intensive industry (i.e., education) and for a male-intensive industry 
(i.e., professional, technical and scientific services).19  
6.3 FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment: Evidence from a female-
intensive service industry  
6.3.1 Data description: FDI and female employment in the education industry 
Table 6.9 reports the average female-to-male labour ratio by ownership for six three-
digit industries providing education services, which are all classified within VSIC Section 
P. While being the most female-intensive industry in the entire services sector, the education 
industry also shows considerable variations in female employment intensity across subgroup 
of activities and types of ownership structure. Differing from the sector data, this industry 
exhibits notably modest participation of state-owned firms as surveyed economic entities, 
being absent in three out of six industries (i.e., P852, P856, P856). In fact, unlike other services, 
 
19 The choices of industries for the sub-sector analyses are based on the data in Table 6.1. Accordingly, 
education is the most female-intensive industry in the sector while the professional, technical and scientific 
services industry is highly male-intensive and has the largest gap with the domestic firms in this regard. 
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education at different levels are generally provided by the government as public services, 
which are operated as non-profit entities and hence are not included in national enterprise 
surveys. Meanwhile, privately-owned education firms are present in all three-digit activities.  
Table 6.9: Female employment by three-digit level and ownership in the 
education industry 
 
VSIC 
Code 
Three-digit education 
industry 
Average female-to-male labour ratio 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
All 
domestic 
firms 
FDI 
firms 
P851 Pre-primary education 13 6.726 6.738 7.207 
P852 Primary education ______ 5.055 5.055 2.587 
P853 Secondary education 0.556 1.231 1.227 1.580 
P854 Higher education ______ 1.405 1.405 2.266 
P855 Other educational activities 1.377 1.778 1.776 2.286 
P856 Educational support services _____ 1.798 1.798 3.147 
Three-digit industry average 4.978 2.999 3.000 3.179 
Sample average (industry-region) 1.461 2.020 2.019 3.007 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
Among domestic firms, both state and private ownership types largely exhibit high 
female-to-male labour ratios (being greater than one, except secondary education by state-
owned firms). Of these, the top-three female-dominant industries comprise pre-primary 
education (P851); primary education (P852); and educational support services (P856). 
Particularly, the ratios are more substantial in the top two industries, having about seven 
women in every eight employees (P851) and five women in every six employees (P852). On 
average, the female-to-male labour ratio by domestic firms is higher across three-digit 
education industries (3.000) than that across industry-region (2.019).  
Similarly, FDI firms operate in all six three-digit education industries employ women 
intensively in their workforce. The top three industries also include P851, P856 and P852. 
Furthermore, compared to domestic counterparts, foreign firms mostly show higher female-
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to-male labour ratios, except primary education (P852). The foreign-domestic gaps are 
sizeable in educational support services (1.75 times) and higher education (1.61 times). On 
average, the female-to-male labour ratio by FDI firms remain close between those across 
three-digit industries and across industry-region, having about three women in every four 
workers. Whereas, the foreign-domestic gap is larger in the sample across industry-region 
(1.5 times).  
Table 6.10 presents the average female-to-male labour ratio by ownership and region 
for firms in the education industry. Compared to the industry distribution, the regional 
distribution exhibits a less divergent pattern in female intensity among local firms. Domestic 
privately-owned firms employ women most intensively in Central Coast and least in 
Southeast. Meanwhile, state-owned counterparts have the highest female-to-male ratio in 
Northern Midland and Mountain and lowest in Central Coast. On regional average, domestic 
firms hire on average two women in every three workers, which is less intensive than that at 
industry region, resulting in the lower sample average across industry-region data.      
Table 6.10: Female employment by region and ownership in the education industry 
 
Region 
Average female-to-male labour ratio 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
All domestic 
firms 
FDI firms 
Red River Delta 0.639 2.261 2.257 3.719 
Northern Midland & Mountain 13.000 2.377 2.437 ____ 
Central Coast 0.580 2.549 2.531 0.925 
Central Highlands ____ 1.579 1.579 ____ 
Southeast 1.408 1.697 1.697 2.819 
Mekong River Delta ____ 2.268 2.268 ____ 
Regional average 3.907  2.122     2.128   2.487 
Sample average (industry-region) 1.461  2.020     2.019   3.007 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
155 
 
While FDI firms are present in all three-digit education services, they are concentrated 
in three out of six regions. Of these, Red River Delta is the most female-intensive region 
among foreign firms, having nearly four women in every five workers. Similarly, FDI firms 
also employ women intensively in Southeast, having about three women in every four 
workers. In contrast, Central Coast shows a more gender-equal ratio. Notably, FDI firms 
largely show higher female intensity in their workforce compared to domestic counterparts 
in the two main regions. The difference between the two groups of firms is approximately 
1.7 times. This gap at the regional level is 1.2 times lower than that of the sample across 
industry-region (1.5 times). 
6.3.2 Estimation results and analyses   
Table 6.11 shows the estimation results for FDI impact on domestic firms’ female 
employment in the education industry. Notably, it suggests that the presence of FDI firms 
does not have any significant impact on the female-to-male labour ratio of domestic 
counterparts in the education industry. The estimated coefficient of foreign presence variable 
(FDI) is negative and statistically insignificant. This finding is consistent with that of Section 
6.2.3 for the group of female-intensive service industries. Education services, particularly at 
the pre-primary and primary levels, are largely characterised as highly feminised profession. 
The feminisation of the education industry is attributable to a complex range of historical 
and social factors, which tend to emphasise the greater perceived suitability of women for 
nurturing and teaching roles. Thus, given the female dominance in the examined industry, 
local firms appear less keen to learn and absorb extra spillovers from foreign counterparts to 
hire a bigger share of women in their workforce. 
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Table 6.11: Main estimation results – Female employment model for the 
education industry 
Variable 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard error 
p-value 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) -3.8224 2.6354 0.1470 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) 0.0051 0.0137 0.7090 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) -0.0605 0.0168 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) -0.0993 0.2615 0.7040 
Competition level (Herfindahlkjt) -0.7460 0.5242 0.1550 
Gender wage gap (lnWageGapjt) -3.2784 1.5631 0.0360 
Industry female intensity (lnIndFemalekt) -0.4340 0.2876 0.1310 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Included   
Year dummies (dTimet) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
22.3990 (0.0000) 
Overidentification test 
(Hansen J statistic) 
  1.2350 (0.2665) 
Endogeneity test 
(C-statistic) 
Model significance test 
3.9020 (0.0482) 
(F-statstic) 4.6200 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 7,163 
Notes: p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses; the estimation accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
The F-statistic indicates that the estimated coefficients are jointly significant at the one 
per cent level. The reported C-statistic confirms the endogeneity problem associated with the 
key variable of foreign presence, which requires the use of the IV-GMM estimator. Moreover, 
the test statistic results confirm the appropriateness of the adopted instruments (foreign 
employment share in the fabricated metal product manufacturing and in the computer, 
electronic and optical products manufacturing at time t in region j non-neighbouring to 
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domestic education service firms). Finally, as reported Tables A6.2 and 6.3 in the Appendices, 
it is unlikely for serious multicollinearity to cause misleading results in this estimation. 
Compared to the overall sector estimation results, Table 6.11 shows the influence of 
fewer control variables on female employment by domestic firms in the education industry. 
Of these, firm-specific characteristics seem less relevant in explaining the intensity of hiring 
women since only one firm-level variable, namely capital intensity (K_intensity), is 
statistically significant. A one per cent increase in capital intensity by domestic education 
firms causes them to lower female-to-male labour ratios by 0.06 per cent. Furthermore, 
gender wage gap (lnWageGapjt) exerts a negative and statistically significant impact on 
firms’ female employment, with a one per cent increase in the regional male-to-female pay 
gap resulting in a 3.28 per cent decrease in female-to-male labour ratios of domestic firms.20 
While these findings are divergent from those of the average services sector, they might 
capture a different underlying preference among education service firms in gendered 
employment given their existing dominance of female workforce. In fact, as asserted by 
Seguino (2005) and Tejani and Milberg (2016), the more capital intensive firms become, the 
lower incentives they have to employ relatively cheaper female labour, given a smaller fraction 
of labour cost in total cost. In this case, substantial feminization among education service firms 
might appeal for a change in gendered workforce composition in favour of higher paid male 
workforce, which capital-intensive firms are more financially capable to realise.     
 
20 Note that due to data constraint, lnWageGap is measured by male-to-female wage gaps, which vary across 
regions and years. The negative effect of this variable might imply a growing demand for higher-skilled 
and high-paid males in this predominantly female-intensive industry given widening gender pay gap. 
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6.4 FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment: Evidence from a male-
intensive service industry 
6.4.1 Data description: FDI and female employment in the professional, scientific and 
technical service industry  
Table 6.12 presents the average female employment by type of ownership in the three-
digit industry that supplies professional, scientific and technical services. They consist of 13 
activities categorised in VSIC Section M. The female-to-male labour ratios differ 
considerably across industries for both groups of domestic firms. State-owned firms are 
largely more male dominant, having the average share of women as half that of men in the 
total workforce. Notably, the top male-intensive industries among state-owned firms are 
head office services (M710) and specialised design activities (M741), having female share 
as one third that of male. While employing more women than state-owned counterparts, 
privately-owned firms remain largely male dominant, showing the average female-to-male 
labour ratio less than one in 10 out of 13 three-digit industries. The average domestic firms’ 
female intensity in the examined industry is notably lower than that in the entire sector and 
particularly the education industry.     
Table 6.12: Female employment by three-digit level and ownership in the 
professional, scientific and technical service industry 
 
VSIC 
Code 
Three-digit industry 
Average female-to-male labour ratio 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
All domestic 
firms 
FDI firms 
M691 Legal services _____ 1.008 1.008 1.786 
M692 
Accounting, book keeping, 
auditing and tax consultancy 
services  
1.007 1.542 1.540 3.632 
M701 Head office services 0.275 0.823 0.793 1.750 
M702 Management consultancy 0.707 0.947 0.946 1.691 
M711 
Architectural and engineering 
services 
0.352 0.430 0.429 0.772 
M712 Technical testing and analysis 0.316 0.551 0.542 1.937 
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M721 
Research and experimental 
development on natural 
sciences and engineering 
0.615 0.578 0.579 0.415 
M722 
Research and experimental 
development on social sciences 
and humanities 
_____ 0.831 0.831 _____ 
M731 Advertising 0.820 0.722 0.722 1.625 
M732 
Market research and public 
opinion polling 
0.897 1.063 1.063 1.723 
M741 Specialized design activities 0.299 0.568 0.568 1.576 
M742 Photographic activities _____ 0.888 0.888 1.044 
M749 Others 0.549 0.857 0.853 0.858 
Three-digit industry average 0.584 0.831 0.828 1.567 
Sample average (Industry-region) 0.403 0.644 0.642 1.339 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
Similar to the reported sector pattern, FDI firms hire female workforce more 
intensively than domestic firms in almost all three-digit industries that FDI is present. One 
exception is research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering 
(M721), which show closely female-to-male labour ratios for both domestic and foreign 
firms. While being more male dominant in three industries (M711, M721, and M749), FDI 
firms employ notably overwhelming proportions of women in remaining industries. 
Compared to the entire sector and education industry, foreign-domestic differences in female 
employment in this industry are more substantial, notably in technical testing and analysis 
(M712) (3.6 times) and accounting, book keeping, auditing and tax consultancy services 
(M692) (2.4 times). The foreign-domestic gap is similar across three-digit industry average 
and industry-region average, showing the female-to-male labour ratio by FDI firms roughly 
twice that of domestic firms.       
Table 6.13 reports the average female-to-male labour ratio by type of ownership across 
six regions for professional, scientific and technical service firms. Compared to the industry 
data, the regional data show greater male dominance among domestic firms, notably 
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privately-owned firms. The average female-to-male labour ratios are largely lower than one 
in all regions. Of these, all domestic firms employ men most intensively in Central Highland. 
In contrast, they employ men least intensively in Red River Delta (state-owned firms) and 
Northern Midland and Mountain (privately-owned firms). The average regional female 
intensity by domestic firms in this service industry is markedly lower than that in the 
education industry and the whole sector alike.   
Table 6.13: Female employment by region and ownership in the professional, 
scientific and technical service industry 
 
Region 
Average female-to-male labour ratio 
State-
owned 
Privately-
owned 
All domestic 
firms 
FDI firms 
Red River Delta 0.440 0.683 0.680 1.095 
Northern Midland and Mountain 0.534 0.499 0.499 6.393 
Central Coast 0.344 0.493 0.492 0.925 
Central Highlands 0.230 0.441 0.439 _____ 
Southeast 0.296 0.680 0.679 1.510 
Mekong River Delta 0.309 0.484 0.483 3.070 
Regional average 0.359 0.547 0.545 2.599 
Sample average (industry-region) 0.403 0.644 0.642 1.339 
Source: Calculations based on Enterprise Surveys 2009-2013, GSO database 
Compared to the education industry, FDI firms in the professional, scientific and 
technical service industry operate at larger geographical area as they are present in five out 
of six regions (except Central Highlands). While being relatively gender equal in 
employment in Central Coast, foreign firms are more female intensive in other regions, 
having female-to-male labour ratios greater than one. More importantly, foreign firms 
exhibit much higher female-to-male labour ratios than domestic counterparts across regions. 
The foreign-domestic gaps are most sizeable in Northern Midland and Mountain (12.8 times) 
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and Mekong River Delta (6.4 times). This regional difference (4.8 times) is higher than that 
of the three-digit industry average and industry-region average (approximately twice).   
6.4.2 Estimation results and analyses 
Table 6.14 reports the main findings for FDI spillovers on female employment by 
domestic firms in the professional, scientific and technical service industry. The estimation 
results suggest that the presence of FDI firms generates positive and statistically significant 
impact on female employment by domestic counterparts in Vietnam’s professional, 
scientific and technical service industry over the study period. Specifically, a one per cent 
increase in foreign presence causes the average female-to-male labour ratio of domestic 
firms to go up by 17.08 per cent (equivalent to a 3.93 per cent increase in the share of female 
labour in the total workforce). The evidence of positive FDI impact on domestic female 
employment is consistent with those from the entire services sector (Section 6.2.2) and the 
group of male-intensive service industries (Section 6.2.3).  
More importantly, the magnitude of FDI impact in the professional service industry 
is much more sizeable than previous estimations (Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3). In fact, the 
coefficient of variable FDIkjt is nearly 8 times and 5.5 times higher than that of the overall 
sector and the average male-intensive industry group, respectively. This finding implies 
more profound spillovers from foreign firms to female employment in this highly male-
dominant service industry.21 This might imply that domestic firms exhibit greater potential 
and stronger incentive to absorb spillover effects from FDI counterparts to enhance the 
employment of under-utilised female workforce in the local labour market. 
 
 
21 Given the existence of more sizable spillovers from FDI firms to domestic counterparts’ female 
employment in this male-intensive industry compared to the sectoral average, the sub-sample analyses for 
this industry are conducted in Section 6.4.3.  
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Table 6.14: Estimation results – Female employment model for the 
professional, scientific and technical service industry 
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) 17.0788 6.6513 0.0100 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) -0.0156 0.0023 0.0000 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0233 0.0039 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) 0.2088 0.0943 0.0270 
Competition level (Herfindahlkjt) 0.5273 0.2408 0.0290 
Gender wage gap (lnWageGapjt) -0.9320 0.2926 0.0010 
Industry female intensity (lnIndFemalekt) 4.7194 1.3470 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Included   
Year dummies (dTimet) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
19.5010 (0.0000) 
Overidentification test 
(Hansen J statistic) 
  0.2590 (0.6109) 
Endogeneity test 
(C-statistic) 
Model significance test 
11.2380 (0.0008) 
(F-statstic) 29.8300 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 71,430 
    Notes: p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses; the estimation accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
Regarding the diagnostic results, the F-statistic and C-statistic indicate the significance 
of overall model and the existence of endogeneity problem. Hence, the IV-GMM estimator 
is preferred with both statistics for overidentification and underidentifiction tests confirming 
the relevance and validity of selected instruments (i.e., foreign employment share in the 
textile manufacturing and in the rubber and plastic manufacturing at time t in region j non-
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adjacent to domestic professional service firms). Besides, severe multicollinearity problem 
is unlikely to occur (as reported Tables 6.5 and 6.6 in the Appendices). 
Table 6.14 also shows the importance of firm-level differences in determining domestic 
firms’ female employment, which is largely consistent with the whole sector estimation 
results, notably regarding the signs of coefficients. Of these, larger firms tend to hire more 
male workers, with a one per cent increase in this variable (lnSize) leading to a 0.016 per 
cent decrease in female-to-male labour ratios. Meanwhile, capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 
exerts positive and statistically significant influence, with a one per cent increase in this 
variable causing a 0.023 per cent increase in female-to-male labour ratios. Moreover, 
compared to the overall services sector, ownerships structure (Own) appears more important 
in explaining female employment among domestic firms in the professional service industry. 
While privately-owned firms tend to employ more females than state-owned counterparts, 
the difference in female-to-male labour ratio for the examined industry (0.21 per cent) is 
more than four times higher than that for the entire sector (0.05 per cent). 
Compared to the estimation for the entire sector, Table 6.14 suggests rather different 
findings on the impact of non-firm-level variables on female employment of domestic firms 
in the professional service industry. Notably, increased competitive pressure (Herfindahl) 
and widening gender wage gap (lnWageGap) tend to dampen female employment as a one 
per cent increase in these two variables lower the female-to-male-ratio of domestic firms by 
0.53 per cent and 0.93 per cent, respectively. Whereas, similar to the sector estimation, the 
industry female intensity (lnIndFemale) is found to have a highly significant and positive 
effect on domestic firms’ female employment, with a one per cent increase in this variable 
leading to a 4.72 per cent increase in female-to-male labour ratios of domestic firms.  
While the findings on competition level and gender wage gap are inconsistent with those 
for the average sector, they might reveal distinct characteristics by this high-skilled and high-
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paid service industry. Under increased competitive pressure, domestic firms in the examined 
industry prefer to promote a more competent workforce by attracting high-skilled and high-
paid workers (Hoi & Pomfret, 2010), which is more favourable to males (Arai, 2003a). In 
addition, the sample shows the existence of gender wage gaps across regions and years. On 
average, males are paid approximately 10 per cent higher than females. The result may imply 
that local firms in this highly skilled service industry consider a widening gender wage gap 
as a signal of differences in labour quality or productivity. Therefore, they are more likely 
to hire males if the pay gap in favour of males increases. 
6.4.3 Heterogeneity of FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment 
6.4.3.1 State-owned versus privately-owned firms 
Table 6.15 presents the estimation results of FDI-linked spillovers on female 
employment by ownership structure of domestic firms. There is strong evidence of positive 
impact from FDI firms to privately-owned counterparts in the industry. Specifically, a one 
percent increase in foreign presence leads to a 16.87 per cent increase in average female-to-
male labour ratio of privately-owned firms (or equivalent to 3.89 per cent increase in female 
share of total workforce). Meanwhile, there is no evidence of FDI spillover effect on 
domestic state-owned firms’ female employment as the estimated coefficient of FDIkjt is 
statistically insignificant. This result might be due to greater flexibility of privately-owned 
firms (as opposed to greater rigidity of state-owned firms) in employment decisions. Thus, 
state-owned firms are less likely to encounter significant influence of local labour market 
changes, including the increased presence of FDI firms.  
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Table 6.15: FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment by ownership 
structure of domestic firms 
  
Variable 
Domestic privately-owned firms Domestic state-owned firms 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-value 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-value 
Foreign presence 
(FDIkjt) 16.8727 6.5455 0.0100 -4.5425 10.5236 0.6660 
Firm size  
(lnSizeikjt) -0.0153 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0222 0.0263 0.3980 
Capital intensity 
(lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0240 0.0039 0.0000 -0.0052 0.0287 0.8560 
Competition level  
(Herfindahlkjt) 0.5634 0.2497 0.0240 -0.0460 0.8653 0.9580 
Gender wage gap 
(lnWageGapjt) -0.9431 0.2932 0.0010 0.5307 1.4628 0.7170 
Industry female 
intensity 
(lnIndFemalekt) 
4.6724 1.3296 0.0000 22.9142 52.1880 0.6610 
Regional dummies 
(dRegionj) 
Included   Included   
Industry dummies 
(dIndustryk) 
Included   Included   
Year dummies 
(dTimet) 
Included   Included   
LM statistic 20.0520 (0.0000) 3.0720 (0.2153) 
Hansen J statistic 0.2720 (0.6018) 1.9570 (0.1619) 
C-statistic 11.2160 (0.0008) 0.0060 (0.9405) 
F-statistic 30.9300 (0.0000) 1663.3600 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 70,891 539 
Notes: p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses; the estimations accounted for firm-fixed effects 
6.4.3.2 Small versus large firms  
Table 6.16 reports the estimation results of FDI-induced spillovers on local female 
employment given the size of domestic firms. Notably, FDI firms exert a positive and 
statistically significant impact on small firms. Accordingly, a one per cent increase in foreign 
presence induces small firms to push up average female-to-male labour ratio by 32.66 per cent 
(or equivalent to a 7.02 per cent increase in the share of women in total employment). The 
magnitude of FDI spillovers is much more pronounced compared to that of the average firms 
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in the professional service industry (i.e., 3.934 per cent). On the contrary, domestic large firms 
are not affected by the increased entry of FDI counterparts in determining gendered workforce 
composition. In fact, the findings for this industry (Table 6.14) and the entire sector (Table 
6.6) suggest that compared to large firms, small firms tend to employ higher rates of women. 
This might explain stronger incentives and capacity among small firms in learning and 
absorbing spillovers from FDI to enhance employment of female workers in their workforce.  
Table 6.16: FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment by size of domestic firms 
  
Variable 
Domestic small firms Domestic large firms 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-value 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error 
p-value 
Foreign presence 
(FDIkjt) 
32.6598 13.3284 0.0140 -2.9461 8.9831 0.7430 
Capital intensity 
(lnK_intensityikjt) -0.0081 0.0115 0.4800 0.0375 0.0048 0.0000 
Ownership structure 
(Ownikjt) -0.4616 0.3503 0.1880 0.0665 0.0932 0.4750 
Competition level  
(Herfindahlkjt) 1.1592 0.6049 0.0550 -0.1974 0.2488 0.4280 
Gender wage gap 
(lnWageGapjt) -1.1725 0.6818 0.0850 -0.7651 0.3587 0.0330 
Industry female 
intensity 
(lnIndFemalekt) 
6.4034 2.5142 0.0110 1.3019 1.7958 0.4680 
Regional dummies 
(dRegion) 
Included   Included   
Industry dummies 
(dIndustry) 
Included   Included   
Year dummies 
(dTime) 
Included   Included   
LM statistic 10.0320 (0.0066) 7.4440 (0.0242) 
Hansen J statistic 0.0090 (0.9237) 0.3050 (0.5810) 
C-statistic 17.7880 (0.0000) 0.0060 (0.8058) 
F-statistic 5.2900 (0.0000) 28.2900 (0.0000) 
No. of obs 30,646 40,784 
Notes: (i) A small firm has the size of less than or equal to the sample mean; (ii) A large firm has the 
size greater than the sample mean; (iii) p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses; (iv) the 
estimations accounted for firm-fixed effects. 
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter presents empirical results and relevant discussion for spillover effects from 
FDI firms to domestic firms’ female employment in Vietnam’s services sector. The overall 
sample shows that female-to-male labour ratios vary markedly across 15 two-digit service 
industries and six regions, suggesting heterogeneous gender mixture in the sector. In 
addition, privately-owned firms exhibit larger shares of women in total workforce than state-
owned counterparts. Notably, the sample shows higher female-to-male labour ratios by FDI 
firms, as compared to domestic firms in almost all two-digit industries and regions. The ratio 
in foreign firms is approximately 1.4 times and 1.2 times that of domestic counterparts at 
industry and region average, respectively.  
The estimation results indicate that the presence of FDI firms exerts a positive and 
statistically significant influence on domestic firms’ female employment in whole services 
sector. A one per cent increase in foreign presence induces domestic firms to raise the 
average female-to-male labour ratio by 2.18 per cent. Furthermore, the findings also suggest 
that smaller, privately-owned, more capital-intensive domestic firms tend to hire women 
more intensively. Increased industry competition and female intensity positively affect 
female employment among local firms in the sector. Service industries at the two-digit level 
differ substantially in many respects, including average female-to-male labour ratios. The 
scatterplots and econometric results suggest divergent patterns in FDI-linked spillovers on local 
female employment by industry female intensity level. While positive spillovers are found for 
domestic firms in male-intensive group, it is insignificant among female-intensive group. 
This chapter provide further insights for a female-intensive service industry (i.e., 
education) and for a male-intensive service industry (i.e., professional, scientific and technical 
services). There is insignificant impact from FDI firms to female employment of domestic 
education firms. Meanwhile, there is evidence of a positive and statistically significant effect 
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from FDI to domestic female employment in the professional service industry, with a one per 
cent increase in foreign presence leading to a 17.08 per cent increase female-to-male labour 
ratio (equivalent to a 3.93 per cent increase in the share of female workers). Extended analysis 
for the male-dominant service industry reveals that FDI-induced spillovers on local female 
employment is found only for privately-owned firms but not for state-owned ones. Besides, 
FDI firms exert a positive and statistically significant impact on domestic small firms but there 
is no evidence of such an effect on domestic large firms in the examined industry. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This final chapter concludes the thesis by firstly summarising key findings in Section 
7.2. This section sequentially present major results of the impacts of FDI firms on average 
wages and female employment of domestic firms in Vietnam’s services sector. Based on the 
empirical findings, Section 7.3 provides relevant implications for local workforce, firms and 
policymakers. Lastly, Section 7.4 discusses limitations of the thesis and future research 
directions.  
7.2 Key findings 
7.2.1 FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages 
The first two objectives of this thesis were to investigate, both theoretically and 
empirically, the impact of FDI firms on domestic firms’ wages. In Chapter 4, I constructed 
a theoretical model to illustrate channels via which the presence of foreign firms can 
influence average wage levels of domestic counterparts, resulting in so-called wage 
spillovers. The model indicates that foreign presence affects the expected average wage 
directly through productivity spillovers and indirectly through cut-off capability. These two 
channels exert contrasting forces so that if positive productivity spillovers take place, the 
direct effect of an increase in foreign presence on the domestic firm’s wage is positive. 
Whereas, the indirect effect is negative as it diminishes the cut-off capability, lowering the 
expected average wage. Hence, the net impact of FDI presence on the domestic firm average 
wage is conditional upon the relative strength of these two forces.  
Based on the theoretical setup, I specified the econometric model to empirically test and 
estimate spillover effects from FDI to domestic firms’ wages, using large panel datasets of 
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firms in Vietnam’s services sector over the period 2009-2013. Empirical results and analyses 
were presented in Chapter 5. Of these, key findings are summarised as follows: 
(iii) Not only do FDI firms pay much higher wages across 15 two-digit industries and 
six regions, they also induce domestic firms in Vietnam’s services sector to pay 
higher. The estimation results confirm the existence of positive wage spillovers 
from FDI with a one per cent increase in foreign presence in the industry-region 
causing domestic firms to raise average real wages by 1.15 per cent. 
(iv) The estimation results also suggest the importance of firm-and industry-specific 
characteristics in determining wages of domestic firms in the services sector.   
➢ Compared to small firms, large firms tend to pay higher with a one per cent 
increase in firm size resulting in a 0.07 per cent increase in its average real 
wage. 
➢ On average, privately-owned firms pay 0.19 per cent lower than state-owned 
counterparts in the entire sector. 
➢ Compared to newly established firms, well-established firms are more likely 
to offer higher wages with a one per cent increase in firm age causing 
domestic firms’ average real wage to rise by 0.04 per cent. 
➢ Input intensity also plays a significant role as a one per cent increase in capital 
intensity leading to a 0.05 per cent increase in average real wage. 
➢ Fierce competition in the product market tends to put upward pressure on 
wages with a one per cent increase in competitive pressure induces domestic 
firms to push up average real wage level by 1.10 per cent. 
(v) Both econometric results and scatterplots of the data indicate diverging patterns 
of FDI-linked wage spillovers by industry wage level. The analyses at the two-
digit VSIC level suggest that:   
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➢ FDI firms exert a positive and statistically significant effect on average real 
wages of domestic firms operating in high-wage service industries with a one 
per cent increase in foreign presence causing domestic firms in the high-wage 
group to raise average real wages by 3.34 per cent.  
➢ On the contrary, FDI-linked wage spillover effect is found to be negative and 
statistically significant in the low-wage group, with a one per cent increase in 
foreign presence lowering domestic firms’ average real wages by 0.85 per 
cent. 
(vi) Further analyses at the three-digit VSIC level reveal deeper insights for a high-
wage industry (i.e., financial, banking and insurance) and a low-wage industry 
(i.e., accommodation and food service). 
➢ The estimations show the existence of positive wage spillovers in the 
financial, banking and insurance industry with a one per cent increase in 
foreign presence resulting in the average real wages of domestic firms to go 
up by 4.65 per cent.  
➢ Meanwhile, the results indicate negative wage spillovers in the 
accommodation and food service industry with a one per cent increase in 
foreign presence lowering domestic firms’ average wages by 2.03 per cent. 
(vii) Enriched analyses shed light on the heterogeneity of FDI-linked wage spillovers 
in the low-wage industry of accommodation and food service. 
➢  Wage spillover effect only exists from FDI firms to domestic privately-
owned firms but not to state-owned counterparts.  
➢ Compared to large and well-established domestic firms, small and newly 
established domestic firms encounter more pronounced negative wage 
spillovers from FDI.  
172 
 
➢ FDI typologies also play an important role in influencing FDI-linked wage 
spillovers as fully foreign-owned firms show considerable impact whereas 
partially foreign-owned firms have insignificant impact. 
7.2.2 FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment 
The other two objectives of the thesis were devoted to theoretical and empirical 
examination of FDI impact on domestic firms’ female employment. To realise the third 
objective, in Chapter 4, I constructed a theoretical model to explain how foreign firms can 
influence domestic counterparts’ decisions in employing women. The model shows that FDI 
firms can affect domestic firms’ female employment (measured by female-to-male labour 
ratio), directly via augmented female productivity spillovers and indirectly via the cut-off 
effect. The two channels work contrastingly, namely if an increase in foreign presence results 
in positive asymmetric spillovers to the productivity of female workers, domestic firms tend 
to employ more females relative to males via the direct channel. Meanwhile, the positive 
productivity spillovers from FDI lower the cut-off capability, allowing less capable firms to 
enter the industry and thereby putting downward pressure on the expected female-to-male 
labour ratio. The net impact of foreign presence on domestic firms’ female employment 
depends on whether the direct channel dominates the indirect one or vice versa.  
Guided by the theoretical framework, I then specified the econometric model to 
empirically test and estimate spillover effects from FDI to domestic firms’ female 
employment, using large panel datasets of firms in Vietnam’s services sector during 2009-
2013 period. Empirical results and analyses were reported in Chapter 6. The main findings 
are summarised below: 
(i) The overall sector sample shows higher female-to-male labour ratios by FDI 
firms, as compared to domestic firms across two-digit service industries and 
regions. More importantly, the estimation results indicate that FDI firms exert a 
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positive and statistically significant influence on domestic firms’ female 
employment with a one per cent increase in foreign presence inducing domestic 
firms to raise the average female-to-male labour ratio by 2.18 per cent. 
(ii) The estimation results reveal the significant impact of control variables on 
female employment of domestic firms in Vietnam’s services sector.   
➢ Intense competition in the product market is likely to induce domestic firms 
in the sector to hire women more intensively, with a one per cent increase in 
competition level leading to a 0.63 per cent increase in the average female-
to-male-ratio. 
➢ Firms operate in female-intensive service industries tend to prefer to hire 
more women as the industry female intensity goes up by one per cent, 
domestic firms’ female-to-male labour ratios will rise by 0.21 per cent. 
➢ Gender wage gap has negligible impact on female-to-male labour ratios by 
domestic firms in the services sector. 
➢ Firm size has a statistically significant and negative impact, with a one per 
cent increase in the size of domestic firms causing a nearly 0.05 per cent 
decrease in their female-to-male labour ratios. 
➢ The more capital-intensive domestic firms are, the more female-intensive 
they are, with a one per cent increase in the capital intensity of domestic firms 
pushing up in their female-to-male ratios by 0.02 per cent increase. 
➢ Privately-owned firms tend to employ more females than state-owned firms 
with the difference in female-to-male labour ratio being 0.05 per cent. 
(iii)  The analyses at the two-digit VSIC level, including scatterplots of the data and 
econometric results, suggest differences in FDI impacts across two groups of 
female-intensive and male-intensive industries.  
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➢ For female-intensive group, the presence of FDI firms shows insignificant 
impact on the female employment of domestic firms.   
➢ For male-intensive group, FDI firms are found to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on domestic firms with a one per cent increase 
in foreign presence causing domestic firms in this group to boost average 
female-to-male labour ratio by 3.13 per cent. 
(iv) The analyses at the three-digit VSIC level provide further insights for a female-
intensive industry (i.e., education) and a male-intensive industry (i.e., 
professional, scientific and technical services). 
➢ The results indicate insignificant impact from FDI firms to female 
employment of domestic counterparts in the education industry. 
➢ Meanwhile, FDI firms are found to have a positive and statistically significant 
impact on domestic female employment in the professional service industry, 
with a one per cent increase in foreign presence leading to a 17.09 per cent 
increase female-to-male labour ratio (equivalently a 3.93 per cent increase in 
the share of female workers). 
(v) Extended estimations for the male-dominant professional service industry reveal 
that FDI-induced spillovers on local female employment is found only for 
privately owned firms but not for state-owned ones. Moreover, FDI firms exert 
a positive and statistically significant impact on small firms but there is no 
evidence of such an effect from foreign presence to domestic large firms. 
7.3 Implications 
7.3.1 Implications for local workforce 
The findings from this thesis can have significant implications for the workforce in the 
local labour market, particularly female labour force. At the sectoral average level, local 
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workers can expect to be better off from the growing presence of foreign firms in the services 
sector since FDI firms pay much higher and simultaneously induce domestic firms to pay 
higher. Apart from income improvement, local female workers can also expect to benefit 
from increased services FDI inflows as foreign firms in this sector are in favour of hiring 
women, and more importantly stimulating domestic counterparts to push up the employment 
of female workforce.  
Enriched analyses from the thesis carry deeper implications for local workers in the 
services sector. They are likely to experience widening wage gap and income inequality 
because rising foreign presence tends to push up wages of workers in the high-pay industries 
while dampening wages of workers in the low-pay industries. This outcome would worsen 
the income of the most vulnerable proportion of local workforce (i.e., those in low-wage 
activities). Regarding female workers, if they are currently working in female-intensive 
service industries, it is unlikely that they would find more employment opportunities in local 
firms due to stronger foreign presence. Whereas, female workers in male-intensive industries 
can expect to improve their employment prospect following increased services FDI inflows.  
The results of this research can provide meaningful implications for local workers, 
assisting their job decision making. If the primary objective is to earn high wages, those who 
are about to participate in the local labour market (e.g., university graduates) may choose to 
apply for jobs in the types of service firms/industries that pay higher and receive beneficial 
FDI-induced wage spillovers. For workers currently working in types of firms/industries 
negatively impacted by foreign presence, they may determine to switch to firm/industry 
types gaining positive wage spillovers. Regarding female workforce, university graduates 
can improve their employment prospect by self-selecting to enter male-intensive industries. 
For existing workers in female-intensive industries, they may also consider switching to 
male-intensive industries. It is, however, worth noting that the transition is likely to incur 
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switching costs if existing (female) workers are required to change or adapt their skill sets 
to work in other types of firms/industries.   
7.3.2 Implications for local firms 
The findings from this thesis have considerable implications for domestic firms in the 
local labour market. As compared to local workers, local firms could confront with 
contrasting and more challenging situations given the increased presence of FDI firms in the 
services sector. At the sectoral average level, positive FDI-induced wage spillovers imply 
upward pressure on domestic firms’ labour costs. For less financially capable firms, they 
may struggle to boost profitability due to growing foreign presence. Foreign firms, especially 
large multinationals, may poach the best workers (via higher wages) and drive up domestic 
firms’ production costs (via positive wage spillovers). Meanwhile, for more financially 
capable firms, the finding of positive wage spillovers from FDI presents a valuable 
opportunity to compete with foreign firms in the market. These local firms can strengthen 
competitiveness in attracting and retaining high-quality workforce via higher wages.  
Results from different levels of data aggregation reveal further implications for local 
firms. For domestic firms in low-pay service industries, the finding of negative wage 
spillovers from FDI is somewhat less detrimental (as compared to the worker perspective) 
since local firms encounter downward pressure on labour cost. Hence, they can take 
advantage of this impact to lower production costs and thereby gradually push up 
profitability in the long run. Whereas, domestic firms in high-pay industries should 
formulate viable compensation strategies since rising foreign presence will exert even 
stronger pressure on domestic wages. As local firms in high-pay industries may find it 
extremely competitive to attract and incentivise competent personnel via wage offers, they 
may choose to capitalise on non-wage forms of compensation (e.g., profit-sharing payments, 
promotion schemes, stock options, family-friendly benefits).    
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Furthermore, the findings carry strong implications for local firms that are in male-
intensive service industries to take proactive strategies in learning from FDI firms to 
stimulate the employment of female talent. Domestic firms should firstly conduct thorough 
analysis on existing gendered employment policies to identify potential of efficient labour 
utilisation and productivity. In this regard, they should take into account beneficial 
experience and competitive strategy of foreign counterparts in the industry and region.  
For the attraction and retention of women, local firms could learn from FDI firms to 
adopt changes in enhancing workplace practices. Of these, domestic firms could foster 
female-friendly policies, capturing key areas of childcare support, carers leave, flexible 
working arrangements, promotion prospect and professional development. Given the nature 
of male-intensive industries and the prevalence of gender stereotyping in the local economy, 
domestic firms’ managers at various levels must demonstrate strong and visionary leadership 
in changing workplace culture to promote female-friendly practices and realise female 
labour potential.    
7.3.3 Implications for local policymakers 
The findings from this research also have important implications for local governments 
concerning inward FDI and labour market. At the sectoral average level, positive impacts 
from FDI firms to wages and female employment of local service firms in Vietnam could 
justify massive incentives and efforts by the government so far to attract FDI inflows into 
the economy. Moreover, revealed findings provide policymakers with new perspectives on 
possible externalities of foreign firms. This would enable local governments to take informed 
decisions to optimise services FDI’s contributions to the host economy in the long run.  
If policymakers essentially aim to improve domestic firms’ wages and female 
employment prospect, they might seek to attract services FDI as well as strengthen linkages 
between domestic and foreign firms in the sector. To boost services FDI inflows, policies 
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should facilitate progressive removal of foreign entry barriers in major service industries, 
including telecommunication; transportation; finance and banking. This requires local 
governments to accelerate the privatisation of SOEs, reducing market distortion, and thereby 
encouraging FDI projects in the sector. Besides, policymakers would have to address other 
obstacles to attracting services FDI (as discussed in Chapter 2). These policies should 
prioritise to improve infrastructure (critical in logistics, telecommunication, tourism, and 
transportation investment), increase the supply of skilled labour specialised in services, 
simplify and strengthen legal system and regulations governing services investment and 
operation.  
Nonetheless, future policies regarding inward FDI and expected labour market 
outcomes in the services sector should be developed and implemented in a cautious and 
selective manner as the findings reveal heterogeneous effects at industry- and firm-levels. 
This means that one policy does not fit all. First, policy intervention related to FDI impact 
on wages and female employment might only be meaningful in the private sector as there is 
no evidence of foreign influence on domestic state-owned sector. Second, policy efforts 
should be directed towards domestic firms operating in low-wage service industries to 
mitigate adverse impact on the most vulnerable share of local workforce. Finally, policy 
intervention should focus on male-intensive service industries only if targeting to attract 
services FDI as a viable strategy to promote employment opportunities for the local female 
workforce. 
7.4 Limitations and future research 
While this thesis has accomplished stated research objectives and made both theoretical 
and empirical contributions to the existing literature, it has a number of limitations that need 
to be acknowledged. These limitations would be helpful for future research to enrich the 
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analysis, providing broader and deeper insights into potential FDI-linked impacts on the host 
labour market. 
First, given the availability of appropriate data, future work would be able to extend the 
empirical exercise by exploring the role of institutional labour market factors in influencing local 
wages and female employment as well as spillover channels. Potential variables might capture 
the possible impacts of unionisation and major supply/demand-side labour market reforms. 
Second, the econometric models left workers’ characteristics in error terms since they 
are unobserved. Given available data, it would be valuable to examine the influence of 
worker specific characteristics (e.g., skill, tenure, age, gender, occupation, marital status) on 
wages and female employment as well as the heterogeneity of FDI-linked impacts at worker-
level (i.e., what type of workers/female workers are more/less affected by foreign presence).  
Third, enriched analysis of FDI heterogeneity (e.g., entry mode of greenfield or 
acquisition, specific threshold of foreign equity, services export intensity) would help identify 
which groups of foreign firms can generate dominant spillovers in the host labour market. 
Fourth, data constraint did not allow the examination of competition and selection 
effects in interpreting findings on negative FDI impact in low-wage industries. It is possible 
that more productive, higher-paid workers self-select to move from domestic firms to 
multinationals. The availability of matched firm-worker dataset could enable future work to 
address this issue. 
Fifth, the theoretical and empirical models did not fully capture the impact of 
possible regional labour movement on local labour market and FDI-linked spillovers. Future 
work might explore adequate data and adopt relevant methodologies (e.g., spatial 
econometrics) to yield better insights into spatial interactions among firms across regions. 
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Appendices 
Table A2.1: Industry distribution of workers by educational attainment 
Service industry 
Educational attainment 
No formal 
degree 
(%) 
Vocational 
training 
degree (%) 
Bachelor 
degree 
(%) 
Advanced 
degree 
(%) 
Electricity, gas, stream and air 
conditioning supply 15.28 55.29 28.31 1.13 
Water supply, sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities 52.12 32.42 15.10 0.35 
Construction 56.92 30.17 12.54 0.36 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 32.36 42.04 24.83 0.78 
Transportation and storage 24.80 56.82 17.72 0.66 
Accommodation and food service 
activities 43.97 41.02 14.44 0.57 
Information and communication 7.10 39.21 51.10 2.59 
Financial and insurance activities 6.52 23.23 66.59 3.66 
Real estate activities 29.26 31.03 37.53 2.18 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 16.65 31.53 48.91 2.91 
Administrative and support service 
activities 50.38 32.09 16.91 0.62 
Education 8.53 30.77 51.76 8.94 
Human health and social work activities 8.16 57.55 26.85 7.44 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 45.36 34.17 19.91 0.56 
Other service activities 40.68 41.48 17.30 0.54 
Source: Calculations based on GSO’s enterprise survey 2012  
Table A2.2: Gender gap in educational attainment across service industries 
Service industry 
Gender gap in educational attainment 
(Male/Female) 
No formal 
degree 
(%) 
Vocational 
training 
degree (%) 
Bachelor 
degree 
(%) 
Advanced 
degree 
(%) 
Electricity, gas, stream and air 
conditioning supply 
81/19 83/17 79/21 78/22 
Water supply, sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities 
52/48 68/32 62/38 70/30 
Construction 84/16 81/19 75/25 83/17 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
68/32 60/40 60/40 68/32 
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Transportation and storage 82/18 79/21 60/40 79/21 
Accommodation and food service 
activities 
45/55 46/54 48/52 59/41 
Information and communication 61/39 65/35 63/37 73/27 
Financial and insurance activities 68/32 46/54 40/60 53/47 
Real estate activities 70/30 63/37 59/41 75/25 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 
74/26 66/34 66/34 75/25 
Administrative and support service 
activities 
69/31 69/31 51/49 60/40 
Education 46/54 45/55 38/62 56/44 
Human health and social work 
activities 
40/60 27/73 48/52 62/38 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 49/51 50/50 51/49 61/39 
Other service activities 54/46 47/53 59/41 65/35 
Source: Calculations based on GSO’s Enterprise Survey 2012 
Table A2.3: Gender gap in average wages across service industries 
Service industry 
Average wages (million VND/month) 
Total  Male Female 
Male/female 
wage gap 
Electricity, gas, stream and air conditioning supply 5,253 5,345 4,733 1.13 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities 
3,769 4,239 3,037 1.40 
Construction 3,369 3,403 3,067 1.11 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
3,774 3,928 3,521 1.12 
Transportation and storage 4,660 4,694 4,443 1.06 
Accommodation and food service activities 3,248 3,845 2,880 1.34 
Information and communication 5,880 6,014 5,643 1.07 
Financial and insurance activities 6,855 6,823 6,880 0.99 
Real estate activities 6,973 7,549 5,869 1.29 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 5,814 5,953 5,575 1.07 
Administrative and support service activities 4,765 4,564 3,569 1.28 
Education 4,260 4,681 4,083 1.15 
Human health and social work activities 4,422 5,121 4,060 1.26 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 3,852 4,080 3,583 1.14 
Other service activities 2,795 2,946 2,628 1.12 
Source: Calculations based on GSO’s Labour Force Survey 2012 
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Table A5.1: First stage regression – Wage spillovers for the whole sector 
Variable 
Dependent variable (FDIkjt) 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard error 
p-value 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) 0.0003 0.00002 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) -0.0018 0.0006 0.0020 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) 0.0003 0.00006 0.0000 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) -0.0006 0.00003 0.0000 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0780 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) 0.1482 0.0082 0.0000 
Instrumental variable 1 (IV1) 0.3597 0.0028 0.0000 
Instrumental variable 2 (IV2) -0.0497 0.0009 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Included   
Year dummies (dTimet) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
19622.3600 (0.0000) 
Model significance test 
(F-statstic) 
11106.0000 (0.0000) 
     Note: p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Table A5.2: Summary statistics – Wage spillover estimation for the financial, 
banking and insurance industry 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average wage (𝑙𝑛𝑤) 7,556 3.3025 0.8883 -1.4524 6.7689 
Foreign presence (FDI) 7,884 0.0501 0.0824 0.0000 0.8793 
Firm size (lnSize) 7,536 6.5970 2.9831 -0.4177 18.3505 
Ownership structure (Own) 7,556 0.9602 0.1956 0 1 
Firm age (lnAge) 7,311 1.7732 0.8687 0.0000 7.6079 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 6,321 3.4916 1.4885 -3.3496 10.8553 
Technology gap (TechGap) 6,434 2499.418 13899.67 -1034988 8334 
Competition (Herfindahl) 7,884 0.1065 0.0968 0.0266 1.0000 
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Table A5.3: Correlation matrix – Wage spillover estimation for the financial, banking 
and insurance industry 
  FDI lnSize Own lnAge lnK_intensity TechGap Herfindahl 
FDI 1       
lnSize 0.0945 1      
Own -0.0254 -0.3837 1     
lnAge 0.0081 0.2976 -0.121 1    
lnK_intensity -0.1146 0.2392 -0.1483 -0.0179 1   
TechGap 0.0251 -0.1768 0.065 0.0973 -0.1472 1  
Herfindahl 0.1197 -0.1332 -0.0795 -0.0093 -0.1513 0.001 1 
 
Table A5.4: Collinearity measures – Wage spillover estimation for the financial, 
banking and insurance industry 
Regressor 
Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) 
Square Root of the 
VIF (SQRT VIF) 
Tolerance 
FDI 1.05 1.02 0.9544 
lnSize 1.44 1.20 0.6949 
Own 1.21 1.10 0.8291 
lnAge 1.14 1.07 0.8802 
lnK_intensity 1.12 1.06 0.8907 
TechGap 1.07 1.04 0.9322 
Herfindahl 1.08 1.04 0.9286 
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Table A5.5: First stage regression – Wage spillovers for the financial, banking 
and insurance industry 
Variable 
Dependent variable (FDIkjt) 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard error 
p-value 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) 0.0023 0.0012 0.0670 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) -0.0063 0.0060 0.3010 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) 0.0051 0.0023 0.0280 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0017 0.0012 0.1650 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.5270 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) 0.0287 0.0239 0.2310 
Instrumental variable 1 (IV1) -0.3791 0.0520 0.0000 
Instrumental variable 2 (IV2) 0.1127 0.0175 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Included   
Year dummies (dTimet) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
60.6100 (0.0000) 
Model significance test 
(F-statstic) 
32.1900 (0.0000) 
     Note: p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses. 
 Table A5.6: Summary statistics – Wage spillover estimation for the 
accommodation and food service industry 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average wage (𝑙𝑛𝑤) 33,211 2.7876 0.5279 -4.2658 6.5977 
Foreign presence (FDI) 33,738 0.1334 0.0981 0.0000 0.3801 
Firm size (lnSize) 33,195 6.2469 1.7391 -1.5578 14.6265 
Ownership structure (Own) 33,211 0.9860 0.1175 0 1 
Firm age (lnAge) 32,313 1.4383 0.7505 0.0000 4.1897 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 24,970 3.8370 1.8750 -4.1825 11.3806 
Technology gap (TechGap) 32,694 154.0922 660.7731 -99427.35 590.0299 
Competition (Herfindahl) 33,738 0.0288 0.0723 0.0059 0.6347 
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Table A5.7: Correlation matrix – Wage spillover estimation for the 
accommodation and food service industry 
  FDI lnSize Own lnAge lnK_intensity TechGap Herfindahl 
FDI 1       
lnSize -0.1239 1      
Own -0.0313 -0.2246 1     
lnAge 0.0983 0.2195 -0.1569 1    
lnK_intensity 0.0407 -0.0174 -0.0843 0.1481 1   
TechGap 0.0804 -0.2056 0.0038 0.0213 0.0421 1  
Herfindahl -0.1635 0.0527 0.0156 -0.0982 -0.077 -0.1018 1 
 
Table A5.8: Collinearity measures – Wage spillover estimation for the 
accommodation and food service industry 
Regressor 
Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) 
Square Root of the 
VIF (SQRT VIF) 
Tolerance 
FDI 1.06 1.03 0.9443 
lnSize 1.18 1.08 0.8497 
Own 1.08 1.04 0.9293 
lnAge 1.11 1.06 0.8976 
lnK_intensity 1.03 1.02 0.9662 
TechGap 1.06 1.03 0.9433 
Herfindahl 1.05 1.02 0.9545 
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Table A5.9: First stage regression – Wage spillovers for the accommodation 
and food service industry 
Variable 
Dependent variable (FDIkjt) 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust 
standard error 
p-value 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) -0.0011 0.0003 0.0010 
Ownership structure (Ownikjt) 0.0025 0.0033 0.4500 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) 0.00004 0.0006 0.9520 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) -0.0005 0.0003 0.0650 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) -0.00002 0.0000 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) -0.0374 0.0270 0.1650 
Instrumental variable 1 (IV1) -0.0676 0.0024 0.0000 
Instrumental variable 2 (IV2) 0.0029 0.0012 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Included   
Year dummies (dTimet) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
665.8600 (0.0000) 
Model significance test 
(F-statstic) 
387.7800 (0.0000) 
     Note: p-values for tests statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table A5.10:  Main estimation results of FDI-linked wage spillovers in the 
wholesale and retail industry 
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Foreign presence (FDIkjt) -4.4886 0.8562 0.0000 
Firm size (lnSizeikjt) 0.0444 0.0011 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Ownkjt) -0.1251 0.0509 0.0200 
Firm age (lnAgeikjt) 0.0640 0.0036 0.0000 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensityikjt) 0.0636 0.0014 0.0000 
Technology gap (TechGapikjt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 
Competition (Herfindahlkjt) 0.2664 0.0639 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegionj) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustryk) Included   
Year dummies (dTimet) Included   
Endogeneity test  30.764*** 
First-stage F-test  
Underidentification test 
587.260*** 
583.576*** 
Model significance test  513.570*** 
Endogeneity test  30.764*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p<0.1; estimation is based on an alternative approach to construct IVs, also 
known as a ‘shift-share’ or ‘supply-push’ approach (Bartik, 1991; McLaren & Yoo, 2017; Moretti, 
2010).  
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Table A6.1: First stage regression – Female employment model for the whole sector 
Variable 
Dependent variable (FDIkjt) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Firm size (lnSize) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) -0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Own) -0.0019 0.0006 0.0010 
Competition level (Herfindahl) 0.1677 0.0071 0.0000 
Gender wage gap (lnWageGap) -0.2510 0.0032 0.0000 
Industry female intensity (lnIndFemale) -0.0396 0.0006 0.0000 
Instrumental variable 1 (IV1) -0.0753 0.0022 0.0000 
Instrumental variable 2 (IV2) 0.0054 0.0002 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustry) Included   
Year dummies (dTime) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
4229.9900 (0.0000) 
Model significance test 
(F-statstic) 
2186.6700 (0.0000) 
     Note: p-values for the tests statistics are in parentheses. 
Table A6.2: Correlation matrix – Female employment model for the education 
industry 
  FDI lnSize lnK_intensity Own Herfindahl lnWageGap lnIndFemale 
FDI 1 
      
lnSize 0.152 1 
     
lnK_intensity -0.0939 -0.0006 1 
    
Own 0.0117 -0.008 -0.0171 1 
   
Herfindahl 0.2995 0.0889 -0.0314 0.015 1 
  
lnWageGap 0.2812 0.0845 -0.0806 0.0106 0.1159 1 
 
lnIndFemale 0.0494 0.1075 0.085 -0.0287 -0.4914 -0.0127 1 
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Table A6.3: Collinearity measures – Female employment model for the education industry 
Regressor 
Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) 
Square Root of the 
VIF (SQRT VIF) 
Tolerance 
FDI 1.26 1.12 0.7910 
lnSize 1.05 1.03 0.9514 
lnK_intensity 1.02 1.01 0.9772 
Own 1.00 1.00 0.9987 
Herfindahl 1.56 1.25 0.6422 
lnWageGap 1.09 1.05 0.9150 
lnIndFemale 1.44 1.20 0.6923 
Table A6.4: First stage regression – Female employment model for the education 
industry 
Variable 
Dependent variable (FDIkjt) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Firm size (lnSize) 0.0013 0.0011 0.2370 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) -0.0046 0.0007 0.0000 
Ownership structure (Own) 0.0141 0.0199 0.4800 
Competition level (Herfindahl) -0.0390 0.0521 0.4540 
Gender wage gap (lnWageGap) -0.1722 0.1196 0.1500 
Industry female intensity (lnIndFemale) -0.0987 0.0096 0.0000 
Instrumental variable 1 (IV1) -0.0682 0.0214 0.0010 
Instrumental variable 2 (IV2) 0.0244 0.0061 0.0000 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustry) Included   
Year dummies (dTime) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
22.4000 (0.0000) 
Model significance test 
(F-statstic) 
10.6700 (0.0000) 
     Note: p-values for the tests statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
203 
 
Table A6.5: Correlation matrix – Female employment model for the 
professional, scientific and technical service industry 
  FDI lnSize lnK_intensity Own Herfindahl lnWageGap lnIndFemale 
FDI 1 
      
lnSize 0.152 1 
     
lnK_intensity -0.0939 -0.0006 1 
    
Own 0.0117 -0.008 -0.0171 1 
   
Herfindahl 0.2995 0.0889 -0.0314 0.015 1 
  
lnWageGap 0.2812 0.0845 -0.0806 0.0106 0.1159 1 
 
lnIndFemale 0.0494 0.1075 0.085 -0.0287 -0.4914 -0.0127 1 
Table A6.6: Collinearity measures – Female employment model for the professional, 
scientific and technical service industry 
Regressor 
Variance inflation 
factor (VIF) 
Square Root of the 
VIF (SQRT VIF) 
Tolerance 
FDI 1.26 1.12 0.7910 
lnSize 1.05 1.03 0.9514 
lnK_intensity 1.02 1.01 0.9772 
Own 1.00 1.00 0.9987 
Herfindahl 1.56 1.25 0.6422 
lnWageGap 1.09 1.05 0.9150 
lnIndFemale 1.44 1.20 0.6923 
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Table A6.7: First stage regression – Female employment model for the professional, 
scientific and technical service industry 
Variable 
Dependent variable (FDIkjt) 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard Error 
p-value 
Firm size (lnSize) -0.00002 0.00008 0.8150 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 0.0001 0.0001 0.1870 
Ownership structure (Own) -0.0052 0.0036 0.1530 
Competition level (Herfindahl) -0.0235 0.0068 0.0010 
Gender wage gap (lnWageGap) 0.0086 0.0105 0.4110 
Industry female intensity (lnIndFemale) -1.1934 0.0151 0.0000 
Instrumental variable 1 (IV1) -0.0085 0.0028 0.0000 
Instrumental variable 2 (IV2) 0.0051 0.0069 0.4660 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Included   
Industry dummies (dIndustry) Included   
Year dummies (dTime) Included   
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 
19.5000 (0.0001) 
Model significance test 
(F-statstic) 
9.7600 (0.0001) 
     Note: p-values for the tests statistics are in parentheses. 
 
